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Response to Rubin/Reason Foundation KRM Commuter Rail Statements

Response to Rubin/Reason Foundation KRM Commuter Rail Statements. January 16, 2009. #142212. Rubin/Reason Foundation Statements. Commuter rail is not an efficient way to travel to Chicago. Milwaukee to Chicago on Amtrak would be 89 minutes compared to 163 minutes on KRM. Response

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Response to Rubin/Reason Foundation KRM Commuter Rail Statements

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  1. Response to Rubin/Reason Foundation KRM Commuter Rail Statements January 16, 2009 #142212

  2. Rubin/Reason Foundation Statements • Commuter rail is not an efficient way to travel to Chicago. Milwaukee to Chicago on Amtrak would be 89 minutes compared to 163 minutes on KRM. • Response • While KRM would connect Milwaukee and Chicago, the objective is to connect Milwaukee, its south shore suburbs, Racine and Kenosha, and the north shore suburbs of Chicago—which Amtrak does not connect. • KRM would provide access to 140,000 jobs (not including downtown Milwaukee or Chicago or the Chicago north side). In comparison, a Milwaukee-Waukesha express bus would only connect about 100,000 jobs.

  3. Rubin/Reason Foundation Statements (continued) • Study did not adequately consider bus options • Limited– stop bus service with traffic signal priority • Rapid bus service along IH 94 serving the higher growth IH 94 area • HOT lanes • Response • Limited stop bus service with traffic signal priority and queue jumpers was in fact considered. • The specific objective was to serve lakeshore communities, not the area along IH94. • HOT lanes would be needed most in Milwaukee County, but would require substantial right-of-way expansion, and therefore are impractical.

  4. Rubin/Reason Foundation Statements (continued) • Commuter rail would draw Milwaukee Area FTA formula funds from MCTS. • Response • Milwaukee area transit systems currently annually receive about $20 million of FTA formula funds. • The current FTA formula would provide an additional $8 million in formula funds annually upon construction and operation of a commuter rail line.

  5. Rubin/Reason Foundation Statements (continued) • Commuter rail would impact other State transportation programs with $50 million one time capital funding need and $4 million annual operating funding need. • Response • This is true for all transportation projects. Not a reason for not doing a project, but costs and benefits of all projects should be carefully considered • The annual State transportation budget is $3 billion.

  6. Rubin/Reason Foundation Statements (continued) • UWM study of construction economic benefits is flawed because there are no local railcar suppliers. • Response • Super Steel has produced cars for Metra and the South Shore Line, and would have the capability to produce the railcars in southeastern Wisconsin.

  7. Rubin/Reason Foundation Statements (continued) • The flexibility of the bus alternative is ignored, and the impact of commuter rail on property values and potential developments is overstated. • Response • The flexibility of the bus is one of its important advantages—ability to relocate, reduce or terminate service. • This flexibility is in contrast to the permanence of the rail, but this permanence is what drives property values and development and redevelopment.

  8. Rubin/Reason Foundation Statements (continued) • Response (continued) • The projected increase in property value comes from national studies. • The projected land development/redevelopment around stations applies the Metra experience in northeastern Illinois with in depth study at each station involving local elected officials and staff, land and business owners, residents, and developers.

  9. Rubin/Reason Foundation Statements (continued) • Costs for the Muskego yard bypass were not included • Response • 20 to 25 CP freight trains per day are routed through the Amtrak station and downtown Milwaukee. • This bypass has been proposed, and will be done whether or not the KRM commuter rail proceeds.

  10. Rubin/Reason Foundation Statements (continued) • A contingency factor of only 17.5% has been included in KRM commuter rail capital costs • Response • Typical for commuter rail project • Physical restoration of existing track with some double track addition • Minimal freight traffic • Three of nine stations exist

  11. Rubin/Reason Foundation Statements (continued) • KRM commuter rail ridership is overstated. (Riders per vehicle hour is about twice national and Metra average). • Response • Ridership forecasts were extensively reviewed by FTA, and under went months of sensitivity analyses and modification with FTA. Ultimately, forecast ridership was increased by 10 percent. • Riders per-vehicle hour are higher and riders per station and train mile are lower as the initial service is proposed as a weekday only service with service focused on peak travel periods. Also, the KRM corridor is unique with a major city at each end, and two larger cities in between.

  12. Rubin/Reason Foundation Statements (continued) • A 2007 FTA study indicates that “New Start” transit guideway projects average 21% over cost estimates and 36% below ridership forecasts. • Response • This FTA study compares capital costs and ridership upon project opening to those projected at completion of corridor study (AA/DEIS). • The projects in the FTA study completed AA/DEIS in the years 1982 to 1995. FTA has been working with project sponsors to improve cost and ridership projection accuracy and has achieved significant improvement.

  13. Rubin/Reason Foundation Statements (continued) • Response continued) Rail Projects 1980 studies 1990 studies Ridership 25% low 14% low Capital Cost 27% high 6% high

  14. Rubin/Reason Foundation Statements (continued) • Cost per incremental passenger of commuter rail ($28) is far greater than the MCTS total cost per total passengers ($3) • Response • $3 MCTS cost only includes bus system operating cost. Including capital costs and ADA related costs results in $3.60 cost per passenger (2007) • KRM costs are in year of expenditure dollars (2012) while MCTS costs are in current year dollars—a 20% overstatement of KRM costs

  15. Rubin/Reason Foundation Statements (continued) • Response (continued) • The “total” cost per total passenger on MCTS is compared to the total cost per “new or incremental” passenger on KRM. • “New” meaning the additional passengers carried compared to an alternative bus service. • To be a fair comparison, the incremental cost of KRM per incremental passenger or the total KRM cost per total KRM passengers should be compared. • Using total KRM passengers would reduce Rubin”s estimate of KRM cost per passenger by 35%.

  16. Rubin/Reason Foundation Statements (continued) • Response (continued) • Lastly, Rubin notes KRM would carry much longer trips than MCTS—about 15 miles compared to 3 miles, but then he ignores that factor (it obviously cost more to provide service over a long distance!) Considering trip length and calculating cost per passenger-mile rather than per passenger reduces the KRM cost by a factor of 5. • Now, if you truly compare the total costs per passenger – mile, you would find the total cost per passenger – mile of KRM is about the same as MCTS!

  17. Rubin/Reason Foundation Statement – June, 2008 • “With substantial new funding, doubling MCTS ridership over five years is not at all unreasonable (getting back to 2000 ridership would be a 80% increase as of today’s ridership level)” • Response • A 24% increase in 2007 MCTS ridership would be needed to return to year 2000 levels • Doubling ridership would be extremely difficult, and likely impossible over five years • Eliminated fares – 30% increase • Doubled service – 40 to 50% increase

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