1 / 25

Venture Capitalists As Benevolent Vultures: The Role of Network Externalities in Financing Choice

Venture Capitalists As Benevolent Vultures: The Role of Network Externalities in Financing Choice. http://campus.hec.fr/profs/leshchinskii/externalities.pdf. Dima Leshchinskii, HEC. Objective.

Gabriel
Download Presentation

Venture Capitalists As Benevolent Vultures: The Role of Network Externalities in Financing Choice

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Venture Capitalists As Benevolent Vultures:The Role of Network Externalities in Financing Choice http://campus.hec.fr/profs/leshchinskii/externalities.pdf Dima Leshchinskii, HEC

  2. Objective • To study how entrepreneurs’ choice of active investors to finance entrepreneurial projects is affected by: • interaction between projects • control rights of potential investors • where potential active investors are VCs and angels • In other words, to show “how and when VCs create more value than other investors” FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  3. Example • You are an entrepreneur with a new project: • R&D required investment of 2 M $; • Probability of success b = 0.3; • Project’s gross payoff is 4 M $; • Another entrepreneur with a similar project. In case of her success, you can borrow her technology investing much less; • Whom should you ask for funding? Who would agree to invest? FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  4. Some Facts About Investors Both VCs and angels: • Have control rights not linked to cash flow rights • Advise the entrepreneurs • Invest more than just money (time, effort, knowledge) • Practice stage financing But VCs • Invest into portfolio of companies • same industry or stage Professional angels • Back a single firm in the industry (no deep pockets or no time to support more firms) FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  5. Main Results • VCs can create more value for their portfolio companies … • Through investment coordination and portfolio approach (internalizing positive externality) • investment decision based on NPVi>0, not on NPVi>0) • Through early project termination (as vultures eliminating negative externality) • ...Only if ex-ante entrepreneurs are better off with VCs than with angel investors (benevolent vultures) FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  6. Related Literature • Sahlman (JFE 1990), Gompers & Lerner, Hellmann & Puri (RFS 2000), Kaplan & Stromberg (1999), Stuart & Robinson (1999) • Bhattacharya & Chiesa (JFI 1995), Cabral (1998), Economides (EJPE 1996); Cestone & Fumagalli (2000) • Hellmann (2000), Ueda (2000) FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  7. Model • Two entrepreneurs with own projects • Two-stage projects: • R&D stage: investment Ii, Ii = {0, , I} • If Ii = I, then R&D success of the project with probability  • Outcomes of R&D stage are independent • Market stage: • If Ii = , then free technology transfer from a rival project • net payoff iV (if both projects continue) • or V (if only one continues) • (1+21, 1<2) FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  8. Model • Entrepreneurs with projects • Externalities: • R&D (technology transfer) • Payoff externality • Competitive Investors: • angels (can invest only into one project) • VC (can invest into two projects) • In return for investment ask for share i in a project i. • Non-zero investment is not verifiable (time, effort etc.) • Investors have control rights even for i < 0.5 FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  9. iV  I Angel funds project i 1- Ij = I e Ij < I 0 (1-)2 0 2I 1-(1-)2 Max{(1+2)V;V} I+e VC (funds 2)  0 (1-) 0 Externality and Investment FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  10. Timeline t = -1 Investors ask for share i in return for investment. Entrepreneurs choose investors, who get zero expected return t = 0 Ii, Ii = {0, , I} are invested t = 1 R&D results are observed. (Technology transfer, if possible). Projects are continued/terminated t = 2 Final payoffs are realized FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  11. Projects’ Payoffs With Angel Investment FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  12. Projects’ Payoffs With Angel Investment FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  13. Positive Externalities (1+2>1):First Best Result FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  14. Entrepreneurs choose angels if: E[NPVEntr.|Angel] E[NPVEntr.|VC] Participation constraint for angels: E[NPVAngel]  0 Angel financing One possible pair of contracts FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  15. Entrepreneurs choose VCs if E[NPVEntr.|VC] E[NPVEntr.|Angel] Participation constraint for VC: E[NPVVC]  0 Incentive compatibility for VC (Deviation-proof) VC financing Continuum of contracts Everybody wants higher stakes FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  16. Example: Positive externalities, investment in both project is the first-best (1-)(1+2)V>I-e • Angel investment is optimal if (1-)1V>I-e • VC cannot improve • Angel investment is suboptimal if1V<I or (1-)2V<I • VC can improve (except when 1V<I and (1-)2(1+2)V<I) by investing into both projects • Angel financing is impossible if 2V<I • VC always reaches the first best FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  17. 0.9 0.8 Improvement 0.7 b (R&D externality) 0.6 No advantage for VC (I;I) 0.5 0.4 Beta, 0.3 resuscitation by VC 0.2 0.1 0 0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 Positive Externality, I/V = 0.5, 1=2>0.5. First Best is (I, I) 1 b(1-b)l=k b(1-b)*2l=k bl=k b*2l=k Lambda, l (market externality) FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  18. 0.9 0.8 0.7 b (R&D externality) 0.6 No advantage for VC (I;I) 0.5 0.4 Beta, 0.3 resuscitation by VC 0.2 0.1 0 0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 Positive Externality, I/V = 0.5. 1=2>0.5 1 b(1-b)l=k Improvement b(1-b)*2l=k bl=k b*2l=k No investment zone Lambda, l (market externality) FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  19. Negative Externalities (1+2<1):First Best Result FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  20. Participation constraint for entrepreneurs VC’s share in firm 1 = VC’s share in firm 2 “Face” NPVi 2  E[NPVi|Angel] Incentive compatibility for VC (Deviation-proof): Prefers to continue only one project V 1/2 1/2 0 VC contracts One single contract. At t = 1 each entrepreneur wants to get formally less! FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  21. Example: Negative externalities, investment in both projects is the first best (1-)V>I-e • Angel investment is never optimal • Angel investment is suboptimal if (1-)1V>I-e or 1V<I or (1-)2V<I • VC can improve (except when 2>0.5 and (1-)1>I) by investing into both projects • Angel financing is impossible if 2V<I • VC always reaches the first best FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  22. Negative Externality I / V =0.05 Resuscitation by VC Lambda, l 1 0.9 Improvement 0.8 b(1-b)l=k 0.7 b(1-b)*2l=k 0.6 b Beta, bl=k 0.5 0.4 b*2l=k 0.3 0.2 0.1 No investment zone 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  23. Empirical implications We should observe more VC investment in the industries with high externalities, especially negative ones VCs invest more than angels into risky projects (low ) … with high profitability (V/I) Portfolio companies of the same VC should have similar characteristics (size and i) FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  24. Conclusion High externalities give VCs potential to create more value for their portfolio companies than angel investors By better coordinating investment By influencing project continuation Their actions increase the value of the portfolio, sometimes at the expense of individual companies Interests of individual entrepreneurs and possible opportunistic behavior of VCs may prevent from getting the optimal outcome FMC, May 2nd, 2002

  25. Question: Can entrepreneurs achieve VC-like results with angel investment... by cross-holding stakes in each other projects? FMC, May 2nd, 2002

More Related