Anthony I. Jack, & Tim Shallice (2001). Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness. Cognition, 79, 161-196. Ikejiri Yoshifumi 12, Dec., 2005. 1. What ’ s the Problem? 2. The Function of Consciousness 3. Type-C processes 4. Introspective Evidences
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Anthony I. Jack, & Tim Shallice (2001).
Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness.
Cognition, 79, 161-196.
12, Dec., 2005
1. What’s the Problem?
2. The Function of Consciousness
3. Type-C processes4. Introspective Evidences
5. A Framework for Understanding Conscious
6. Argument Defending Physicalism
◆ What is the underlying mechanism and processes that
giving rise to conscious experiences?
What’s the Problem?
◆ How do we tackle this problem?
→ Biology as an example
→ To characterize the properties of consciousness
e.g. 1. Introspection as a method
2. NCC approach
◆ What is the function of consciousness?
The Function of Consciousness
◆ Why the function is unknown?
→ No clear agreement about what needs to be
explained – no coherent data
◆ How should we do anyway?
◆ “We are conscious of sth..” vs.
“We have consciously performed an action.”
e.g. 1. the processes underlying attentional selection
2. the control processes such as planning,
problem solving, inhibition of pre-potent
response, etc. in prefrontal cortex
Two Senses of Csns
◆ “Awareness is necessary for intentional action”
e.g. Jacoby Exclusion Task
Conceptual Linkage Between the Two Senses
◆ To be noted, this principle is just a working
hypothesis, the aim is to provide a thorough scientific
characterization of this principle in information-
1. To provide an account of how the principle should be
grounded in phenomenology
Three Ways to Make a Scientific Characterization
2. Providing precise specification of the relation between
perceptual awareness and intentional axn (in
3. Explain intentional axn in information-processing
◆ Introspective evidence is necessary to identify Type-C
processes, that can only operate on information
available for report and be recruited when tasks
involve intentional axn
How does Phenomenological Understanding be used?
◆ Is this a HOT model?
→ No. To be conscious of information,, it is sufficient
for any Type-C process to be effectively operating
on that information. Thus, subject need not making
◆ Type-C processes are processes that can only operate
effectively on information when normal subjects
report awareness of that information.
◆ The enable and the endow view
1. The process underlies conscious reflection
→ underlie the ability to categorize one’s own sates of
Pre-experimentally characterized Type-C processes
2. The process which underlies the ability to freely report
the identity of an unanticipated but known stimulus at
the time of presentation
→ It is the same process whatever type of stimulus
is being recognized
3. The process underlies the re-experiencing of a past
event held in memory
→ The process underlies checking the veridicality
of recalled information, or the planning of action
4. The process involved in encoding material into
episodic memory – the process that underlies the
ability to retrospectively report the identity of the
earlier stimulus in a free recall task
Experimentally characterized Type-C processes
5. The process of “exclusion” involved in the Jacoby
6. The process underlying the discounting of perceptual
fluency due to prior exposure of a stimulus
→ This process underlies the abolition of various
“perceptual fluency” effects, such as judgements of
familiarity, preference, perceptual clarity,
brightness and darkness
7. The process underlying the addition of stimuli to a
discriminatory response set
→ Jack’s paradigm – Incorporation of the stimulus
into the response set required conscious
◆ A basic assumption underlying the approach is: if on
some occasions subjects carry out a task in the
absence of awareness of particular information (e.g.
the identity of a masked word), then we conclude that
Type-C processes are not necessary for processing the
information in that manner (e.g. semantic priming)
◆ Main problem: Mis-intepretation & difficult to gain
◆ How to avoid?
→ Use introspective evidence to examine the self-
reflective subsystems – the processes responsible
for the “model’ subjects have for understanding
their mental states – and the effect these processes
have on thought and behavior
→ Use introspective evidence to distinguish between
mental states – by using the information that is made
available to reflective subsystems when subjects
However, it should be noted that we do not interpret
this information as information about our functional
states, rather, we use our won folk-psychological
We replace or refine the subject’s model by i) providing
a well specified model and ii) re-interpreting the subject’s reports in terms of a testable functional theory
◆ In sum, introspection could be done under these
1. relevant conscious states can be reliably elicited
by varying the stimulus and/or experimental
2. the introspective reports are closely related to
◆ High-level operation → Conscious processes
Informationally encapsulated processes → Non-
A Framework for Understanding Conscious Processes
◆ The Norman – Shallice model
◆ The model is concerned with action selection. It has
1. Special purpose processing subsystems
2. Action and thought schemas
3. Supervisory Attentional System (SAS) – to cope
with non-routine situations
◆ The Super robot -- Rene
Argument Defending Physicalism
◆ If Rene’s self-reflective capacities are to be useful,
then its subjective concepts should map onto
functional distinctions between its cognitive states.
And we could use Rene’s introspective reports as a
guide to Rene’s functional organization, as well as
providing data on the operation of Rene’s self-
Through experiencing “what it is like to” do well specified tasks, we may learn to relate our subjective understanding of our mental states to such objective specifications of those states.
◆ Legacy of Behaviorism
→ Introspection is not reliable
◆ Perception without awareness
→ Introspection is a reliable method for assessing
the presence or absence of awareness
◆ Logothetis (binocular rivalry paradigm) –
Stimulus remains constant while the conscious
percept changes (IT & STS) → necessary
◆ Frith – Stimulus changes while conscious percept
remains constant → sufficient
◆ Processes occur in the absence of awareness
◆ Problems for NCC approach – function of csns