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Briefing to Portfolio Committee on Police SAPS Restructuring/Reorganisation 1 June 2010

Briefing to Portfolio Committee on Police SAPS Restructuring/Reorganisation 1 June 2010 Johan Burger & Bilkis Omar Crime and Justice Programme INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES. Reasons for and concerns with restructuring & redeployment Comparing the trends (police expansion & crime)

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Briefing to Portfolio Committee on Police SAPS Restructuring/Reorganisation 1 June 2010

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  1. Briefing to Portfolio Committee on Police SAPS Restructuring/Reorganisation 1 June 2010 Johan Burger & Bilkis Omar Crime and Justice Programme INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES

  2. Reasons for and concerns with restructuring • & redeployment • Comparing the trends (police expansion & crime) • Research focus & methodology • Key findings • SANAB (anti-drug unit) • ACU (anti-corruption unit) • SVC units (serious & violent crimes) • FCS units (family and child abuse) • CCU’s (public order policing) • Concluding remarks & recommendations Presentation Outline www.issafrica.org

  3. SAPS reasons: • Area level not in line with section 205 • (1) of the Constitution (3 tiers of Govt) • Area level created a duplication of • functions & acted as a post office • Senior and experienced members were • concentrated at Provincial & Area levels • Need to strengthen police stations SAPS reasons for re-structuring and redeployment www.issafrica.org

  4. Specialised units were disbanded and their members were ‘migrated’ to the various Accounting and Priority Stations • Specialisation would be weakened as members • would be overwhelmed by other investigation • demands • Organisational expertise would be reduced due • to the loss of dedicated specialist personnel • It would reduce the organisation’s ability to • produce replacements • Loss of esprit de corps & negative impact on • morale Concerns with restructuring www.issafrica.org

  5. Comparing the trends Murder 1994 - 2009 Police expansion 2004 - 2012 Assault GBH & Assault common Att Murder Police budget 2003/04 - 2010/11 Trio crimes www.issafrica.org

  6. The research was guided by two primary • questions: • What was the impact of the restructuring • initiative on the service delivery of the SAPS? • 2. What are the lessons to be learned from the • SAPS’ approach to restructuring/reorganisation? Research Questions www.issafrica.org

  7. Specialised Units: • Serious & Violent Crimes Unit (SVC); Family • Violence, Child Protection & Sexual Offences • Unit (FCS); Crime Combating Units • Add SANAB, Anti-Corruption Unit, Murder & • Robbery Unit • Area Commissioner’s offices • Accounting stations • Cluster Commanders Research focus www.issafrica.org

  8. Initial request to conduct research denied by • SAPS (July 2008). Reason given - not enough • time to determine success & research • methodology not clear • Alternative methodology therefore adopted – i.e. • interviews with former members of these units & • other senior members • Assess other research reports and available • official documents Research methodology www.issafrica.org

  9. Four provinces visited: Northern Cape; • Western Cape; Gauteng; & KwaZulu-Natal • Interviews conducted with former members of • Anti-Corruption Unit; SVC Unit; SANAB; and • various other senior officers (incl PC’s; Prov • Heads of Detectives; etc) • Refer to FCS Report by RAPCAN, 2009 • Refer to Monograph on Crime Combating Units • (Omar, 2007) & updated information Research methodology(contd) www.issafrica.org

  10. South African Narcotics Bureau (SANAB) • Phased out between 2000 – 2004 and • functions taken over by Organised Crime Unit & • (until 2006) Station Task Teams • Official reasons: To enhance detective capability • to fight organised crime more effectively & to • improve service delivery at station level • Reasons according to members: Perceptions of • corruption within SANAB & lack of transformation Key findings www.issafrica.org

  11. Impact of restructuring – SANAB • Increase in drug related crime arrests (49 839 • in 2000 to 117 172 in 2009) more as a result of • increase in drug trade than restructuring (UN • Report on Drugs and Crime states SA is by far • the largest market for illicit drugs in Southern • Africa) • Ex-SANAB members argue that street level drug • trade became neglected and there is a noticeable • increase in drugs such as cocaine and ecstasy Key findings www.issafrica.org

  12. Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) • Established 1996 - closed down 2003. Functions • taken over by the Org Crime Unit and stations • Official reasons: Corruption is an organised • crime function and police corruption • was decreasing • Reasons according to members: ‘Investigations • had identified suspects linked to senior national • police officials’ Key findings www.issafrica.org

  13. Impact of restructuring on the ACU • Corruption related to organised crime investigated • by OCU – all other corruption investigated at • station level – intelligence gathering placed with • Crime Intelligence – ‘the function ceased’! • Corruption within SAPS investigated in a • haphazard manner by various agencies • Dedicated police anti-corruption capability was • lost & no single source of information to assess • the scale of the problem Key findings www.issafrica.org

  14. ‘Restructuring led to loss of expertise in a • unique and complicated area of investigation’ • Public Service Commission Report (PSC) on • corruption (2000) found that ‘uncertainty around • restructuring is impacting on the morale and • effectiveness of the Unit’ [ACU] & dedicated staff • were declining while number of corruption cases • were increasing • Corruption remains a substantial problem • plaguing the SAPS Key findings www.issafrica.org

  15. Serious and Violent Crimes Unit (SVC) • Unit established in 2002 by integrating various • smaller units such Murder & Robbery • In 2006 restructuring led to decentralisation of • SVC to 169 Priority Stations – approximately two • members per station • Official reasons: Decentralising expertise to • station level will improve service delivery Key findings www.issafrica.org

  16. Impact of restructuring on SVCs • Police members perceived ongoing restructuring • as demonstrating uncertainty by police manage- • ment and impacted negatively on morale • SVC detectives at some stations became over- • burdened with general investigations and the • specialised detective function became diluted • Loss of expertise and a weakened ability to • produce new specialists/experts Key findings www.issafrica.org

  17. Family Violence, Child Protection & Sexual Offences Unit (FCS) • Established in 1996 (gradual incorp. of some Child • Protection Units depending on resources, etc) • By 2006 - 49 FCS units and 17 CPU’s • Initially FCS attached to Org Crime Unit, in 2004 • moved to General Investigations and in 2006 • decentralised to Accounting Stations (approx 6 p/s) • Reasons and impact largely similar to those for • SVC units Key findings www.issafrica.org

  18. The restructuring had a profound impact on both victims and personnel responsible for these services. No longer a national pattern that demonstrates dedicated officers, dedicated resources, and specialised management for cases within the FCS mandate(page v) Key findings (From aRAPCAN Report, 2009, Raising the Bar: A Review of the SAPS Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Units) www.issafrica.org

  19. Current system for delivery of FCS services a reversal of historical developments aimed at offering a skilled & specialised service to complainants in FCS-related cases • Policy objective to prioritise crimes against women and children cannot be realised under the new structure • Services devolved to local level without articulated national strategy, specialised management and oversight, and dedicated budgets and resources Some key conclusions (RAPCAN report) www.issafrica.org

  20. Restructuring resulted in confusion and • uncertainty (internally and externally) • Result was the placement of staff that: • (1) were not suitably trained • (2) were not suitably experienced • (3) did not undergo special screening or selection • (4) did not elect to work on FCS cases • (5) did not have some of the basic requirements to do • the job, e.g. drivers licences • Resulted also in demoralisation and demoti- • vation of FCS members Some key conclusions (RAPCAN report) www.issafrica.org

  21. SA is out of step with comparable countries in shifting away from specialised services • Inter-sectoral collaboration with stakeholders required to deliver essential services has suffered • Victims have been impacted on negatively and currently exposed to services of questionable quality in many areas Some key conclusions (RAPCAN report) www.issafrica.org

  22. Crime Combating Units (CCU’s) • Or Public Order Police Units (POP’s) • POP’s established during mid-90’s for crowd • management and underwent restructuring in • 2001 and 2006 • In 2000/01 POP mandate was adapted to crime • combating (with crowd control as a secondary • function) • Official reason was that crime was increasing & • public protests were decreasing – also that this • was part of a plan to strengthen fight against • crime and improve service delivery at local level Key findings www.issafrica.org

  23. POP units were renamed Area Crime Com- • bating Units (ACCU’s) & in 2006 CCU’s • Between 2001 – 2005 violent crowd manage- • ment incidents increased from 632 to 932 • & peaceful incidents from 7 281 to 9 230 • With restructuring in 2006, 50% of personnel • were redeployed to stations and other units & • 20 of the 43 units were closed down Key findings www.issafrica.org

  24. Impact of restructuring - CCUs • In 2008 during xenophobic violence CCU’s • were not able to manage the situation alone • and the military had to be asked to assist • Result was that former members of CCU’s • had to be recalled and SAPS were forced into a • process of rebuilding these units • Restructuring resulted in work overload, longer • travel distances, low morale and poor team spirit • Many of the good and experienced members of • these units have since resigned because of • frustration with ongoing restructuring Key findings www.issafrica.org

  25. Comparing the trends Murder 1994 - 2009 Police expansion 2001 - 2012 Assault GBH & Assault common Att Murder Police budget 2003/04 - 2010/11 Trio crimes www.issafrica.org

  26. This study revealed that although intentions may be • good, restructuring is undertaken without adequate • research (i.e. pilot or impact studies), a clear strategy • and meaningful external and internal consultation • When problems occur within a unit, it should be • addressed without necessarily having to close down • the unit • Uncertainty resulting from ongoing and staff experiences • of random change leads to despondency, dissatisfaction, • low morale and loss of efficiency and effectiveness Concluding remarks www.issafrica.org

  27. A clear strategy for police reform over 3 to 5 years • should be developed as part of a White Paper policy • process • The strategy should be developed by teams of highly • experienced police officials and civilians with proven • experience in effective change management • It should be informed by best policing practices both • locally and internationally • Clear & detailed links should be made between the • strategy and expected results and not simply assumed Recommendations www.issafrica.org

  28. The strategy should be broadly consulted on both within • and outside of the police (SAPS members, Unions, civil • society, other government departments) • All concerns should be considered and meaningfully • addressed • Where restructuring is broadly agreed as being required • it should be piloted and tested before being rolled out • Implementation should be independently assessed and • reported on to the Minister and parliament Recommendations(Contd) www.issafrica.org

  29. Thank you/Baie dankie : www.issafrica.org : +27 12 346 9500 : +27 12 346 4569 : jburger@issafrica.org

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