The threat of the use of force in WMD counterproliferation:

1. The threat of the use of force in WMD counterproliferation:   Comparing the cases of Syria, Iran and North Korea Professor Christoph Bluth Division of Peace Studies, University of Bradford

2. The second nuclear age • The end of the strategic nuclear confrontation • The end of Great Power armed conflict? • The decline in inter-state conflict • A democratic peace? • News Wars, international terrorism and ungoverned spaces • The emergence of conventional global power projection capabilities • The irrelevance of nuclear arsenals?

3. The changing dynamics of nuclear proliferation • Nuclear proliferation risks during the Cold War • The changing role of nuclear weapons in international security • Nuclear proliferation as the key strategic challenge • Nuclear weapons in crisis regions • Nuclear weapons and ‘rogue states’ • Non-Proliferation and Counterproliferation • The “myth of nuclear proliferation”

4. Rogue states • Isolation from the international community • Authoritarian/Totalitarian Government • Human rights violation • Failure of the political elite to adhere to/internalise international norms (on the use force in particular) • Failure to respect the territorial integrity of other states and use of state sponsored terrorism • Development of nuclear, chemical, biological weapons

5. The origins of the Iranian nuclear programme • The Shah’s nuclear ambitions • Khomeinei and the rejection of the Islamic bomb • The Iran/Iraq war: The search for WMD • The Khan proliferation network • North Korean missile proliferation

6. Secrecy & Deceit • A civilian or military nuclear programme in Iran? • Secret enrichment and the violation of IAEA safeguards • The illogic of domestic enrichment • The infrastructure of a weapons programme • Weaponisation: Project 111 • The controversy over the US NIE • The ballistic missile programme

9. Iran’s Motives • Deterrence of Iraq • National pride and prestige • Ambition to be the dominant power in the region • Deterrence of the United States • A deterrent relationship with Israel? • Conflict with the international community as an instrument to achieve domestic legitimacy • Regional power struggle with Saudi Arabia • Aim: A full-fledged capability or just potential?

10. The legality of the use of force • The legal case against Iran: Violation of obligations under the NPT • Remedies under international law: Enforcement actions (demand for inspections, demand for implementation of remedies, sanctions agreed by the UNSC) • Strikes against Iran on the basis of self-defence • The Israeli assassination programme and the Stuxnet attack

11. The strategic dilemma • Towards a nuclear agreement with Iraq? • If diplomacy fails: The futility of the use of force in the cause of counterproliferation • Can a nuclear Iran be deterred? • The dilemma posed by Iran’s regional ambitions and the potential impact of a nuclear deal

12. Repudiation of Iran deal by USG • US withdraws from the JCPA • No evidence that Iran is in violation • Claim: JCPA only postpones a nuclear Iran • Reason given: JCPA does not address the issue of ballistic missiles and Iran’s involvement in Syria, Iraq etc. • Sanctions to enforce change in Iran’s policy • Rift between US and Europe on JCPA • Defiant Iran continues with compliance for now

13. The strategic dilemma If diplomacy fails: The futility of the use of force in the cause of counterproliferation • Can a nuclear Iran be deterred? • The dilemma posed by Iran’s regional ambitions and the potential impact of a nuclear deal

14. North Korea’s security dilemma • Strategic isolation • The US threat: Real or imagined ? • Socio-economic collapse: The North Korean state is not viable • Reform threatens the regime • The problem of succession • The challenge of the Republic of Korea

15. The North Korean threat • 1.North Korea’s security dilemma as the source of threat • 2. The use of low-level military actions • 3. The nuclear and missile threat • 4. Proliferation of unconventional weapons • 5. The threat of collapse • 6. Propaganda and subversion • 7. Assessing the risks

16. The strategic dilemma on the Korean peninsula • 1. The division of the Korean peninsula • 2. The Korean War and its aftermath • 3. North Korea: The long march to ruin • 4. South Korea: From dictatorship to vibrant democracy • 5. The military confrontation on the Korean peninsula • 6. Containment or engagement ? • 7. Korea and regional security in North East Asia

17. Dealing with the NK nuclear programme • The first nuclear crisis 1994 and the “agreed framework” • The first Bush administration: isolate and contain • The collapse of the agreed framework • The Six Party Talks and the 13 February agreement • The succession crisis and the second nuclear test: suspension of the Six Party Talks • Obama and the policy of “strategic patience”

18. The first nuclear crisis and the ‘agreed framework’ • North Korea and the NPT • The conflict over IAEA inspections • The failure of negotiations and the threat of the use of force • The meeting between former President Carter and Kim Il Sung • The agreed framework – freezing the plutonium programme • The failure to achieve a missile deal

19. The second nuclear crisis • The Bush doctrine, 9-11, and the ‘axis of evil’ • The collapse of the agreed framework: threat of containment but not the use of force • The origins of the multilateral talks • The failure of the Six Party Talks • The role of China • The ROK and the North Korean nuclear programme • North Korean negotiating tactics and strategic objectives: Renewed confrontation and the nuclear test • The February 13 Agreement: Towards a Resolution of the Nuclear Issue ?

20. Understanding North Korea’s nuclear policy • The nuclear programme as an instrument to address North Korea’s security dilemma • The dynamics of confrontation and engagement • North Korea’s only card: How to cash it in without losing it. • Military threats as a diplomatic instrument

21. Assessing the failure of engagement • Unconditional engagement (separating economics from politics) has not produced tangible results • Efforts to use political and economic inducements to end the nuclear program in NK have failed • Attempts to bind NK into institutions have failed • Explanation: NK does not act on the basis of norms, but only power • NK’s self-isolation means the regime is not integrated into the international community and seeks to leverage needed economic support by coercion

22. Perception of increasing threat Nuclear development continuing unabated Frequent tests of short-range and medium range missiles Internal turmoil: Kim’s rule of fear, the killing of Jang Son-thaek (uncle), Kim-Jong-nam (half-brother) Election of Trump: Abandon Obama’s policy of strategic patience

23. Escalation of crisis • Testing of Hwasong-15 missile (ICBM ?) July 2017 • Tense and escalating rhetorical threats. Trump threatens “fire and fury” • September 2017: North Korean nuclear test. Kim threatens missile attack on Guam and nuclear test over the Pacific • US initiates policy of “maximum pressure” with sanctions

24. Return to engagement South Korean president Moon Jae-in invites North Korea delegation to Winter Olympics to initiate engagement and relaxation of tension Moon/Kim summits April 2018/May 2017 Trump/Kim Summit in Singapore 12 June 2018

25. NK conditions for denuclearization • Ensuring the United States and South Korea do not locate nuclear weapons strategic assets within the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula[ • Ceasing development or operation of strategic nuclear assets during USFK–ROK combined military training • Ensuring the United States will not attack North Korea with conventional or nuclear weapons • Converting the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement into a peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula • Establishing official diplomatic ties between North Korea and the United States.

26. Results of summit • NK commitment to denuclearization but no practical steps yet except closure of test site and cessation of missile and nuclear tests • Cancellation of US-ROK military exercises • Return of remains of US soldiers from Korean War • Trump offers security guarantees in the even of denuclearization • De facto suspension of policy of “maximum pressure” and exemption of South Korean from sanctions

27. The future of Korea • Doubts about denuclearization: Will the crisis resume? • Engagement without resolving the nuclear issue • Has the role of China in North Korea weakened as a result of US engagement and South Korean conflict mediation? • Possible outcome: Partial denuclearization, closer relations between North and South • Peace treaty: Is it achievable?

28. Syria and chemical weapons • Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal • The use of chemical weapons against rebels in the civil war • Defiance of the international community

29. Syrian chemical weapons activity https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity

30. Syria and chemical weapons • Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal • Obama’s Red Line: Failure to obtain approval for the use of force. • Disarmament to avoid military strikes • Failure of compliance • The Trump administration and the controlled strike on Syrian facilities • Empty threats and gestures: the failure of compellence

31. WMD proliferation and the use of force • The effectiveness of deterrence of new nuclear powers • The proportionality of the use of force to constrain nuclear developments • The legality of the use of force against nascent nuclear states • Diplomacy works: The threat of the use of force is not credible or proportionate • Lessons of the Iraq War – escalation of the threat of force to a disastrous conflict