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To “war” or not to “war”? “ Foresighting ” the Korean Missile Crisis

To “war” or not to “war”? “ Foresighting ” the Korean Missile Crisis. A pathway to scenarios via three discussions. First Discussion:. Is Korea just a version of the Cuban crisis?. Does this capture its “essence”?. Korea – Ultra-Brief Timeline. Early History – 2330 BCE – 300 BCE

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To “war” or not to “war”? “ Foresighting ” the Korean Missile Crisis

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  1. To “war” or not to “war”?“Foresighting” the Korean Missile Crisis A pathway to scenarios via three discussions

  2. First Discussion: Is Korea just a version of the Cuban crisis?

  3. Guy Stanley 14-03-2018 Does this capture its “essence”?

  4. Korea – Ultra-Brief Timeline • Early History – 2330 BCE – 300 BCE • Struggle for Unification 108 BCE – 935 (Cholla Kingdom 700 – 900 CE) • Chinese domination/influence – Wei to Qing Dynasties 400 CE - 1895 • Unitary Dynastic Periods (3) 918-1910 • Japanese Imperial Rule 1895-1945 • Korean Provisional Government (Exile) 1919-1948 • Military Government 1945-48 • Division of Korea 1948-Present • 1950-53 Korean War – armistice only. War is still on. • Kim Il-Sung dynasty 1948 – Present (North) • South Korea: Rhee (1950-60); Park Chung Hee (military)1960-1979, and Chun Doo Hwan (military) to 1987. Since then: Democracy • Question: What is the role of Korea in its region? Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  5. North Korean “levelling” the Field • 1995:  Kim Jong Il succeeds Father, Adopts "Arduous March" Famine Campaign post Soviet Collapse, plus severefloods, drought • 1996-7 deaths upwards of 2-3 million, China steps up • 1998 : Arduous March ends, IRBM development then test; moratorium agreed with Clinton deal; sidelined enrichment; increased WFP food, loans, education exchanges • 2003:  Bush II withdraws from Clinton deal; North Korea begins testing rockets, enriching. Mass starvation. • 2005/6: missile launch test;  nuclear testing begins,  • 2011: Kim Jong UN succeeds father; consolidates power - eliminates Chinese advocates, spies, family rivals  • 2015-16 brother murdered (in Bangkok), pace of nuclear bomb testing up; heightened military readiness • 2016: Donald Trump US President- threatens regime change; denuclearization  • Question: Is NK’s chief value its anomalous status? Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  6. NK Air Order of Battle Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2015 A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012

  7. North Korean Ground Forces Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  8. North Korean Navy Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  9. North Korean Missiles Same source

  10. Notes on Missiles Note: North Korea has produced its own version of the SCUD B, and the SCUD C, an extended-range version of the SCUD B. North Korea will continue using and improving the TD-2, which has only been used in a space-launch role, but could reach the United States with a nuclear payload if developed as an ICBM. North Korea is also developing the KN08 road-mobile ICBM and has paraded six launchers for the system. The KN08, an IRBM, and an SLBM have not been flight-tested and their current reliability as weapon systems would be low. * Launches of the TD-2 have been observed from both east and west coast launch facilities. ** ICBM is defined as a ballistic missile (land-based) capable of a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers (or 3,418 miles). Same source

  11. Is this an accurate North Korean picture? • A hyper-authoritarian régime • Remnant of a war which the world neglected to finish • A régime that survives partly on nuclear blackmail and criminal enterprises. • Is this about the arithmetic of arms control, the problems of the NPT, moving closer to settling the war and the other issues of the peninsula? • Or is the issue more complex – in scale and scope. Is NK’s the anomaly that staves off full regional settlement – and a change in the geopolitical lineup? • Are there new factors in the evolution of conflict theory we need to consider? Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  12. Hardly the ONLY perspective... Crises have: • Primary and other participants • Stakeholders with strategies and objectives • Elements of rationality and non-rationality • Time and other constraints (scope and stakes) • Crises also have: • Origins • Development (Beginning, middle and end-games) • Outcomes • Scenarios Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  13. US Scenarios for war...? • NK’s defences can be turned by US air power • That precision weapons can: • Successfully destroy the nuclear installations • Take out the artillery threatening the South • Perhaps decapitate the regime if necessary. • Is that Scenario plausible? • Do we need a war-fighting scenario: e.g. US - • Skor holds out for 30dys while US air power cleans out major threats, invasion army including ALLIES assembled and transported to theatre (200K personnel). • Is that plausible? Consequences of success or failure? Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  14. Non-US Perspective • Pre- emptive Strike?   • - Not “large platform” engagement where American escalation dominance prevails;  • - NKor small arm stealth capacity can standoff US and inflict significant damage: • 50,000 military and up to half million plus civilians in first hour;  • 5 million plus civilians and half million military within a week • Broader consequences ,,,? Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  15. Scenarios for peace? • Last minute Chinese intervention with or without Russia: • Insists on right of Nkor to have nuclear weapons for self-defence (NPT-Pakistan model) • Makes it an arms control issue: no ICBMs • Terminates Korean war under UN auspices • Creates an economic development program for Nkor to help it become source of value in North Pacific region – with or without US participation. • Plausibility? Consequences of success or failure? • Does either scenario take into account the character and full defensive capability of N.Kor.? Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  16. Discussion 2: Guy Stanley 14-03-2018 If there’s more, then what do we add?

  17. Whither North Korea? • Is there a time limit to this crisis, or can it become permanently seething like the others? • China? Three thousand years of continuous history has taught China the value of harmonious order and the costs of division when facing the West. How “monolithic” is its decisional capability? Will it move suddenly to “break the dragon’s back” – just at the entrance to the chaos zone? • Do other regional powers have aims in this crisis and can it achieve them? • What are stakes? What is the scope? • War or No War? When? Scenarios of crisis development and risk? • Is there a Canada angle? (Helpful or Mouthfull in a wider game?) Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  18. Korea and its Neighbourhood Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  19. Outstanding World Issues: little progress • “Rules-Based” globalization in which tyrannies and the one-per cent outperform democracy on social and economic indicators • Erosion of International Law protections against wars of aggression, torture, ethnic cleansing , genocide and protocols governing humanitarian and development assistance. Cruelly inadequate response to massive refugee and economic migrations • Outstanding financial imbalances and flimsy workarounds in Europe and the US • Israeli-Palestine, Iran and modernization in the Middle East. Successor to Sykes-Picot • Western Balkans back in play (“WW II ended, but WWI did not”) • Climate change challenge to the hydrocarbon economy • Compare with 1945-50...Upgrading League to UN, resettlement of European refugees, establishment of humanitarian agencies and codes of law that reinforced peace with prosperity, Marshall plan, occupation and democratization of former enemy countries... Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  20. Why are we at this point? • Deterrence decay: • Absent threat of “total” destruction, aggressive deterrence and appeasement generate the same result: a “spiral” or “cobweb” that ends in war – or chaos • Precision weapons enable in-fill between the rungs of Kahn’s escalation ladder. Temptation to High Velocity attack? • The weaponization of civil society’s internal divisions through social media and privatized (Non-State) agents of delivery. • The Hegemon’s retreat • Nearly 20 or more years of persistent “small” wars • Result: “liquid”war– permanent state of conflict flowing through successive or alternating geographic theatres Guy Stanley FSN 14-03-2018

  21. View From Japan https://www.fdbetancor.com/2015/07/26/japans-strategic-challenge/

  22. https://www.google.ca/imgres?imgurl=https://i.pinimg.com/736x/90/b2/ed/90b2ed42325fee94467bde475fc199b4--arctic-ice-superpower.jpg&imgrefurl=https://www.pinterest.com/mrschrenkjr/arctic-geopoliticshttps://www.google.ca/imgres?imgurl=https://i.pinimg.com/736x/90/b2/ed/90b2ed42325fee94467bde475fc199b4--arctic-ice-superpower.jpg&imgrefurl=https://www.pinterest.com/mrschrenkjr/arctic-geopolitics

  23. Nunavut’s Shale and Tight Resources, www.nrcan.gc.ca

  24. https://southfront.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Russian-Arctic-Military-Map.jpghttps://southfront.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Russian-Arctic-Military-Map.jpg

  25. Mike Nudelman/Business Insider 7 August 2015

  26. Discussion 3 Guy Stanley 14-03-2018 Could “chaos” be the New Normal for “wicked” conflict problems?

  27. “War” was once about imposing stable order on instability and chaos. Now? • 20th c Wars • Total wars for New World Order (WWI and II) • Big Wars for “credibility” (Korea, Viet Nam) • Wars for new M.E./Great Game Order (Afghanistan (USSR), Iran (Iraq) Iraq 1 (but not 2 ) (US+) • 19th c Wars • Limited wars, defined goals (Balance Of Power) e.g. Germany-France, Russia-Turkey, Victoria’s “Little Wars” (? After 1870, wars for nation-building ) • 21st c. The Nihilism of “controlled” Chaos? • “Gerasimov Doctrine”; Dubinsky’s “A Cloudless Sky” • Nihilism in a sheepskin (academic post-modernism) ? Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  28. Chaos as: Breakdown of Society intowarring groups • Society= u/s based on « domesticprimacy » of a cultural system • Effective authority /social contract– Hobbes/Locke • Shared Moral sentiments – (Smith) • Hierarchylinked to knowledge (Comte- 3 stages) • Economicallydetermined class conflict (Marx) • Status and Function (Durkheim) (anomie/suicide) • Behavioralnorms flow from élites as examples (Elias) • Overlappingpoliticalmajorities (Rawls/Habermas-but not the sameway) • Layers of self-construction over time (Mannheim-Berger) Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  29. A Glimpse of the Future of « PoliticalWarfare » • ...while Russia has pioneered the toolkit of asymmetric measures for the 21st century, including cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns, these tools are already yesterday’s game. Technological advances in artificial intelligence (AI), automation, and machine learning, combined with the growing availability of big data, have set the stage for a new era of sophisticated, inexpensive, and highly impactful political warfare. - from Exsum, RUSSIA, THE WEST, AND THE COMING AGE OF GLOBAL DIGITAL COMPETITION--LINA POLYAKOVA,SPENCER P. BOYER (Brookings Institution) Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  30. Deterrence (“Escalation dominance”) • Deterrence is a tool for reducing “bad” acts or “threat” from an unacceptable level to a more acceptable level, if not zero. • To “model” I use a population growth map – not a linear “action-reaction” model. Instead, threat capacity grows by spreading, or multiplying a threat population. But as threat increases also increase the deterrent, its rate of growth diminishes in proportion to its capacity growth. • E.g. “escalating” the deterrent may reduce the threat “stock” that upgrades in response. The total threat still remains greater. • This change makes “deterrence” non-linear in effect – and thus potentially chaotic. Arguably, we have seen this occur in the Middle East. • I submit that this may well be the “new normal”, with all that implies. • It can be modelled by a formula: • Xt+1 = RXt(1-Xt) • Where Xt is the initial capacity for harm or “threat”. • The equation gives a “quadratic map” – best solved by cobweb iteration • The (1-Xt) is the effectiveness of the deterrent on reducing R, the rate of “threat reproduction” – the growth of threat capacity - compared to its full reproductive capacity. • What’s “new” is that R(1-Xt) can not only reduce the rate of threat increase, but it can also pass a critical threshold beyond which lies chaos... • Can we not suggest this helps explain what happened to the USSR in 1989? • Can we not then suggest that this is a possible outcome at which US North Korea policy currently aims? Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  31. Here’s What That looks Like https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:LogisticCobwebChaos.gif#/media/File:LogisticCobwebChaos.gif • File:Logistic_map_scatterplots_large.png#/media/ • File:Logistic_map_scatterplots_large.png Guy Stanley 14-03-2018 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: Logistic_Bifurcation_map_High_Resolution.png#/ media/File:Logistic_Bifurcation_map_High_Resolution.png Note thatthisistechnical chaos: aperiodic, bounded, deterministic, sensitive dependence on initial conditions

  32. But Wait! What Happens When Others Join In? • Three possibilities: Competition, Predation, Mutualisation – the latter is rare: could it happen in Korea? • “Invasion” is the handmaiden domestic division. My “enemy” is my enemies “friend”. But Great Power Deterrence also operates (umbrella). So the “friend” concentrates “bad acts” on domestic enemies, or takes heat himself that would otherwise be felt by the domestic faction my enemy “rescues”. Competition & predation combined. • The refugee flow further reduces the scope for “bad” acts directed outward. • Other Rivals of the enemy Ally rally to support “the people” against the invader helping the local dictator. • The scale of “bad” enters the “chaos” zone. But the energy is directed inward. The “deterrent” structure is effective; chaos also forestalls mobilizing national solidarity against invaders. • Thus we move from “balance of power” to “ecology of horror”. (Think Syria) Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  33. Is “chaos” now a more cost/efficient alternative to “commitment” or “loss”? • “Liquid War” – permanent flows around the map, from weak ordered State to w.o. State: non-state actors, special operators, private and public. Keeps the pot stirring. • Chaos by design: weaponizing “strange attractors”, i.e. Reciprocating social division, varying deterrent tolerance so it is unpredictable, using on again-off again economic sanctions. Minimizes national caps to resolve own issues. • Conflict as “timeless” process: Pressing on long-standing divisions and points of ambiguity (e.g. Donbas, Baltics, Georgia, WTO trading system, and the Koreas.... • Is conflict protracted because no general settlement is possible, or the reverse? (If the rock hits the pitcher or the pitcher the rock, it’s bad for the pitcher.) Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  34. Chaos looks much easier to “manage” than stability – or is it? • Russia/Iran in Syria? Turkey? • Israel v. Syria& Iran? What about the GCC & Jordan? • China-Japan – Australia in the Pacific? China is playing its “civilizational” card, so Japan? Whither Taiwan? • Trump - under threat at home - wants to substitute military hegemony for a shrinking economic hegemony. Is this even feasible? • Putin wants to return Russia to its Petrine borders and strut upon the stage as a champion of authoritarian global order – and now has Poland and Hungary following. • Can order dominate chaos in this line-up? Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  35. GETTING TO SCENARIOS A SUGGESTED PROCESS

  36. Scenarios – Stories and Outcomes? Prob Whew! That was close! Mushroom Clouds and Dover Cliffs – Vera Lynn. (Dr. Strangelove) Guy Stanley 14-03-2018 Zone of acceptable tension Ouch! That Hurts a Lot!! Monty Python armless knight VAR 0

  37. Scenarios II Futures States • Three horizons: Present, Future and Middle Transition: for issue and region and (possibly) world • Three or four sided cube (s): Focus on interconnections and driving forces: Is Stability Possible? (“Strange attractors” interlinking and feeding off local chaos and ambiguities.) • Our organization & Process (next slide) Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  38. Scenarios Scenario • Choice: Teams or individuals? • Choice: Pick a method (consensus or team choice?) • Devise, scenarios (plus a wild card?) (e.g: Best case, worst case and middle case, plus wild cards) • Scenarios should consider: • Cast of actors • Driving and stabilizing forces, trends and vectors? • What’s at Stake • What ‘s the scope • Games and outcomes • Risks and Probabilities • Thursday: As a group, we will put the scenarios on the table and boil down to one set + wild card (if we can – more if we can’t.) Guy Stanley 14-03-2018

  39. Nowit’s Over to You!! Guy Stanley 14-03-2018 Thanks for your time and attention!!

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