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Politics versus Bureaucracy Analyze further this tentative chain of causality: (Pol+Adm) Institutions QoG (Corruption)  Eco Growth 1) Pioneering cross-country study of What Produces QoG La Porta et al. 1999: few institutions…(culture, traditions, geography) 2) Politics is what matters

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Politics versus Bureaucracy

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politics versus bureaucracy
Politics versus Bureaucracy
  • Analyze further this tentative chain of causality:
    • (Pol+Adm) Institutions QoG (Corruption)  Eco Growth
  • 1) Pioneering cross-country study of What Produces QoG
    • La Porta et al. 1999: few institutions…(culture, traditions, geography)
  • 2) Politics is what matters
    • Tsebelis 1995: a new comparative political theory (veto players)
    • Andrews and Montinola 2004: apply veto players theory  corruption
  • 3) What happens in the apartment upstairs does not matter: how the Bureaucracy is organized/recruited is what matters:
    • Evans and Rauch 1999
good press for political institutions
Good press for ”political institutions”…
  • Quality of Government =
    • Democracy
    • Separation of powers
    • Veto players
    • Checks and balances
  • For both scholars and policy-makers
bad press for bureaucracy
Bad press for “bureaucracy”…
  • Quality of Government # bureaucracy:
    • Obsolescent, undesirable, and non-viable form of administration
    • Market > Bureaucracy
    • Niskanen: bureaucrats = budget-maximizers
    • New Public Management > Bureaucracy
    • States = ”steering” > Private actors = ”rowing”
  • Although the Effects of New Public Management are not so clear:
    • in OECD countries, probably positive
    • in developing countries, probably negative
now time to rediscover bureaucracy johan olsen 2006
Now, Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy (Johan Olsen 2006)
  • Is ‘‘bureaucracy’’ an organizational dinosaur helplessly involved in its death struggle?
  • No!! Chronology of a come back:
    • 1980s: case studies on the importance of the State  Development in East Asia (Evans 1995)
    • 1990s: international institutions (World Bank 1997)
    • 2000s: expansion of theoretical + empirical studies
  • Bureaucracy seem to matter, specially for developing countries
la porta et al 1999
La Porta et al. (1999)
  • Pioneering: first encompassing empirical test of what produces “good government” or QoG
  • Necessity to look at Exogenous factors  QoG
    • No Economic Growth
    • What could be an exogenous factor?
factors qog
Factors  QoG
  • 1) Ethnic heterogeneity: mechanisms?
    • Governments become more interventionist  less efficient  less quality of public goods
    • Alternative?
  • 2) Legal Origin: Mechanisms?
    • Why Common Law > Civil Law?
    • Civil Law = instrument of the state for expanding its power
    • Socialist Law? It is an “extreme” civil law
    • So, the French, German and Scandinavian Law (as part of Civil Law) should be bad, but, wait a minute, they say German and Scandinavian are good…Why?
    • Is there a problem of “endogeneity” in legal explanations of QoG/Type of State?
factors qog7
Factors  QoG
  • 3) Religion: mechanisms?
    • Max Weber: Protestant > Catholic
    • La Porta et al. 1997: ”hierarchical religions” worse QoG. Why?
    • Are they more ”interventionist” religions (”they like to tell people what to do”) than Protestant?
    • Iannacone and the ”positive” effects of fundamentalism www.religionomics.com
    • In Catholic & Muslim countries religions had excessive power and bureaucracies have developed from religious ranks (”clerk come from cleric”)
    • Is not counter-balancing power good? Aren’t religious good civil servants?
  • Good description of government indicators
  • Interesting approach:
    • Correlations between dependent variables (T.2). Why?
    • Correlations between in dependent variables (T.3) Why?
results t 4 6
Results (T.4-6)
  • Convincing results for you?
  • Some omitted variables? They don’t include “colonial status” and “continent”. Right, wrong?
  • Other omitted variables?
    • Not much of political institutions (democracy vs. dictatorship, veto players..)
    • Not many interactions: always ethnolinguistic heterogenity is bad?
    • Generally speaking, very few control variables
    • Maybe, better to focus on 1 dep var (instead of 15?)
coming back to political institutions
Coming back to political institutions…
  • New typology of political systems: Tsebelis’ Veto Player Theory (1995, 2002)
  • Traditional typologies in comparative politics:
    • Democracy/ Dictatorship
    • Presidential/ Parliamentary
    • Electoral systems: Majoritarian/ Proportional
    • E.g. Persson and Tabellini…
sartori 1984 definition of political systems
Sartori 1984: definition of political systems
  • Presidentialism:
    • Head of State directly elected for a fixed time span
    • Government not appointed by the Parliament, but by the President
  • Parliamentarism:
    • Government is appointed by the Parliament
    • One-party or multiple-party coalition governments
  • Which one is separation-of-powers system and which one power-sharing systems?
tsebelis veto players theory i
Tsebelis’ Veto Players Theory I
  • “Veto players”= individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo of policies
  • Prediction: the More Veto Players a country has, the More Policy Stability
tsebelis veto players theory ii
Tsebelis’ Veto Players Theory II
  • Instead of comparing political systems according to their “formal” classification as Presidential or Parliamentary, we should look at their number of veto players:
    • Italy (where two or three parties must agree for legislation to pass) = the US, where the agreement between several institutions is needed to pass a law
    • UK (all power in hands of one party) = a presidential regime where the President and the Legislature are in hands of the same party
andrews and montinola 2004
Andrews and Montinola 2004
  • Prediction: More Veto Players  More Rule of Law
  • Theoretical inspiration:Madison (The Federalist Papers)
    • Institutions must be divided and arranged so that each may be a check on the other
  • The more checks (e.g. veto players)  the less incumbents may misuse their power
a m s game theory model
A&M’s game-theory model
  • Canonical Prisoners’ Dilemma payoff structure:
empirical test
Empirical test
  • How would you test this theory?
  • What should be shown in an empirical test of this theoretical model?
interesting empirical test
Interesting empirical test
  • Faithful codification of the number of veto players in every country following Tsebelis’ theory
  • Very good control variables: among others, Economic Development! (distrust those who don’t…)
  • Each vp +  0.16 increase in the 1-6 index of rule of law
  • They test which classification of political systems works better: the traditional Presidential/Parliamentary regimes or the new Veto Players one
    • Presidential regimes < Parliamentary. Why?
problems with the test
Problems with the test?
  • 35 “emerging” democracies in around 20 years = 354 observations?
  • Other variables?
  • Legal origin? E.g. veto players only necessary in civil law countries…
  • Time of democracy?
more veto players better qog





Low revenues

High revenues

Expected outcome under VP model

Actual outcome

More Veto Players  Better QoG?
more veto players better qog20







More reform

Expected outcome under VP model

Actual outcome

More Veto Players  Better QoG?
evans and rauch 1999
Evans and Rauch 1999
  • What makes QoG are not the characteristics of the political system (Pres, Parl, VPs), but features of the Public Administration
  • Move the focus from the Executive and Legislature to the State Administration
the bringing the state back in school
The ”Bringing the State Back In” School
  • 1980s: case studies on the importance of the State  Development in East Asia
  • 1990s: also international institutions (World Bank 1997)
  • Lack of coherent theory and of broad empirical analysis (e.g. Evans 1995: “Embedded Autonomy)
evans rauch 1999 a double advance
Evans & Rauch 1999: a double advance
  • Theoretically: show the mechanisms that connect the State Administration with Economic Growth
  • Empirically: an original dataset on bureaucracies
    • 35 developing countries
    • Methodology: experts survey
weberian administration economic growth
+ “Weberian” Administration  + Economic Growth
  • “Weberian” Bureaucracy:
    • Max Weber: Patrimonial Administrations vs. Bureaucratic (Weberian) ones
    • Bureaucracy = meritocratic recruitment + predictable long-term career rewards
  • Why is it good?
mechanisms through which wb affect economic growth
Mechanisms through which WB affect economic growth
  • More Efficient (“better types”, more competent)
    • OK, but why Microsoft does not use them?
  • Longer time horizons (Rauch 1995: US cities)
  • ”Signal” to the private sector (=impartiality)
empirical analysis
Empirical analysis
  • 35 “semi-industrialized” countries
  • High correlation between Weberianess Scale and GDP/cap: 0.67 !!
  • Regression: WS trumps out or reduces the effect of traditional variables explaining economic growth (human capital, domestic investment)
need for more data on bureaucracies
Need for more data on bureaucracies…
  • More within country and cross-country variations
  • Problems: neglect of comparative datasets on bureaucracies by political scientists, public administration scholars and international organizations
rothstein teorell 2005
Rothstein & Teorell 2005
  • “Quality of Government” matters, but we lack a definition
  • Economists use “good governance” = “good-for-economic-development”
  • Definition of QoG: Results of Government  the Procedures of government
qog impartial government institutions
QoG = impartial government institutions
  • Impartiality in policy implementation
  • Focus: not on how decisions are taken in a country (dem, dict..), but on if policies are provided in an impartial way
  • Does policy implementation favour some people over others? Or is impartial?
  • Which are the differences between (the new) Impartiality and (the traditional) Rule of Law?
  • Are “professional norms” impartial?
  • A faithful implementation of a discriminatory law is “impartiality”?
  • Do you prefer Evans & Rauch 1999 or Rothstein & Teorell 2005 approach to “good administration”?