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ARTEFACTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS, DEPICTION and an example in Robot-usable models of visual consciousness Igor Aleksander Inte

ARTEFACTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS, DEPICTION and an example in Robot-usable models of visual consciousness Igor Aleksander Intelligent and Interactive Systems group Imperial College London. Main Points: Inner Depiction: what is it? What isn’t it? What else? (5 what elses)

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ARTEFACTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS, DEPICTION and an example in Robot-usable models of visual consciousness Igor Aleksander Inte

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  1. ARTEFACTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS, DEPICTION and an example in Robot-usable models of visual consciousness Igor Aleksander Intelligent and Interactive Systems group Imperial College London

  2. Main Points: • Inner Depiction: what is it? What isn’t it? • What else? (5 what elses) • What do you need to know to accuse an artefact of maybe being conscious? • Why is this not GOFAI or GOFANN? • The example: not ultimate but embryonic. • A philosophical missile shield.

  3. Inner Depiction: what is it? What isn’t it? • It is thepattern of firing activity of asubset of cellsin a massive, structured cellular system (the system also possesses non-depictive cells) which has….. • ….. (some):1 correspondence with the world relative to the observer • …. a (some):1 correspondence with the elements of immediate sensation and this defines‘what the artefact is conscious of’ at any time. • It is nota symbolic encoding of world events, but as accurate as possible a model of world events. • It is not a 2-D picture in the head .

  4. Aleksander & Dunmall: An extention to the hypothesis of visual conciousness. Proc R Soc Lond B (2000) 267, 197-200 Velmans: ‘Understanding Consciousness’ - Routledge 2000 Aleksander: ‘How to build a mind’ Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000 NRM: www.sonnet.co.uk/nts

  5. What else? (5 what elses) • Necessary abstract conditions for an artefact to be considered as potentially conscious. • 1. Perceptual:Possession of a mechanism that depicts the material world from the point of view of the organism, using all available sensory modalities. Note gaze-locking in primate vision. • 2. Reflexive:The depiction is of an ‘out there’ world which requires action to be reached: i.e. the motor effort is part of the depiction. • 3. Imaginational:Supepositional recall of past depictions in function of the current depiction. • 4. Active: The ability to map depiction to action conditionally on current depiction. • 5. Predictive: Ability to predict changes that result from action depictively.

  6. What do you need to know to accuse an artefact of maybe being conscious? • Judging behaviouris not it! • Introspection is not helpful in defining what we are looking for. • I suggest looking for depictive ability in the mechanism including the 5 constraints. No depictive mechanisms, no opportunity for consciousness.

  7. Why is this not GOFAI or GOFANN? Depiction implies... Fine granularity within depictive modules with each grain a state variable of a dynamic system. (NOT GOFAI) An evolved architecture of specialised modules to cope with many streams of sensory input, depictional areas and output action. (NOT GOFAI) Knowledge coded by learning of state trajectories in this evolved architecture: in GOFANN it is thought to be coded in weight matrices. (Depictional systems could be achieved with GOFANN, but this has been too weight-fixated - our models are weightless).

  8. The example: not ultimate but embryonic.

  9. The example: not ultimate but embryonic. Note... possible transfer to robots

  10. A philosophical missile shield. Velmans’ idea of reflexive consciousness (functional activity that has out-thereness) is supported by depiction. Inner sensation in an artefact cannot be distinguished from Depiction and depiction is technologically achievable. Even in human beings, others depict whereas I am conscious.

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