slide1 n.
Skip this Video
Loading SlideShow in 5 Seconds..
Technology-Forcing Automobile Emissions Provisions of the 1970 Clean Air Act: PowerPoint Presentation
Download Presentation
Technology-Forcing Automobile Emissions Provisions of the 1970 Clean Air Act:

Loading in 2 Seconds...

  share
play fullscreen
1 / 27
Download Presentation

Technology-Forcing Automobile Emissions Provisions of the 1970 Clean Air Act: - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

albert
227 Views
Download Presentation

Technology-Forcing Automobile Emissions Provisions of the 1970 Clean Air Act:

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript

    Slide 1:Technology-Forcing Automobile Emissions Provisions of the 1970 Clean Air Act: Forcing Invention or Innovation? David Gerard & Lester Lave Center for the Study & Improvement of Regulation Carnegie Mellon University November 2002

    Slide 2:2 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments mandates 90% reductions in mobile source emissions sets short time horizons -- 1975 for HC, CO; 1976 for NOx establishes $10,000 per car penalty for non-compliance limits EPA’s discretion to delay implementation Sharp contrast to provisions for stationary sources

    Slide 3:3 Two Marquee Technologies Ford, GM install catalytic converters on 1975 MY vehicles; devices on most US vehicles by 1977. Widespread introduction of three-way catalysts in 1981 ? US producers do not meet standards set in 1970 statute until 1993

    Slide 4:4 Major Control Technologies of New Vehicles Sold in US

    Slide 5:5 Federal Emissions Standards

    Slide 6:6 Questions 1. How does the technology-forcing regulatory process work? Who are the stakeholders / participants? What are their incentives? What did they do throughout the process? 2. What is the relationship between regulations and the development of new emissions control technologies? Regulations ? Technological Advance

    Slide 7:7 Answers -- Overview of Talk 1. Brief Theoretical Primer 2. We draw on information from economics, history, legal scholarship, court cases, and stakeholder interviews to look at three periods: Historical antecedents, Why Technology-Forcing Regulations? 1971-1975, catalytic converter 1975-1981, three-way catalysts 3. Lessons, Limitations, Conclusions

    Slide 8:8 Regulatory Instrument Choice Technology Standard low monitoring costs, relatively high degree of certainty of outcomes Performance Standard flexibility, lower costs, greater incentive to innovate

    Slide 9:9 Technology-Forcing Literature Firms generally have superior information incentive to disguise, downplay ability to innovate incentive to under-invest in R&D Regulator commitment and credibility is central to motivating recalcitrant industry to do R&D. ?Models generally predict that firms will either meet standard, or miss by a lot. (Kleit, 1992; Yao 1988). ?Treat industry as single player (compare with Hackett, 1995; Puller, 2002).

    Slide 10:10 Regulations ? Technological Advancein oligopoly setting Generalized Model of R&D Incentives (Puller, 2002) 1. Reduce compliance costs (+) (M) (exo) 2. Operationalize Cost Advantage (+) (raise rivals’ costs) ___________ 3. R&D costs (-) (M) (exo) 4. Spillovers, Appropriability (-) (exo) 5. Ratcheting, Regulator Credibility (-) (M)

    Slide 11:11 R&D Investment Link often Deterministic, but TF Fraught with Uncertainty Cost Technological breakthroughs (even if firms make good faith efforts) Reliability Unintended consequences Lock-in of inferior technology ?all present challenges for political feasibility, and administrative actions

    Slide 12:12 Answers -- Overview of Talk 1. Brief Theoretical Primer 2. We draw on information from economics, history, legal scholarship, court cases, and stakeholder interviews to look at three periods: Historical antecedents, Why Technology-Forcing Regulations? 1971-1975, catalytic converter 1975-1981, three-way catalysts 3. Lessons, Limitations, Conclusions

    Slide 13:13 Historical Antecedents to Clean Air Act Post WWII, US auto manufacturers a comfortable, untouchable oligopoly. 1961 California mandates PCV valve 1965 Unsafe at Any Speed; federalization of automobile emissions regulations (MVPCA) 1966 Safety Legislation (administrative discretion) 1967 Air Quality Act … HEW follows CARB’s lead in setting emission standards. 1969 Dept of Justice sues Big 3 (+1) for conspiring to suppress emissions control technologies. Stands until 1981. 1970 Nixon, Muskie back and forth leads to technology-forcing aspects of Clean Air Act Amendments measure

    Slide 14:14 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments 1. EPA must set new Federal Test Procedure 2. HC, CO standards effectively changed in 1972, and NOx standards set to go into effect in 1973. 3. Mandates 90% reductions in mobile source emissions HC 4.1 ? 0.41 by 1975 MY CO 34 ? 3.4 by 1975 MY NOx uncontrolled ? 0.41 by 1976 4. $10,000 per car penalty for non-compliance 5. EPA has discretion to delay standards once.

    Slide 15:15 Development and Diffusion of the Catalytic Converter EPA “enormous benefits at modest costs” equips its own vehicles and satisfies 50K standard Industry Agrees in principle, but wants longer time horizon GM most adamant, as it has best shot at meeting standard at low cost

    Slide 16:16 Timetable of First Delay

    Slide 17:17 Effects of Catalytic Converter Push EPA sets stringent interim standards, basically forcing GM and Ford to put catalytic converters on vehicles HC 4.1 ? 1.5 (0.41) CO 34 ? 15 (3.4) Manufacturers no longer have to detune vehilces to meet standards. Catalytic converters reliable and durable (when not poisoned by leaded gasoline). Chrysler basically didn’t do anything, and does not put catalytic converter on its 1975 MY vehicles. Emissions of HC 38% and CO 60% higher than Ford, GM vehicles

    Slide 18:18 Recapitulation Ambitious goal, short time horizon EPA had clear idea of what it wanted to do: force development and installation of a fairly mature technology Industry did not have big information advantage EPA shows extra-ordinary determination, but winks at Chrysler rapid diffusion of catalytic converters and steep reductions in HC, CO emissions, but still not that close to meeting standards

    Slide 19:19 Complicating Factors Economic Malaise of 1970s Oil Embargo Questions about whether emissions controls affect fuel economy. GM splits with Ford, Chrysler Congressional delay from 1976 to 1977 EPA technical staff jumps ahead of the curve on fuel economy Sulfate question EPA delays deadline from 1977 to 1978 industry split EPA split

    Slide 20:20 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments Industry cannot comply with 1978 standards, but produces vehicles anyway EPA cannot delay standards Congress forced to delay standards or shut down industry, chooses to delay standards to 1981 for NOx.

    Slide 21:21 Hard NOx July 20, 1973 EPA delay of NOx standard not particularly controversial -- neither EPA nor industry has a good plan for meeting standard (plus EGR was not working particularly well) 1975 EPA and NAS suspect that industry is lax in its research efforts 1981 Three-way catalysts put on most US vehilces. Major problems with technology

    Slide 22:22 What Happened? Possible Explanations for Problems with Meeting Standards Too many disruptions Industry diligently pursued new technologies, but simply couldn’t get enabling technologies in place For whatever reasons industry scaled back its R&D efforts. EPA lacked credibility after giving Chrysler a free ride. EPA did not have a clear idea of whether NOx controls were feasible Informational chasm between industry and EPA Forcing invention inherently more uncertain

    Slide 23:23 Technological Advance through 1970s and 80s Fuel Economy Improvements Beefed up horsepower Incremental improvements in emissions performance Competing Explanations Regulations led to putting electronic controls on cars. This produced a platform for performance improvements. Industry saw dramatic entry and competition, which forced firms to redouble their efforts to improve their products.

    Slide 24:24 HC Emissions of 1974-1990 Vehicles

    Slide 25:25 To Be Continued California Regulations 1989 ZEV mandate 2002 CO2-reductions mandate

    Slide 26:26 Lessons Consistent with Theoretical Predictions technology forcing works best when asymmetry of information is limited and regulators are committed and can credibly enforce standards Consistency with conventional wisdom about technology standards versus performance standards less clear Difficult to force technological leaps (to say nothing of high fixed costs of network effects) Process especially vulnerable to unforeseen complications

    Slide 27:27 Limitations Controlling for External Factors Says nothing about whether technology-forcing regulations pass a cost-benefit test does not endorse technology-forcing as the best approach stiff gas tax aggressive I/M program, vehicle scrappage driving restrictions