Georg Sootla Professor of Public Policy Tallinn University

1. Configurations of politico-administrative roles in organisation of public administration reforms. (Inductive approach ) Georg Sootla Professor of Public Policy Tallinn University

2. Why inductive approach • Deductive theories are not exclusive and focus on selected dimensions of reform process • Shifts in understanding policy process (P.Sabatier vs. W.Parsons) • Reform as story to understand it as systemic phenomena

3. Variables • Institutional environment • Actor and possible ways of interactions • Division of labor along politico/administrative lines

4. 1. Institutional environment • Triggers: external pressure – accidental events • Conceptual background: explicit choice based on core values – non-understanding – hidden agenda • Political support – over-politicized vs. lack on any interest

5. 2. Actors • From corporation of political elites – • Weakly structure or even informal but powerful actors (PHARE experts)

6. 3. A-P-R • Problem of political vs. administrative coordination (as deductive variables)

7. Main patterns of reform organization 1. professional-technocratic configuration 2. politico-administrative balance 3. interagency conflict 4. politicised reform configuration 5. rational actor configuration 6. bureaucratic reform configuration

8. 1. Professional-technocratic configuration • Issue is considered as purely technical • Low political sensitiveness of main issue • Absence of clear political/ conceptual focus and choice • Main actor – outside experts/academicians • Main actors do not favour (neglect) civil service in the policy process; • Issue is initiated by external pressure or benchmark

9. Professional technocratic configuration 2 7. Implementation issues are secondary or out of consideration or taken for granted 8. Civil servants tend to become veto player 9. Late inclusion of other P/A actors (ministries, agencies) and constituencies, who become restrictive/ destructive variable

10. 2. Politico-administrative balance • Issues of implementation are at the first site or policy seek answer to very practical problems • Clear leading agency -- Ministerial or interministerial commission -- which can raise above the ministerial specific interests • Main micro-triggers and pressures to foster reform activities from implementation controversies • More attention to conceptual issues but absence of mechanisms of involvement of conceptual debates

11. Politico-administrative balance 2 5. Low intensity of party competition on that issue; may be problems to rise new issues into political agenda 6. Civil servants 6.1.as main source of policy advice; 6.2.gradual substitution of politicians by key civil servants in decision-making at commission; 6.3.high level of cooperation between civil servants from different ministries at commission work; integration of all actors into coherent network;

12. Bureaucratic reform configuration • Low interest of politicians • Main triggers are practical issues • Focus on piecemeal solutions of certain issues, general picture could be clear but does not play definitive role • Sectoral autonomy could promote very close professional cooperation or could foster also interagency conflict

13. Bureaucratic reform configuration 2 5. Very open and inclusive / network type of policymaking 6. Especially crucial importance of political links with agenda-setting locus 7. Solution of practical issues at implementation began gradually to reveal crucial conceptual problems and political choices, which could trigger debates and interagency conflicts

14. Interagency conflictconfiguration • Conceptual controversies raise at the forefront • conceptual positions become to back clear interests, but still low intensity of party political interests; • Agencies started to focus on their own dimension of reform, 3.1.all started to develop their own configurations of reform management; 3.2.different and high variety of configurations of reform management 4. Attempt to involve the same persons – especially among higher civil service – into decision arenas increase internal controversies and conflicts at the level of working groups

15. Interagency conflict configuration 2 4. Interagency conflict has raised on political level 4.1.Decision-making capacity of ministerial commission low because key ministers out of commission 4.2.MC cannot never become as the lead agency; • Conflict over Civil service issues starts to block also other central reforms (local government, central institutions).

16. Politicised reform configurationl(rational choice explanations) • Trigger and conceptual directives from political corporation (cohesiveness needed) • Temporal coincidence of strategic interests of key actors (political corporation and local government leaders • Exclusive style of policy making • Civil servants as technical support structure at best Top CS out of game

17. Politicised reform configuration 2 5. Destabilisation of implementation structure (lead agency) 6. Loss of interest in reform immediately after adoption of Act 7. Considerable reshaping power balance along in the power vertical 8. Considerable controversy (unbalance) basic values inside institutions

18. Political rational actor configurationl • Very clear political initiative (coalition agreement) and will, collegial cabinet • Development of clear comprehensive programme, i.e. conceptual starting points, which were backed by political agreements (also with Parliament factions at the stage of elaboration). • Lead agency as Complex network , which includes ministerial committee assisted by administrative support structure (Office of PA Development). • Leading agency as arm length to Commission but not as coordinator of interministerial actions (commissions, working groups).

19. Political rational actor configuration 2 5. Attempt to receive expert advice from outside of civil service (PA Reform Council) 6. Very sophisticated (multilevel) and coherent system of preparation/ implementation from Cabinet to regional committees 7. Inability to develop similar structure in the dimension of Central Administration and Civil service reforms which failed at the outset 8. Developing political support from below through political trade-offs

20. In conclusion • Reforms are far from being linear hand having certain logic, model of management • Inductive approach makes it possible -- to find probable points of breakthrough and failure -- to generate non-controversial styles of communication between actors • Politico-administrative balance as a key for consistency of reforms