Intergovernmental strategies for the UK Government: views from the centre

1. Presentation for ESRC seminar on Incongruence and Intergovernmental Relations, London, September 2010 Alan Trench (University of Edinburgh and the Constitution Unit, UCL; Author, ‘Devolution Matters’ blog) Intergovernmental strategies for the UK Government: views from the centre

2. Devolution and intergovernmental relations • Evidence clear that little thought was given when devolution was being framed in 1996-8 of its impact on UK as a whole – hence limited and late attention to such issues as ‘the English question’ incl West Lothian question, devolution finance, and arrangements for intergovt co-ordination • This rested on a misunderstanding of what devolution was about – ‘dual devolution’ and interdependent devolution (cf J Mitchell’s work) • Once in place, the centre treated devolution as an event not a process • Therefore not surprising that UK Govt had no clear ‘strategy’ for management of intergovt relations either – and the easy conditions in which it functioned between 1999 and 2007 meant it was under little pressure to put one in place • That changed after 2007: the UK level has been under greater pressure to have some sort of strategy, even if that has not been fully thought through or consistently implemented.

3. Possible territorial strategies for the UK Government In principle, 4 general strategies are open to the central state for managing the territorial politics of the devolved UK: • An all-UK electoral strategy, emphasising the presence of the governing party in each electoral arena and relying on party linkages and interest to ensure policy co-ordination. This emphasises direct appeal to voters to legitimise actions at the centre, with an assumption of UK-level hierarchical superiority • An ‘interparliamentary’ strategy, emphasising the role of elected legislatures and links between them (at expense of governments). This emphasises the democratic element of government – and is weakened by the extent to which executives now dominate the practice of politics.

4. Possible territorial strategies cont’d • An ‘intergovernmental’ strategy: emphasise role of governments dealing with each other, and use their pragmatism to secure agreement when necessary. Means only one institution needs to deal with another tier of govt – simplifies institutional relationships • A ‘disengagement’ strategy: distinguish as clearly as possible between devolved and non-devolved matters, allow a high degree of autonomy for devolved ones, and minimise spill-overs. Aspires to replicate classic ‘dual federalism’. If successful, creates a high degree of political insulation for UK from devolved policies, if not vice versa.

5. The relationship of these strategies The four strategies mapped out above aren’t exclusive of each other. In particular, 1 and 2 can be quite readily combined, and 3 and 4 can be combined. In other words, approaches that emphasise ‘integrated democracy’ are mutually consistent, and those that emphasise ‘separated governments’ are mutually consistent – but other combinations are neither consistent nor (probably) workable. 1 or 2 need institutions at the centre to articulate the interests of particular territories (cf Bundesrat in Germany or Ständerat in Switzerland) And 3 and 4 need a willingness to use intergovernmental machinery, reshape both legal and administrative structures, or both

6. Other strategic issues for the centre • Should the UK level try to put all the devolved territories in, as much as possible, the same position, and treat them in the same way – or should it treat each of them individually in an ad hoc, bilateral way? • This could bring a degree of consistency to government, and individual citizens’ rights, across the UK • Logically, could be accompanied by seeking to distinguish the government of England from the government of the UK as a whole • What is the remaining role of the UK and of ‘Britishness’? What is the UK for, after devolution? • Rhetorical/symbolic Britishness – ‘British values’, ‘last night of the Proms’ etc • Or something tangible and practical (like the NHS: universal right to free health care regardless of means free at the point of use) • Or is UK level happy to rely on habit and inertia? • Key point: these issues are linked, or should be treated as linked.

7. Applying territorial strategies: what Labour did, 1999-2007 Expectation of high degree of interpenetration and interaction (Dewar’s ideas for UK Cabinet Cttees/JMC) Memorandum of Understanding deliberately terse – left things to be worked out in practice, and relied on territorial Secretaries of State as mediators Process of drafting bilateral concordats more important than their practical application In practice • Informal conduct of relations • Reliance on ‘goodwill’ • Dealing with disagreements behind closed doors, and in knowledge there would be a solution • ‘Conditional autonomy’

8. Understanding what Blair’s Labour did • Little attempt to disentangle functions, at least constitutionally or formally (though some additional functions devolved – student support in Wales, rail transport in Scotland & Wales) • No reform of financial arrangements, whether fiscally, struc-turally or institutionally • Disuse of formal JMC mechanisms – little intergovernmen-talism • Extensive executive linkages, but mainly bilateral and at ‘working’ official level • Limited interparliamentary links, and impetus for those came from Westminster – not Whitehall, Millbank or devolved legislatures (and mostly relating to Wales) • But strong role for internal party debates – vivid e.g. of that in responses to Richard Commission (Better Governance for Wales: title of both internal party paper of Sept 04 as well as white paper of June 05)

9. Understanding what Blair’s Labour did II • Heavily bilateral, and made a virtue of that. Occasionally accompanied by rhetoric about ‘Britishness’ but with negligible substantive content • Failure to act on the NHS a good example • Therefore best understood as a version of the ‘all UK electoral’ strategy – electorally, Wales and Scotland were Labour heartlands, and it did well in much of England too • But all this was unconscious rather than deliberate or strategic • Bilateralism, in particular, was a surprising choice for a social democratic government, and is one left-of-centre govts elsewhere tend to eschew • Shows greater concern with ‘not rocking the boat’ and existing electoral tactics rather than an understanding of the implications of constitutional change or an attempt to take more strategic view

10. What Brown’s Labour did, 2007-10 • Four-way change in 2007 – not just SNP govt in Scot-land and Labour-PC coalition in Wales, but also Gordon Brown as PM and change of Cabinet personnel and restoration of devolved govt in N Ireland • Launch of constitutional debates in Scotland & Wales: National Conversation, All Wales Convention • Calman Commission started as Scottish Labour initiative, gained support from Unionist parties & through Parliament – but could only get underway once UK Govt gave consent • Slow revival of JMC framework and extension into substantive policy areas through JMC (Domestic) • Impetus for JMC (D), at least, from Scotland • Revision of Memorandum of Understanding

11. What Labour did, 2007-10, cont’d • Fortuitous effects of constitutional debates taking place in separate arena – distanced both from day-to-day intergovt relations and ‘ordinary’ policy debates • Minimised intergovt strife arising from devolved inabilities to deliver policies • Calman was a partial attempt to use an interparlia-mentary strategy (led by Holyrood, involved Westminster) – but this was a tactical manoeuvre to legitimise action by one govt despite opposition from the other directly affected • It also meant that a wider debate directly involving the general public never happened

12. Understanding Labour policy, 2007-10 • Striking how much of impetus for ‘new approach’ to IGR came from outside London, including JMC revival, Scottish & Welsh constit debates. London may have reacted favourably, but this was reaction not active engagement let alone pre-emption • Bilateralism (and separate territorial offices in Whitehall) maintained as part of this • JMCs used only as a technique of management not for wider strategic purpose • UK response to wider debates very often a defence of status quo with little or no explanation (Nov 09 white paper Scotland’s Place in UK and dilution of Calman recommendations, response to SCBF or Holtham first report)

13. The Conservatives’ emergent strategy in opposition • ‘Respect’ agenda: the Sunday newspapers’ initiative • Coupled with emphasis on the Union (and a rationale for having it), and on Britishness (Niall Ferguson) • The electoral dimension: • Attempts to challenge strongly in Scotland – allocation of campaigning resources, • 12+ seats in Wales needed to form UK majority (but more limited campaign resources) • UCUNF alliance with UUP in N Ireland • Widely considered ill-advised • If it had worked, a meaningful Conservative electoral presence across UK would have legitimised a forceful role for Westminster (and limited that of devolved govts). Conservatives could have governed from London, subject to leaving devolved govts in their box: ‘respect’ need not have gone very far

14. The Coalition’s approach • Election outcome scuppered the all-UK approach – that Conservative strategy clearly failed, with no new seats in Scotland, none in NI at all, and fewer than expected won in Wales • Coalition looked to Lib Dems to provide support on Scotland • Programme for Govt included several devolution pledges, mostly reflecting shared or Conservative policies: • Implementation of Calman (C & LD manifestoes) • Referendum on legislative powers in Wales (C & LD) • Commission on West Lothian question (Con only) • Calman-style commission on finance in Wales, in lieu of any substantive response to Holtham (neither) • Commitment on fossil fuel levy (Lib Dem only) • Commitment on Corporation tax in NI – (Con only – itself a concession to UUs)

15. The Coalition’s approach II • Early talk of ‘respect’ coupled with visits etc • And plenary JMC meeting, June 2010 • But preserved separate territorial offices for Scotland, Wales & N Ireland • Devolved govts have however become sceptical about ‘respect’: • Cuts: strong resistance, especially from Wales – though too early to judge impact of spending review • Sheltering effect of commitments on health and education spending • Scotland has had gains (notably the fossil fuel levy), while Wales hasn’t • Timing of AV referendum • Timing of Welsh referendum on primary powers • Health quango reform (HPA and FSA) • Clear that WAG has embarked on an intergovt politics of hostility and criticism, while Scottish Govt has been much more guarded and cautious (and emphasised Scottish political arena) • Dangers for Whitehall of treating JMCs as end in themselves not as a policy instrument

16. The Coalition’s approach III • A high degree of insensitivity toward devolution issues from Whitehall – perhaps explained by a combination of speedy action by new govt, and ministerial lack of awareness (cf the election manifestoes & their limited devolution literacy) • But again, is there a devolution strategy from Whitehall? • Continued bilateralism • ‘Britishness’ rhetoric emphasising traditional symbols e.g. Armed forces • No evidence of any attempt to disentangle functions, or think what that means • Greater use of intergovernmental mechanisms; but is that an embrace or a necessity? • Loss of D-G Devolution from new Cabinet Office structure • Conservative promise of ‘Welsh minister’ in every department has (unsurprisingly) not been delivered • Role of UK Parliament: will territorial select committees take a more active role? • WAC already active in previous Parliament (LCOs and policy matters) • As much to do with party politics as institutional or constitutional strategy

17. In conclusion ... • Before 2010, it’s questionable whether there was in fact an intentional UK Govt devolution strategy. There were many ad hoc interactions, but little by way of consistent, formulated planning, whether for particular parts of the UK (NI possibly excepted), let alone for the whole • Between 2007 and 2010 there were attempts to become more strategic – but these were limited. While policy may have become more energetic and engaged, it was still largely reacting to initiatives from elsewhere rather than seeking to make the running • To go back to the four approaches sketched at the outset, these approaches are a combination of 1 (all-UK electoral strategy) and 3 (intergovernmentalism). • This involves reconciling two broadly irreconcilable approaches, which may explain many of the strains and difficulties that have emerged in the management of intergovt relationships since 1999

18. In conclusion II ... • In any event, the UK lacks both the UK-wide institutions at the centre needed to make 1. work properly, given that the UK Parliament does not in fact pay much heed to territorial interests (territorial select cttees notwithstanding). • The institutions for intergovernmentalism (JMC, chiefly) are still under-institutionalised as well. • While it is early to judge on the experience of the Coalition govt, it seems to have made very little difference. Policy remains fragmented, bilateral, ad hoc and reactive. • Even though the political and constitutional stakes have risen very considerably • Quaere does Whitehall, and do ministers, realise that?

19. In conclusion II ... • Perhaps this is unsurprising; one of the ironies is that Labour’s approach in office seems to have been naturally ‘Tory’, and Labour eschewed approaches that would have been more consistent with a social-democratic agenda concerned with state-wide equity if not uniformity • Cf Conservative approaches in Canada, or traditional Liberal ones in Australia (pre-Howard) • Arguably, this reflects a wider lack of strategic thinking on Labour’s part more than anything else • And to reconcile different electoral strategies in different arenas, two of which it regards as its natural strongholds • Challenges for a new govt are considerable; not just incon-gruence, but profound policy disagreements underlying that, notably about cuts. UK Govt may not realise how lucky it has been, both in how easy relations were until 2010 and in how the insulation of constitutional debates helped it.

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