Bioweapons

1. Bioweapons Diseases, Detection, and Doctrine

2. I. Guillemin: Points to Remember • Three phases in the history of BW • Difficulty of effective employment – • US/UK difficulties in efficient aerosol dispersion. • USSR incidents in Kazakhstan and Sverdlovsk • Japanese program backfires (perhaps kills more Japanese soldiers than Chinese!) • Nonstate programs numerous but rarely effective: Criticisms of “Dark Winter” scenarios • No “Golden Age” of bioweapon use – defenses kept pace with offense. Chemicals more commonly used. Why?

3. I. Guillemin: Points to Remember • The Development of BW as WMD • Note the US progress in WW II • The “Immunity Deal” with Japanese scientists and Cold War Research • Bureaucratic politics and the need to match atomic-scale devastation (competition for scarce resources) • Arms races • “Looking Glass” justifications and overestimation of opponents • The surprising unilateral renunciation of Nixon – What explains it?

4. I. Guillemin: Points to Remember • Offense-defense overlap • Vaccines as keys to offensive BW • Project Whitecoat and the misuse of conscientious objectors • The dilemma of verification – the weakness of the BWC • The Soviet program • US resistance to verification • Merits and risks of secrecy • Responsible/Irresponsible nations distinction and international law

5. II. Supplements to Guillemin • Use in World War II • The case of Stalingrad… • Suspicious outbreak of tularemia at Stalingrad • Kenneth Alibek (Soviet weapons scientist) alleges USSR used bioweapons • Other scientists believe outbreak was natural

6. 2. Japan’s Unit 731 a. Guillemin lowballs the figures for Chinese deaths. But Langford (Introduction to Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2004, p.142) says 250,000 Chinese killed by Japanese BW, mainly plague. b. A few thousand – 250,000 is a big range. Can we narrow down the effectiveness of the Japanese program?

7. i. Testimony of Hayashi Shigemi (October 7, 1954) • "In 1943…(we) spread cholera once in Shantung Province... The germ was first dumped into the Wei River, then the dike was destroyed to let the water flow into a larger area to rapidly spread the germ. I personally participated in this mission. I handed the germ to Kakizoe Shinobu, an Army medical doctor. He then in turn sent someone else to spread the germ. According to my knowledge, in our local area there were twenty five thousand two hundred ninety one Chinese people who died from this. How many died altogether I do not know, because it was top-secret information. Our mission was to murder Chinese people in mass, to test the effectiveness of the cholera germ, and to be ready to use it in fighting the Russians.“ • Problem: Unable to locate source of testimony (reprinted on highly nationalist web sites – but no trials in 1954…)

8. ii. Sources of evidence • Estimate of 3000 = testimony of one official who witnessed about 600 deaths/year for 5 years at Ping Fan • Now considered “gross underestimate” because excludes other camps • Prisoners not issued unique IDs: 101-1500 used as ID numbers, then recycled with next batch of prisoners. X-Rays destroyed by end of war. • NONE of these estimates include the actual plague outbreaks in China. But can those be blamed on Japanese BW, or were they natural? • Ishii had incentives to exaggerate effects of BW

9. iii. Possible BW-caused epidemics, 1939-1942 • 1939-1940: Typhoid (near Harbin) from well poisonings • 1940: Cholera (near Changchun) • 1942: Paratyphoid A and Anthrax (near Nanking) • 1939-1942: Plague epidemics near Ningbo (possibly from infected rats released in cities by Japanese troops)

10. c. Bureaucratic Politics? • Japanese forces were decentralized (Unit 731, Unit 100, Eu 1644, other units) • Ishii-Kitano rivalry created incentives to overestimate BW effectiveness by both researchers • Hypothesis: Ishii and Kitano deliberately avoided use of controls (i.e. comparison to plague deaths in non-BW areas) in order to produce results (think US BMD tests or manufacturers’ tests of effectiveness for parallels) • Hypothesis suggests deaths were >10,000 (killed directly) but <250,000 (because that ascribes all epidemics to BW, which is probably false) • Proven BW-induced epidemics killed <1000 in each case, sometimes < 100 • Accordingly, real figures more likely to be in 20,000-50,000 range • Problem: No evidence with which to test hypothesis. Much was destroyed and most of the rest is STILL classified by the US

11. B. A broad definition of bioweapons 1. Pathogens: Cause illness 2. Toxins: • Produced by biological organisms or synthesized in the labs • Generally worse than “chemical weapons” • Also prohibited by treaty -- “biological and toxin weapons” different from CW even if toxins are synthetic

13. C. Types of Pathogens • Antipersonnel – To kill or disable people. Focus of most writers. • Antianimal – To kill livestock or pack animals. Less useful with mechanization, but still economic weapon.

14. 3. Antiplant: A neglected hazard • US stockpiled fungi (wheat stem rust, rye stem blast, rice blast) until 1972 for use against crops • Most existing fungi have some corresponding fungicides – ineffective unless transport / industry destroyed • Monoculture increases vulnerability – use of GEOs (genetically engineered organisms) increases risk because generally are cloned/engineered and patented. • Potential devastation. Examples = Irish potato famine, American chestnut blight

15. 4. Antimateriel • Microbes can attack petroleum (developed for cleaning up oil spills) • Other microbes produce rust and degrade rubber (less useful against modern alloys and plastics)

16. III. Biological Weapons: The Threat A. Characteristics: Dependent on type of agent and dispersal mechanism 1. Types • Major Categories: Bacteria, Viruses, Toxins • Persistent (Anthrax) vs. non-Persistent (Influenza) • Lethal (Botulism) vs Incapacitating (Q Fever) • Contagious (Smallpox) vs. non-Contagious (Anthrax) 2. How powerful are bioweapons? Answer depends on goals of program. Needed: BW strategy and doctrine

17. B. The Ideal Mass Killer: Characteristics • Persistence: Spores or local animal reservoir • Highly lethal (% infected that die), with little immunity • No effective treatment (i.e. reducing mortality or enabling productivity) • Factors encouraging epidemic formation • Communicable between people (usually trades off against persistence – ideal is BOTH animals and people as carriers) • Relatively long incubation period • Asymptomatic infection: Infectious before symptoms emerge • Vague onset symptoms • Widespread dispersal • LowID50– Amount needed to infect 50% of people (median infective dose) • Which pathogens come close?

19. C. Do BW Superweapons Exist? • No natural disease qualifies • Genetic engineering can increase lethality and virulence – but usually not persistence or communicability • Tendency for reduced virulence over time – disease that kills 100% usually burns out before infecting all possible hosts. Result = evolution to weaker forms over time. • Who would build one – and why? Conclusion: Assessing risk requires analysis of strategic choice

20. D. The Strategic Choice of Antipersonnel BW Agents • Two key choices = whether pathogen will spread on its own (communicability) and whether disease kills or merely sickens (lethality)

21. 1. Bioweapons: Design Choices

22. 2. Bioweapons: Strategic Choices

23. 3. Bioweapons: Selected Examples

24. IV. In Depth: Four BW Agents • Selected as examples of general classes of BW agents

25. A. Smallpox (Variola virus) • History • Most deaths of any infectious disease (500 million deaths in 20th Century alone) • Natural disease eradicated • Last U.S. case – 1949 (imported) • Last international case – 1978 • Declared eradicated in 1979 • Officially, only two stocks remaining (US and Russia)

26. c. Use of smallpox in war i. French and Indian Wars (1754-1767) • British gave Native Americans infected blankets • Outbreaks ensued, some tribes lost 50% ii. Allegations of use in U.S. Civil War iii. Alleged use by Japanese in China in WWII

27. d. Why worry about an eradicated disease? • Former Soviet Union scientists have confirmed that smallpox was successfully weaponized for use in bombs and missiles • Active research was undertaken to engineer more virulent strains • Possibility of former Soviet Union virus stock in unauthorized hands

28. 2. Bioweapon Potential a. Features making smallpox a likely agent • Can be produced in large quantities • Stable for storage and transportation • Known to produce stable aerosol • High mortality • Highly infectious • Person-to-person spread • Most of the world has little or no immunity

29. b. Likely effects of attack • Nonimmune population • <20% of U.S. with substantial immunity • Potential for more potent attack • Engineered resistance to vaccine

30. c. Paths to attack • Airborne route known effective mode • Initially via aerosol in BT attack • Then person-to-person • Hospital outbreaks from coughing patients • Highly infectious • <10 virions sufficient to cause infection • Aerosol exposure <15 minutes sufficient

31. d. Epidemiology of smallpox • Person-to-person transmission • Secondary Attack Rate (SAR) • 25-40% in unvaccinated contacts • Relatively slow spread in populations (compared to measles, etc.) • Higher during cool, dry conditions • Historically 3-4 contacts infected • May be 10-20 in unvaccinated population • Usually requires face-to-face contact • Very high potential for iatrogenic spread 

32. FEVER – 4 – 3 – 2 – 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 21 Days Pre-eruption Papules-Vesicles Pustules Scabs RASH Onset of rash 3. Symptoms and Outcomes a. Incubation: Four-day period before rash develops

33. b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms (not infection) • Day 1: Initial rash appears minor

34. b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms (not infection) • Day 2: Papules appear

35. b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms (not infection) • Day 3: Rash is distinct; papules are raised evenly

36. b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms (not infection) • Day 4: Vesicles have become firm and filled with liquid (highly infectious)

37. b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms (not infection) • Day 5: Vesicles have become pustules. Fever rises.

38. b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms (not infection) • Day 7: Unmistakeable smallpox rash (note that the chest / torso usually have less pox than face / extremities – unlike chicken pox)

39. b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms (not infection) • Day 8-9: Pustules reach maximum size.

40. b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms (not infection) • Day 10-19: Pox dry up and scab over. Scabs contain live smallpox virus. Victim is still highly infectious.

41. b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms (not infection) • Day 20: Victim ceases to be infectious, but is likely to be scarred for life

42. b. Symptoms of smallpox from day one of symptoms (not infection) • Again, note that torso has fewer pox than face / extremities:

43. c. Outcomes of smallpox • Historical data from limited-immunity populations • 

44. d. Predicting fatalities: Relevant Factors • S-shaped curve is known – but how many are in initial population exposed (first generation of cases) determines upper bound. • Any delay in notification logarithmically increases total cases (and deaths) • About 15% of those who get smallpox die in partially-immune populations • Danger is greater outside developed countries (little residual immunity)

45. Timeline of Emergence of Influenza A Viruses in Humans Avian Influenza H9 H7 Russian Influenza H5 H5 H1 Asian Influenza H3 Spanish Influenza H2 Hong Kong Influenza H1 1918 1957 1968 1977 1997 2003 1998/9 B. Influenza: A potential WMD? 1. History: Disease distinguished recently

46. a. 1918-1919: The worst recent pandemic

47. From America’s Forgotten Pandemic byAlfred Crosby “The social and medical importance of the 1918-1919 influenza pandemic cannot be overemphasized. It is generally believed that about half of the 2 billion people living on earth in 1918 became infected. At least 20 million people died. In the Unites states, 20 million flu cases were counted and about half a million people died. It is impossible to imagine the social misery and dislocation implicit in these dry statistics.”

48. i. US deaths from influenza greater than US killed in any war Thousands Civil WWI 1918-19 WWII Korean Vietnam War Influenza War War

49. ii. Military Effects • Slowed delivery of US troops on the Western front. • 43,000 deaths in US armed forces. • Slow down and eventual failure of the last German offensive (spring and summer 1918) attributed to influenza.

50. iii. An unusual flu – it killed military-age people