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ICANN Evolution and Reform Analysis and Comments June 2002 Bucharest, Romania. ICANN. IRP. CHAIR: VINT CERF. 4 ccSO. 3 DNSO. 3 PSO. 3 ASO. 4 VB’s. GAC. 5 @ Large. Domain Name Support Org. Protocol Support Org. Address Support Org. At Large Membership 176,837.

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Icann evolution and reform analysis and comments june 2002 bucharest romania

ICANN Evolution and ReformAnalysis and CommentsJune 2002Bucharest, Romania


ICANN

IRP

CHAIR: VINT CERF

4 ccSO

3 DNSO

3 PSO

3 ASO

4 VB’s

GAC

5 @ Large

Domain Name Support Org.

Protocol Support Org

Address Support Org

At LargeMembership176,837

Becky BurrBob ShawChristopherWilkinsonWIPOOthers

Names Council (21)

AddressCouncil

ISPS

ITUIETFETSIWWWC

Trade Marks

Business

RIPEARINAPNIC

Non-Commercial

Registries

Registrars

Country Code Managers

General Assembly

ICANNThe Internet Compartion for Assigned Names and Numbers

President & CEO: Mike Roberts

November 1998 - 9 Member Virgin Birth Board


ICANN

CHAIR: VINT CERF

5 Liaison

* Nom Com

2 CCSO

8 “At Large”

2 GNSO

2 ASO

Generic Support Org

Country code Support Org

Address Support Org

g Registries

g Registrars

c Registries

RIR’s

ISP’s

Large bus. users

Small bus. users

IP orgs

Academic/Public

Consumer groups

Individual Nameholders

IAB/IETF

TAC

GAC

4 unspecified

Selected by the Nominating Committee*

Names Council (16)

AddressCouncil

International Council (number unspecified)

TACIAB/IETFRSSACSACGAC

ISPS

Registries

Voting members commit to ICANN policy development

Registrars

RIPEARINAPNICLACNICtbd

Non-Commercial

Trade Marks

Business

Others ?

General Assembly

ICANNThe Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers

President & CEO: Stuart Lynn

Board seats

Standing committees


Erc proposal

The “Names Council”

ISP

Business

ISP

Business

Registries

Non Commercial

Registries

Non Commercial

Registrars

IP

Registrars

IP

Elected by Nom Com

(voting)

Elected by Nom Com

(voting)

Elected by Nom Com

(voting)

ERC PROPOSAL

Chair

Selected by the Council

Providers

Users

GAC Appointer

(non-voting)


Erc proposal1
ERC PROPOSAL

The Country Names Council

Unspecified number of regionally voting Councillors

Unspecified number of regionally voting Councillors

1/3 of Council by :

- appointments by Nominating Committee (voting),

- 1 GAC appointee (non-voting)


Overview icann a blueprint for reform
Overview: ICANN: A Blueprint for Reform

“A Blueprint for Reform”, posted 20 June 2002, summarizes the recommendations of the Evolution and Reform Committee (ERC) to the ICANN Board of Directors

Process accelerated in February, 2002 with paper “ICANN: A Case for Reform”, followed by the renaming of the Board committee to the Committee on Evolution and Reform, and several papers:

Staff Paper on What ICANN Does

Working Paper on ICANN Mission and Core Values

Working Paper on the ICANN Structure and the Nominating Committee Concept


Overview cont d
Overview, cont’d

  • A Blueprint for Reform:

  • Result of extensive consultation and outreach since February, 2002

  • “A Case for Reform” was controversial in some aspects; less so in others.

  • Broad community agreement that changes were needed; no agreement on many of the solutions proposed in the Case for Reform.


Goal of blueprint is to ensure an icann that is
Goal of Blueprint is to ensure an ICANN that is:

  • Effective and responsive

  • Streamlined processes that support participation but lessen burdens of unnecessary procedures

  • Has more credibility

  • Maintains consensus where possible, but has timely conclusions, able to make decisions

  • Supports individual and other forms of participation

  • Has adequate funding

  • Maintains open and transparent processes


Mission and core values
Mission and Core Values

  • Discussions about “Thick” versus “Thin” didn’t bring any answers

  • Input from community confirms that ICANN does have some policy making responsibilities

  • ICANN’s role is to perform the technical coordination and to obtain the policy guidance for it.

  • ICANN’s role in policy should be limited to those areas reasonably related to ICANN’s technical mission


Mission and core values1
Mission and Core Values

  • Differences in view will continue regarding when ICANN is outside its mission parameters

  • ERC didn’t define “boundaries” but called for follow on work.

  • Propose to reject view that ICANN should not be involved in policy at all.

  • Notes importance of addressing questions with input of those affected, and the public interest.


Icann s mission is to coordinate stable operation of the internet s unique identifier systems
ICANN’s Mission is to coordinate stable operation of the Internet’s unique identifier systems.

ICANN coordinates:

-allocation and assignment of three sets of unique identifiers for the Internet (Domain Names, Internet Protocol addresses and autonomous system (AS) numbers, Protocol port and parameter numbers)

-operation and evolution of the DNS’s root name server systems

-policy-development as necessary to perform these functions.


Icann s structure as presented has some significant changes
ICANN’s Structure, as presented, has some significant changes:

  • Composition of Board changes

  • Board doesn’t have power to ratify selections of Nominating Committee

  • Policy Organizations select/elect their own chairs and board members

  • Composition of Nominating Committee includes particular interest groups and public interest.

  • GNSO structure more detailed

  • Establishes Country Code SO (CNSO)

  • Disestablishes PSO; Establishes TAC

  • Governmental involvement strengthened in terms of how broadly the GAC is involved and gives new power to GAC.

  • Remains a public benefit corporation chartered in California, with an elected Board of Directors


Icann s board structure 15 member board presently 19 5 non voting liaisons
ICANN’s Board Structure--15 member board (presently 19), 5 non voting Liaisons

Voting Members (15)

  • Nominating Committee appoints 8

  • Policy Supporting Organizations each select 2 (for a total of 6)

  • President of ICANN

    Non voting Liaisons (5)

  • Technical Advisory Committee (TAC)

  • IAB/IETF

  • Root Server System Advisory Committee (RSSAC)

  • Security Advisory Committtee (SAC)

  • Government Advisory Council (GAC)


Supporting organizations
Supporting Organizations non voting Liaisons

  • GNSO: Generic Names Supporting Organization

  • CNSO: Country Names Supporting Organization

  • ASO: Addressing Supporting Organization

  • No Protocol Supporting Organization in new model

    Four Standing Advisory Committees

  • GAC

  • TAC

  • RSSAC

  • SAC

  • All would be appropriately staffed


Gnso purpose engaging in activities relevant to gtlds
GNSO: non voting LiaisonsPurpose: engaging in activities relevant to gTLDs

  • Developing policy recommendations to the ICANN board

  • Nurturing consensus across the GNSO’s constituencies

  • Initially: 6 voting constituencies

  • Open to adding others as provisionals, but have to meet certain criteria

    Providers Users

    -gTLD registries -business const.

    -gTLD registrars -int. property const.

    -ISP const. -non commercial const.


Gnso council aka generic names council
GNSO Council: aka Generic Names Council non voting Liaisons

Initially, 6 voting members elected, 2 each,

  • by the provider voting constituencies

  • and user voting constituencies

    PLUS

  • Three voting members elected by NomCom

  • AND

  • One non voting liaison appointed by the GAC


Further organizational details gnso
Further Organizational Details: GNSO non voting Liaisons

  • Chair selected by voting members of GNSO

  • Size may change if provisional constituencies become voting constituencies, goal is to maintain overall balance among three main groups; as well as equality of representation between provider and users. Votes may be reallocated accordingly with these changes.

  • Renewable two year, staggered terms


Further organizational details gnso s general assembly is significantly modified
Further Organizational Details: non voting LiaisonsGNSO’s General Assembly is Significantly Modified

  • Member of GNSO Council, appointed by the Council, as chair

  • Cross constituency meeting place of voting and non voting constituencies

  • Exists for purpose of exchange of information and ideas

  • Resource for creation, under GNSO Council direction, working groups, drafting groups, Task Forces

  • Not forum for decision making or taking formal positions; no votes

  • Use of moderated discussion lists and forums. Unmoderated lists can exist in other fora.

  • GNSO Council has responsibility for GA

  • Review by Board via independent entity of GNSO and Council in 12 months with changes possible at that time if needed


Cnso purpose engaging in activities relevant to country code top level domains
CNSO: non voting LiaisonsPURPOSE: ENGAGING IN ACTIVITIES RELEVANT TO COUNTRY CODE TOP LEVEL DOMAINS

  • Develops policy recommendations to the ICANN Board

  • Nurtures consensus across the CNSO’s constituencies [members], including the name-related activities of the ccTLDs

    ERC:

  • Acknowledged diversity of ccTLDs, concerned with which responsibilities fall under purview of national or local jurisdiction and those that lead to the need for global harmonization.

  • Concluded CNSO is forum where distinctions will be further developed and from which global aspects will emerge.

  • Concluded there is an interplay between ccTLD domain names and other identifiers whose global policy coordination ICANN is charged with and that interaction within the ICANN sphere is required.


Cnso composition and selection
CNSO: Composition and Selection non voting Liaisons

  • Intended to be a policy development body

  • Voting membership: include representatives of ccTLDs registries committed to global policy development through ICANN’s processes, as evidenced by signed agreements or by other means, such as funding support

  • CNSO Council composed of a) regionally elected members selected by and from among voting ccTLDs and b) several additional voting members chosen by the NomCom, with emphasis on individuals with experience in global names policy and c) a non voting GAC liaison. Regionally elected members should comprise about 2/3’s of Voting members.

  • Shouldn’t be separately incorporated, or a trade association for cc Administrators. Those functions should occur outside ICANN.


Status on addressing cctld agreements
Status on Addressing ccTLD Agreements non voting Liaisons

  • ERC hasn’t addressed these issues

  • Progress is being made

  • ERC recommends that the Board encourages the GAC and delegates from the global ccTLD community to explore possible resolutions


Aso address supporting organization
ASO: Address Supporting Organization non voting Liaisons

  • Viewed as working well

  • Few changes except addition of non voting GAC liaison


Advisory committees
Advisory Committees non voting Liaisons

  • GAC: Committee with bylaws determining its membership. Advisory to Board.

  • Has non voting liaision seat on Board, policy organizations, and other advisory Committees.

  • Should receive notice and opportunity to comment on all ICANN policies before taken.

  • Invites the GAC to explore ways for multi-way communications


Rssac root server system advisory committee
RSSAC: Root Server System Advisory Committee non voting Liaisons

  • Stays largely the same

  • Adds GAC liaison

  • Appoints a non voting liaison to Board

  • Review of RSSAC by ICANN to be conducted on recommendations on effectiveness, including security planning and current relationship to ICANN

  • Some have expressed concern about further formalization of some operational aspects; however the present root server operators have widespread community support.


Sac security advisory committee
SAC: Security Advisory Committee non voting Liaisons

  • Stays largely the same

  • Adds GAC liaison

  • Appoints non voting liaison to Board


Tac technical advisory committee
TAC: Technical Advisory Committee non voting Liaisons

  • Available to provide technical advise and guidance to Board and other organizations

  • Resource and active watchdog for technical issues

  • Meeting point for various parts of technical community

  • In part, replacement for PSO, but has different purpose.

  • At minimum,membership could include: IETF, ITU, ETSI, and W3C, plus three members with strong technical background appointed by the NomCom.


Nominating committee nomcom purpose select directors and other individuals
Nominating Committee (NomCom) non voting LiaisonsPurpose: select Directors and other individuals

  • Intended to balance representative selection of other directors and positions to ensure that ICANN can benefit from individuals of highest integrity who place public interest above special interest, and who are knowledgeable about the environment ICANN operates in.

  • Chair appointed by Board and two non voting liaisons, RSSAC and SAC.

  • The NomCom is an attempt to balance providers, users, technical and public interests.


Composition of the 19 delegates appointed to the nomcom
Composition of the 19 delegates appointed to the NomCom non voting Liaisons

One delegate from each of the following:

gTLD registries Academic and other public users

gTLD registrars ccTLD registries

Consumer/Civil Society Address Registries

Ind. Domain Name holders IP Organizations

IAB/IETF Internet Service Providers

Large Business Users TAC

Small Business Users GAC

PLUS

Unaffiliated public interest persons (4)


Selection of the nomcom
Selection of the NomCom non voting Liaisons

  • Constituencies select their own reps

  • Where no constituency is in place, Board will appoint delegates following consultation with bodies who “speak” for the affected groups

  • Will be further defined in Transition Process

  • Objective would be to qualify other constituencies to appoint noncom delegates

  • At Large could play part as matures

  • Terms would be non renewable two year terms

  • Limitations on serving as board member for a year following serving on NomCom


Policy and process
Policy and Process non voting Liaisons

  • ICANN Board is ultimate decision making body.

  • May be instances when Board has to act if consensus not reached

  • Everything that ICANN does in not policy. Certain characteristics should determine what is policy

  • Policy development through bottom up consensus process should be encouraged.

  • IF Board doesn’t accept a policy recommendation of a policy body, it must return to the SO with clear statement of concerns to be addressed

  • If resubmitted to Board, a 2/3’s majority would be required to reject or modify.


Policy and process cont d
Policy and Process, cont’d non voting Liaisons

  • Process: New policy development or revisions can be generated by Policy body, or by Board.

  • Clear criteria are presented for any policy development process.

  • Emergency situations might require temporary measures.

  • Elements of policy development must include timelines, process for public input and other advice, and process for consensus wherever possible.

  • Staff support will be provided to SOs

  • Task Force of representatives from ICANN community will recommend specific set of policy development procedures and timetables, to complete work by August 31,2002


Accountability
Accountability non voting Liaisons

  • Ombudsman Office is established, reports to the Board. Has its own budget, authorized by Board. Charter adopted by Board after public comment.

  • Public Participation: Staff position to manage public participation and facilitate receipt and analysis of all public comments.

  • Reconsideration: amended to apply to actions by staff which are alleged to contradict board policy or inconsistent with known facts, or 2)actions by Board alleged to be based on error. Sets timeline for reconsideration.

  • Amendments to by-laws require 2/3s vote, as now

  • Creation of non binding arbitration will be required for allegations that Board acted in conflict with bylaws.


Government participation
Government Participation non voting Liaisons

  • GAC to appoint liaison to

  • Board

  • Nominating Committee

  • Non voting liaisons to each of the SO councils and the Advisory Committees

  • Appoint contact individual to coordinate between IANA and particular government officials in delegations or redelegations are pending

  • GAC should be requested to participate in dialogue with ICANN and ccTLD community re consummation of agreements that provide framework of accountability


Advisory panels
Advisory Panels non voting Liaisons

Board can create expert advisory Panels

Advise is not binding, but adds to record


Funding
Funding non voting Liaisons

  • Core of funding to come from those registries and registrars with agreements – primarily today the gTLD registries and registrars

  • Base funding should come from these sources

  • Other sources include RIRs and ccTLDs where ICANN does not yet have agreements

  • Board should pursue a mechanism where those with agreements forward a fee based on approx. 25 cents US. This fee is collected by the registries and registrars on behalf of all beneficiaries of the ICANN process.

  • Expenditures are subject to public annual budget approval.

  • Priority to build reserves. Amount can be reduced once reserves are in place.


Internal icann structure
Internal ICANN Structure non voting Liaisons

  • Technical/operational functions ICANN manages should be organizationally and functionally segregated to the extent possible from policy functions.

  • There is no plan to separate technical and policy functions into separate organizations


Some interesting points
Some Interesting Points non voting Liaisons

  • Role of ccTLDs seems better recognized and importance of positive dialogue seems clearer.

  • Relationship of funding mechanism and how it applies to ccTLDs unclear.

  • Agreement to keep the users and providers together in policy making in gTLDs is positive.

  • Selection of own board members and chairs by policy entities is improvement and key.

  • Approach to structure of policy development SOs is still rather top down through insertion of NomCom selected participants, and new GAC liaison


Interesting points cont d
Interesting Points, cont’d non voting Liaisons

  • Structure of NomCom and its scope and the non-constituency selected delegates is rather unclear

  • Role of NomCom in how many/who they select seems very significant. Scope of influence appears broad for untested new organization.

  • Although not voting, governments via the GAC seem to have moved into a “watch” and liaison role in all functions. Represents a significant shift and a huge change in work responsibility for the GAC members

  • Recognition of need to staff policy development important step.


What are the other key areas which still need addressing
What are the Other Key Areas which still need addressing? non voting Liaisons

  • Still lots of work to be done after Bucharest on incomplete areas affecting ccTLDs

  • Process of design of new gTLD SO may also have implications for ccTLDs

  • Transition from DNSO into new CNSO will require planning and coordination with existing entities

  • Do the GAC members want new role; have time and finances to support expanded work functions implied?

  • Does this change the private sector leadership in any significant way?

  • Other Questions?


Aptld on reform

APTLD on Reform non voting Liaisons

A comparison of the APTLD position paper with the report of the Board Committee on Evolution and Reform


Aptld paper erc

Focused on Lynn paper,which: non voting Liaisons

Invites governments to bring pressure on cctlds

Was written alone

Departs substantially from Lynn paper

Encourages GAC and cctlds to talk

Has received substantial ccTLD input

Aptld paper ERC.


Aptld erc

Failure to reach contracts due to misunderstanding by ICANN of role of LIC, Govts.,ccTLD managers, and ICANN’s relationship, leads to imposition of “g-solution”

“global aspect is of extreme importance, …….requires an intense interaction within the icann sphere”

APTLD ERC


Aptld erc1

ccTLD’s require entry in the IANA database of role of LIC, Govts.,ccTLD managers, and ICANN’s relationship, leads to imposition of “g-solution”

and root server service

Supports White Paper principles

No comment

No comment

General support of some, abandons direct election of @Large board seats

APTLD ERC


Aptld erc2

Does not favour enhanced role for governments of role of LIC, Govts.,ccTLD managers, and ICANN’s relationship, leads to imposition of “g-solution”

Places GAC appointees on Board, g-SO and ccSO and their councils.

Permits GAC comment

( or “approval”?) of every policy developed

APTLD ERC


Aptld erc3

Approves of ccSO of role of LIC, Govts.,ccTLD managers, and ICANN’s relationship, leads to imposition of “g-solution”

Disapproves of Nominating committee appointing SO Board members

Approves of CNSO

SOs select own Board members

APTLD ERC


Aptld erc4

Queried legal nature of role of LIC, Govts.,ccTLD managers, and ICANN’s relationship, leads to imposition of “g-solution”

maintains independent review

Confirms:

California corporation

maintains modified independent review, and adds Ombudsman

APTLD ERC


Further comments

Further Comments of role of LIC, Govts.,ccTLD managers, and ICANN’s relationship, leads to imposition of “g-solution”

APTLD has resolved to seek clarification from the ERC on a number of matters.

Until those answers have been considered, APTLD reserves its position on those matters


Aptld questions of erc
APTLD questions of ERC of role of LIC, Govts.,ccTLD managers, and ICANN’s relationship, leads to imposition of “g-solution”

  • The questions of the ERC are:

    1.What is the “interplay” and what are the “other identifiers”which requires the “intense interaction with ICANN” of page 11, para 2?

    2. What do the extra appointees to the International Council = 1/3 of the ccSO, while only 1/4 of the g?


Aptld questions of erc1
APTLD questions of ERC of role of LIC, Govts.,ccTLD managers, and ICANN’s relationship, leads to imposition of “g-solution”

  • What is the “imbalance” in the ccSO, which is made up of cc managers, to make policy for ccTLDs, which the NomCom appointees rectify?

  • If the NomCom is in response to the need for “at large” representation, where was it ever recommended that the At Large make appointments throughout the ICANN structure?


Aptld comments on erc
APTLD comments on ERC of role of LIC, Govts.,ccTLD managers, and ICANN’s relationship, leads to imposition of “g-solution”

  • There are occasional lapses in language in the Report where g-names are not clearly distinguished from c-names:

  • At pages 5, paras. 5&6 refer to “market mechanisms to promote… a competitive environment” and

  • “competition in the registration of domain names…”

  • at page 19 a per domain name levy is calculated of $0.25.


Aptld comments on erc1
APTLD comments on ERC of role of LIC, Govts.,ccTLD managers, and ICANN’s relationship, leads to imposition of “g-solution”

  • No reason is given as to why the ccSO could not separately incorporate, nor function additionally as a trade association.

  • Its hard to sustain an argument that failure to reach a cctld contract, a root server agreement, or an RIR contract is due to burdensome process.


Aptld conclusion
APTLD Conclusion of role of LIC, Govts.,ccTLD managers, and ICANN’s relationship, leads to imposition of “g-solution”

  • We are cautiously optimistic.

  • This is a good position to negotiate from.

  • Our (cctld) efforts in explaining our case seems to be achieving results.

  • We are committed to further work with our cctld colleagues and ICANN entities to further this important work


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