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Survivable Computing Environment to Support Distributed Autonomic Automation. Dr. Andrés Lebaudy, Mr. Brian Callahan, CDR Joseph B. Famme USN (ret) ASNE Controls Symposium Biloxi, MS December 10-11, 2007. 1. Damage Control Requirements.

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survivable computing environment to support distributed autonomic automation

Survivable Computing Environment to Support Distributed Autonomic Automation

Dr. Andrés Lebaudy, Mr. Brian Callahan,

CDR Joseph B. Famme USN (ret)

ASNE Controls Symposium

Biloxi, MS

December 10-11, 2007

1

damage control requirements
Damage Control Requirements

Naval studies show thatships are seldom lost to primary damage (direct blast effects) but the result of secondary damage: the progressive spreading of fire and flooding into surrounding areas

Key Challenge is to Increase Control System Survivability & Decrease Casualty Response Time

Past experience has demonstrated that when engineering casualties or damage occurs a human is too slow and vulnerable, and requires enormous logistical and medical support

Distributed, Survivable Autonomic Processing Contributes to Reduced Response Time

2

onr multi level control integration
ONR Multi-level Control Integration

Mission Control Layer

Situational Awareness

Operator Interfaces

System Coordination Layer

Situational Awareness

Decision Aids ---- Systems Interactions

Autonomous System Layer

Survivability

HM & DC

Signatures

Electrical

WAN

WAN

Engineering

Propulsion

Defining the Requirements for Survivable Computing

4

what is a smart valve
What is a Smart Valve?

Smart Valves sense or infer valve and fluid parameters

valve (actuator) position

fluid flow rate

upstream and downstream fluid pressure

fluid temperature*

Embedded, programmable microprocessor-based controller

controls valve actuator

filters sensor data

estimates flow rate

perform valve actuator diagnostics

can be programmed to be “intelligent”

Communication interface

interface with device- or field-level network

send/receive information to/from other devices on the network

send/receive information and commands to/from next highest control system tier

Courtesy of Tyco International Ltd.

smart valve applications
Smart Valve Applications

Method 1: Hydraulic Resistance

Method 2: Flow Inventory

  • Requires only pre-hit communication
  • Each valve independently determines whether it lies along the rupture path
  • Valves initiate a closure sequence after pre-configured time delay
  • Activates only when pressure and flow conditions are abnormal
  • Requires full or partial communication between adjacent smart valves
  • Neighboring smart valves calculate flow balance
  • Rupture detected when flow into the zone is not equal to flow out of the zone
  • Valves operate to isolate zone
  • Allows for estimating rupture or leak size
  • Number of branches and uncertainties in individual flow estimates determines “size” of rupture that can be reliably detected
live fire test of smartvalve technology autonomic fire suppression system
Live Fire Test of “SmartValve” Technology & Autonomic Fire Suppression System
  • AFSS EDM successfully responded to all of the live-fire test scenarios (Shadwell 2002)
  • Follow-up testing of an AFSS prototype was demonstrated successfully during a Weapons Effects Test (WET) on ex-USS Peterson (Peterson 2003).

8

pac component modular design
PAC Component Modular Design
  • Multi-domain functionality-including logic, motion, and process control-on a single very flexible and highly configurable platform.
  • Mil Qualified Shock, Moisture …

9

multi level mil spec control modules
Multi-level Mil-spec Control Modules
  • Computational and storage resources that grow with application demands
  • Resistant to component failures by distributing the processing load

10

next generation control software
Next Generation Control Software
  • Survivable, reconfigurable third-generation graphical design tool
  • Windows-based software package that relies on intuitive drag-and-drop, undo-redo, and cut-copy-paste functionality

11

next generation graphical design environment
Next Generation Graphical Design Environment
  • Comprehensive set of field-proven function blocks
  • state-diagramming features allow design engineers to define operational states

12

field proven function blocks
Field-proven function blocks

Examples:

  • Controller Blocks (e.g., PID controller, lead-lag controller)
  • Signal Conditioning Functions (e.g., characterizer, rate limiter, track & hold)
  • Signal Comparator Blocks (e.g., high/low alarm, equality, thresholding)
  • Mathematical Operators (e.g., addition, natural log, exponent, sine)
  • Logic Functions (e.g., NAND gate, XOR gate, RS flip flop)
  • General Purpose Operators (e.g., timer, ramp profile, multiplexer, A/B switch)
  • Hardware Access (e.g., analog input, barograph display, pushbutton)
  • Networking Operators (e.g., broadcast, receiver, parameter synchronization)
  • Diagnostic Operators (e.g., data recorder, hardware status monitor)
  • Text Manipulation (e.g. string constants, concatenation, left, right, etc.)

13

fleet modernization installation examples
Fleet Modernization INSTALLATION EXAMPLES

Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) in Philadelphia to accomplish Ship Alteration 480D for the following ships: USS Boone, USS McInerny (FFG 8), USS Gary (FFG 51), and USS Vandergrift (FFG 48).

To regulate the cooling of the four SSDGs, as well as the SSDG waste heat temperature,

the fuel temperature in two sets of oil service and transfer heaters, the hot water tank temperature, and the start-air-mixer air temperature.

The PACs also control the main engine lube oil purifier, cooler, and service pressure loops.

14

distributed i o processing saves cable cost
Distributed I/O Processing Saves Cable Cost

Chameleon PAC Can Interface

With Any Control System

Machinery Control System

HMI & Processors

  • Enclosureless Mini-RTU/DAU
  • Highly distributed, located in close proximity to machinery - Reduced Cable Cost
  • Wired or secure wireless communications
  • Topologies supported: Ring, Bus, Star, Mesh
  • Interface to smart sensors 1451.4 and 1451.5
  • DDS Publish / Subscribe
  • Industrial Communications
  • Network Gateways
  • Legacy I/O

TSCE Network

e

r

u

c

e

S

k

n

L

i

E

C

S

T

1451.4

1451.4

PWM

RTD

4-20mA

SecureBluetooth

or 802.11 a/b/g

Pressure

1451.4

RPM

1451.5 /

LonTalk

Temperature

ZigBee

Vibration

Copper/Fiber10/100MBps

Ethernet Ring with DDS

Communications

ProfiBUS

Ethernet/IP

0-5V

4-20mA

e

r

u

c

e

g

S

/

b

/

a

1

RTD

1

.

2

0

8

TSCE Network

compare conventional wiring to distributed process wiring
Compare Conventional Wiring to Distributed Process Wiring

TSCE

Conventional

Compartment

I/O Drop

Distributed

Compartment

I/O Drop

Distributed

Compartment

I/O Drop

  • Distributed
  • Savings:
  • Installation Costs
  • Weight

Ethernet etc.

MIL-SPEC RTUs

Machinery

Machinery

conclusions
CONCLUSIONS

New Shp Classes will be able to employ Decentralized Ship System Architectures with Distribute Control Systems in order to Improve Rapid System Recovery / Ship Survivability and Fight Through Capability

Survivability is Achieved through Computational and Process Electronics Protection Provided by Hardware, Hardware Architectures / Control Software that is Mil-Spec and Locally Reconfigurable

Using Control Hardware that has been Tested to Highest Level of Survivability to Reduce Vulnerability to Damage and Ensure No Critical Single Points of Vital System Failure

This solution Supports Reduced Crew Size, Lowers the Weight of Wire, and the Cost to Install Control Systems thus Improving Ship Production.

Proposed solutions are Technical Readiness Levels 7, 8 & 9.

18