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The Global Financial Crisis and the Difficulties of the Economic Development  in

International Conference "Inter-regional Banking Cooperation: Solid Financial Future ” Baku, 26 - 30 May, 2010. The Global Financial Crisis and the Difficulties of the Economic Development  in the Central Caucasian Countries By Vladimer Papava. The Contemporary Global Financial Crisis.

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The Global Financial Crisis and the Difficulties of the Economic Development  in

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  1. International Conference "Inter-regional Banking Cooperation: Solid Financial Future”Baku, 26 - 30 May, 2010 The Global Financial Crisis and the Difficulties of the Economic Development  in the Central Caucasian Countries By Vladimer Papava

  2. The Contemporary Global Financial Crisis • The first signs of the crisis appeared in the US financial system in the summer of 2007. • It expanded to Western Europe and Japan and reached all developing countries and economies in transition by the end of 2008. • The progression of the modern financial crisis: there was a mortgage crisis at the start which grew into a banking crisis which led in turn to an industrial crisis.

  3. The Financial-Cum-Economic Crisis • The contemporary financial crisis has transformed into economic crisis. • The root of the present crisis (which is labelled as a “credit crisis”) one should be connected to the overproduction of debts. • Others suggest that the modern crisis is nothing unique but is actually the result of the previous situation of an overproduction of goods and services at the expense of future incomes which sometimes were not received at all.

  4. A Short-Term Perspective • In a short-term perspective, the existence of the overproduction of debts is apparent. • The financing of the current consumption took place by means of loans which were extended on the account of some future – but not always realistic and reasonable – incomes.

  5. A Long-Term Perspective • Due to the current incomes being tied-up with consumption in the past, the future incomes can hardly be used for consumption in the corresponding period of time. • The cost of goods and services to be produced in the future is higher than the buying capacity of incomes raised in the corresponding period. Consequently, in a long-term perspective the effect of the overproduction of goods and services also becomes apparent.

  6. “Leader” and “Outsider” Countries • Key objectives, and the ways in which to achieve by the post-Communist countries differ according to the extent they overcame the Communist past (as “leader” countries) or to what extent they are enslaved by their Communist heritage (as “outsider” countries). • “Leader” countries are the members of the EU.

  7. Necroeconomics • The dead enterprises which the “outsider” countries received as their legacy of the command economy have proven to be quite “tenacious of life.” • The market economies of “outsider” countries have been hampered by the burden of a necroeconomy.

  8. Zombie-Economy • The occurrence of financial crises has initiated a government’s bailout programmes implemented thorough the banking sector in support of de-facto bankrupt firms. • A network of zombie-banks and zombie-firms develops upon which the entire system of a zombie-economy rests.

  9. Economy’s Zombie-ing in the “Outsider” Countries • The zombie-ing has a great deal to do with a necroeconomy which is a factor that will make it rather difficult to improve an economy’s health after the end of the financial crisis. • As a rule, governments are interested in artificially maintaining the employment level, so they try to make such a decision which will facilitate keeping insolvent companies and banks in business under the circumstances of economic crisis.

  10. Post-Crisis Difficulties • There are many cases of companies and banks becoming insolvent during the economic crisis although it is very difficult for a government to make a political decision and put into effect the bankruptcy legislation by initiating its activation. • It is of great importance the extent to which a government will go to continue supporting insolvent companies and banks in the post-crisis period and to what extent it will facilitate simplifying the bankruptcy procedures.

  11. The Central Caucasian Countries • Unfortunately, the Central Caucasian countries – Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia – are “outsider” countries. • Although financial markets are not well-developed in the countries of the Central Caucasus, even these countries could not escape any negative implications of the global financial crisis.

  12. Azerbaijan: the Least Damage • There is a broad consensus over the fact that Azerbaijan has suffered the least damage from the global financial crisis as compared to the other countries of the post-Soviet world. • Azerbaijan’s ability to cope with the global financial crisis easier is fuelled by the following two factors: the underdevelopment of its financial sector and the domination of the oil and gas sector in the national economy.

  13. Azerbaijan: the Necroeconomic Hardships • The particular hardships have been suffered by necroeconomic enterprises; specifically, the steel, aluminium and chemical industries. • The overall growth of industrial output in Azerbaijan made up 103.9 percent during the eight months of 2009 as compared to the same period in 2008. • The production rate of the non-oil sector for the same period of 2009 comprised only 94.3 percent of the similar indicator for the same period in 2008.

  14. Azerbaijan: A Package of Anti-Crisis Measures • The preventive steps against the artificial growth of prices on the consumer market; • The depositing of the foreign currency reserves which are kept abroad in the most reliable of local banks and ensuring reliable governmental control over the investing of these resources in the real sector of economy; • Enhancing assistance to export-oriented enterprises, increasing the volume of privileged loans to businessmen and intensifying the government’s support of agriculture, etc.

  15. Georgia: New Challenges • The five-day Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. • Negative impact of the global financial crisis. • Domestic roots of the economic crisis.

  16. Domestic Roots of the Economic Crisis • The inflow of financial resources substantially exceeded the real sector’s growth rates. • The construction sector became dominated by “financial pyramids.” • Banks incremented their lending resources basically by accumulating cheap resources from European financial markets with the majority of such resources having been lent for construction and acquisition of consumer goods of which 100 percent are imported in Georgia.

  17. Donor Support At the conference held in Brussels under the aegis of the World Bank in October 2008, it was decided to allocate USD 4.55 billion in financial aid for post-war Georgia of which USD 2 billion is a grant and the remainder a loan. Georgia will receive these funds during 2008-2010 and a major part of it will be spent for the liquidation of economic damage caused to Georgia by the Russian military aggression.

  18. “New Financial Package” The “Package” is targeted to strengthen the banking and construction sectors: • Issue of the treasury bills; • The issuance by the Tbilisi City Hall of financial guarantees to construction companies as a means of encouraging banks to lend money to the construction companies which will then be spent for the renovation of the old sections of the capital.

  19. The Threat of Zombie-ing • The government is not going to finance necroeconomic facilities. • The Government is going to provide financial assistance to the construction companies many of which represent “financial pyramids.” This is nothing else but a step towards the zombie-ing of those construction companies and also of those banks which will be extending loans to such construction companies owing to the financial guarantees from Tbilisi’s City Hall.

  20. Armenia: New Difficulties • In the absence of any serious deposits of natural resources, the global financial crisis had a very serious negative impact. • The country was also gravely affected by the Russian-Georgian war. According to official sources, the direct and indirect damage caused to Armenia by the war is estimated to amount to USD 700 million.

  21. Industrial Sector • As was expected, the crisis hit the country’s industrial sector in the first place wherein the enterprises of necroeconomy are concentrated. • In 2008, the production rate in metallurgical and chemical industries fell to 9.6 and 14.8 percent, respectively, as compared to 2007.

  22. Armenian Anti-Crisis Programme The main goal of the anti-crisis programme is to attract the funds of non-residents, particularly Diaspora Armenians, into Armenian banking and, finally, the launching of the All-Armenian bank by the government which will also act as a major shareholder (aimed at attracting the funds of Diaspora Armenians for investments in Armenia).

  23. Support of Local Industries • Government provides for the support of local industries by means of subsidising or issuing governmental guarantees to companies experiencing certain difficulties and even taking a stake in some of them. • Under the framework of this approach, more than twenty companies have already received governmental assistance in the aggregate amount of USD 67 million.

  24. What is Necessary to Do? The only effective mechanism to get rid of both a necroeconomy and a zombie-economy is to adopt a sound bankruptcy law which, in turn, requires the strong political will of the ruling elite.

  25. Thank You

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