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ARRC Collision Avoidance System. 2005 ASME/IEEE Joint Rail Conference March 16-18, 2005 Presented by Chinnarao Mokkapati Robert D. Pascoe Union Switch & Signal Inc. Alaska Rail Road Facts (2003 Data). Employees 722 Year-round 10.8 average years of service 43.2 average age

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arrc collision avoidance system

ARRC Collision Avoidance System

2005 ASME/IEEE Joint Rail Conference

March 16-18, 2005

Presented by

Chinnarao Mokkapati

Robert D. Pascoe

Union Switch & Signal Inc.

slide3
Alaska Rail Road Facts (2003 Data)
  • Employees
    • 722 Year-round
    • 10.8 average years of service
    • 43.2 average age
  • Operating Statistics
    • 446,162 Passenger ridership
    • 8,324,395 Freight tonnage
    • 102,292 Revenue car loads
  • Trains per day
    • 33 Freights
    • 14 Passenger - Summer
    • 1 Passenger - Winter
  • Operating Data
    • Miles of track
      • 466 main line
      • 59 branch line
      • 86 yards/sidings
      • 611 Total
  • Rolling Stock
    • 1,625 Freight cars
    • 42 Passenger cars
    • 60 Locomotives
  • Train Control
    • ~500 miles of DTC
    • ~30 miles of CTC
arrc cas objectives
ARRC CAS Objectives
  • PREVENT TRAIN TO TRAIN COLLISIONS BY ENFORCEMENT OF AUTHORITY LIMITS
  • ENFORCE SPEED RESTRICTIONS
  • PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR ROADWAY WORKERS AND EQUIPMENT
  • IMPROVE EFFICIENCY OF OPERATIONS
  • INCREASE CAPACITY
fra requirements
FRA Requirements
  • Generation of safe mandatory directives
  • Enforcement of authority limits
  • Enforcement of speed restrictions
  • Protection of Maintenance-of-Way workers and equipment
  • Rule 236 Subpart H compliance required
  • Performance Std: New system must be as safe or safer than the system being replaced
    • Operating conditions, parameters, constraints must be defined
    • Structured qualitative and quantitative assessment of safety (Base Case and New Case) required
      • Product Safety Plan or Safety Case
slide6
Some Definitions

CTC and DTC Operation

slide7
Some Definitions

Track Bulletins Used in System

slide13
Block 5

Block 9

(( ))

Existing

Comms

Block 6

Block 3

Block 7

Block 11

OSS

Dispatcher

Work

Stations

Servers

CAD

Vital

Independent

Check of

LOA, Bulletins

General Philosophy of CAD and OSS Subsystems

Track

slide14
Vital Checks Done by OSS
  • Via the OBC, the position of all trains are known to the OSS
  • ‘Occupies’ Virtual blocks
  • ‘un-occupies’ Virtual blocks
  • Checks Bulletins associated with Blocks & LOA
slide15
Network

Interface

Adapter

CAD Subsystem

Ethernet Switch

Ethernet

RS423

Microlok II

Microlok II

RS423

HUB

RS423

RS423

RS423

Microlok II

Microlok II

OSS Hub Physical Architecture

slide16
Block 6

Block 1

Block 3

Block 5

Block 7

Block 9

Block 11

Block 13

S#7

S#5

Software in MicroLok II Units

North

  • Executive Software
  • Operating System
  • Application Processing
  • Serial Communications Control
  • Safety Diagnostics
  • User Interfaces
  • Event Logging
  • Application Data Tables
  • Track Sections defined as Virtual Blocks
  • Switch locations
  • Other identifiable points
slide17
OBC Requirements:
  • Profile Generation
  • Train Location and Speed Determination
  • Digital Track Data Map
  • Communication via Digital Radio
slide18
LOCATION AND SPEED DETERMINATION
  • DGPS
  • Accelerometers
  • Tachometers
  • Digital Map

The result is that the OBC vitally

determines its location on the rails

and transmits its location to Central

slide24
MONITORING DEVICES

Rail Integrity

Switch Position

Signal Aspect in CTC

slide25
Short Range

Data Radio

Locomotive

Broken rail

Device

Short Range

Data Radio

N

R

Locomotive

Device

Short Range

Data Radio

Aspect

Locomotive

Device

  • The Locomotive’s ATP Interrogates Three Wayside Devices
  • using a short range data radio:
  • A Rail Integrity Device
      • Broken Rail Detection
      • MicroTrax
  • A Switch Position Device
      • Normal or Reverse
  • A Wayside Signal Device
      • Aspect
cas safety assurance
CAS Safety Assurance
  • Safety resides in OSS and OBC, though CAD performs some safety-related functions
  • OSS is implemented on US&S MICROLOK II Platform
  • OBC implemented on US&S MICROCAB Platform
  • These platforms use a combination of Inherent Fail-Safety and Diversity & Self-Checking safety architectures
  • Certified by independent safety assessors
  • Extensive service history
cas safety assurance1
CAS Safety Assurance
  • Compliance with FRA Rule 236 Subpart H
  • Risk analysis of CAD-only DTC/CTC Operation (Base Case)
  • Derive safety requirements for CAS
  • V&V of CAS design and operation
  • Risk analysis of CAS (CAS Case)
  • Risk assessment
    • Show CAS provides higher safety than CAD-only DTC/CTC operation
risk analysis
Risk Analysis
  • Conduct Hazard Analyses
    • PHA
    • O&SHASSHA
  • Determine MTTHE using FFTA
derive safety requirements for cas
Derive safety requirements for CAS
  • Potential hazards in Base Case
  • FFTA of CAS elements
  • CAS subsystem safety requirements
v v of cas design and operation
V&V of CAS design and operation
  • Normal operation
  • Systematic faults
  • Random hardware faults
  • Common Mode faults
  • External influences
risk analysis of cas cas case
Risk analysis of CAS (CAS Case)
  • Conduct Hazard Analyses
    • PHA
    • O&SHASSHA
  • Determine MTTHE using FFTA
risk assessment
Risk Assessment
  • Show CAS provides higher safety than CAD-only DTC/CTC operation
  • Submit PSP
    • 20 elements required per FRA Rule 236.907
project timeline
4/16/2005

-

10/16/2005

4/15/2006

-

10/15/2006

2005Peak Season

2006 Peak Season

2005

2006

2007

11 / 2005

CAD SAT

Complete

06 / 2006

Office Safety and OBC FAT

4Q 2004

System

Definition

Complete

10 / 2006

Office Safety and OBC

SAT

1 / 2006

CAD Cutover

complete

2 / 2007

Revenue Service

Project Timeline
conclusions
Conclusions
  • CAS is a practical, relatively inexpensive PTC System
  • Scalable for larger systems
  • Uses proven safety architectures
  • Credible, straight-forward safety proof
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