1 / 8

Beyond EUP to EUSE

Beyond EUP to EUSE. Mary Shaw Carnegie Mellon University. EUSE has wider scope than EUP. Concern for system properties – usability, dependability, security, privacy These depend on the integrated system, not the individual parts Sufficiently dependable for the current need

adonia
Download Presentation

Beyond EUP to EUSE

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Beyond EUP to EUSE Mary Shaw Carnegie Mellon University

  2. EUSE has wider scope than EUP • Concern for system properties – usability, dependability, security, privacy • These depend on the integrated system, not the individual parts • Sufficiently dependable for the current need • In the context of each EU’s expectations • Using low-ceremony as well as high-ceremony knowledge • EU composition of resources from diverse sources to solve that EU’s own problem • Components, data feeds, … • … and more, but let’s discuss these points …

  3. EUs are not SEs • EUs do not have rich and robust mental models of their computing systems • they fail to do backups, misunderstand storage models, execute malware, and innocently engage in other risky behavior • EUSE is not “fixing the users” • EUSE must be about developing ways for EUs themselves to address traditional SE concerns • system-level properties • sufficient quality for current task (cost-effectiveness) • integration of resources from multiple sources

  4. Everyday Dependability

  5. High Ceremony Evidence • Widely accepted among computer scientists • Potentially high levels of assurance • Need precise specifications, substantial effort • The Academic Big Four – the “gold standard” • Formal verification • Results from trusted automatic generator • Systematic testing • Empirical studies in operation • And also • Inspections • Assurance cases, other sound certification • (others from comparative analysis)

  6. Low Ceremony Evidence • Widely available information, used informally • Largely ignored by professionals • Not suitable for high assurance, but inexpensive • Examples • “best X” reports (linear functions of subjective marks) • editorial reviews recommending certain components for certain contexts (cf Consumer Reports) • advertising claims by vendors, branding, seller reputation • 3rd party reviews of vendors and products by users • recommendations by co-workers • auction and betting mechanisms, “wisdom of crowds”, http://www.nationalreview.com/nrof_luskin/luskin200410080821.asp • subjective certification • checklists • popularity

  7. Open Resource Coalitions Objective: compose autonomous distributed resources • “Coalitions” because the resources will not have a shared objective • “Open” in contrast to control assumed for closed-shop development • cf “mash-up”s This changes everything!

  8. Example: Yahoo pipes • Promising, but limited • not quite unix pipe/filters • Domain: RSS feeds (and similar) • sequence of items (title, link, attributes) • plus strings, numbers, URLs, … as parameters • Operations: sequence operations • fetch, merge, filter, sort, … • compute/collect parameters • Composition by drag-and-drop • Warning: “save” button doesn’t show up in IE • Example: http://pipes.yahoo.com/

More Related