Cryonic Enabling Technologies And The Bioweapons Risk

1. Cryonic Enabling Technologies And The Bioweapons Risk What Happened to the “Committee on Advances in Technology and the Prevention of the Application to Next Generation Bioterrorism and Biowarfare Threats?" Presentation by Douglas Mulhall to Terasem Fourth annual virtual workshop On Geoethical Nanotechnology __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

2. Background Cryonic and related methods for preserving/ reviving humans and their memories require powerful nanotechnologies with “dual use” potential as bio-weapons. Dual-use-potential technologies include: DNA & cellular repair, self-assembling structures, artificial blood, artificial or biological replacement parts, multi- dimensional memory, and strong AI. The dual use debate has raged since Drexler explained it for nanotech in the 1980s and Joy and Kurzweil debated relinquishment. Despite the best minds working on it, no one has a workable solution. __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

3. The Dilemma Conventional policing measures don’t work because nanotechnologies are easy for small numbers of people to manufacture and difficult to track. For example, nuclear weapons require large infrastructures relatively easy to track remotely, while nanoweapons can be manufactured with a laptop and lab-on-a-chip. Present weapons policing can “afford to fail” without immediate catastrophic results. For example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is a slow-moving failure but no one has started a nuclear war…yet. One nuclear accident does not end the world. This might not be the case with nano bio-weapons. __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

4. There Is No Compelling Impetus Some scientists understand the potential risks but have not been able to generate action, while the voting public is largely unaware or only mildly concerned. A troubling example: Nanoparticles were put in products without adequate toxicity testing. New studies suggest some particles behave like asbestos in organisms. Despite this, industry continues to call such studies alarmist and is pressing ahead. This bodes poorly for proactive molecular manufacturing risk management. __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

5. Role of The National Academy of Sciences Recognizing such risks, the NAS formed a “Committee on Advances in Technology and the Prevention of the Application to Next Generation Bioterrorism and Biowarfare Threats.” In 2006, the Committee issued “GLOBALIZATION, BIOSECURITY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE LIFE SCIENCES”. Then the Committee disbanded hoping other organizations would take up its work. Let’s see what happened since… __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

6. The Report’s Recommendations OVERALL “A wide range of actions is required to successfully manage the biological threats that face society.” (Translation: Much money, time and effort required) __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

7. The Report’s Recommendations • Support the Free and Open Exchange of Information • Broaden the “Threat Spectrum” • Strengthen and Enhance Scientific and Technical Expertise • Adopt and Promote a Common Culture of Awareness and a Shared Sense of Responsibility • Strengthen the Public Health Infrastructure __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

8. Individual Recommendations (1) • Support the Free and Open Exchange of Information • “…restrictive regulations and constraints on the flow of information are not likely to reduce the risk that technologies will be used with harmful intent.” (i.e. relinquishment and suppression won’t work.) • “New developments in the life sciences and related technologies are essential to countering the future threat of bioterrorism; therefore, policies and practices that promote the free and open exchange of information in the life sciences should be supported.” (i.e. we’ve got a problem with secret weapons research.) __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

9. Individual Recommendations (2) • Broaden the “Threat Spectrum” • “U.S. national biodefense programs currently focus on a relatively small number of chemicals, chosen because of their history of development as potential biological weapons” • “A broader perspective on the “threat spectrum”, or types of possible threats, is needed.” (i.e. wake up and smell the coffee ! Nanoweapons are here !) __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

10. Individual Recommendations (3) • Strengthen and Enhance Scientific and Technical Expertise • “It is…. important to build a robust and sustained analytical capability within the national security community.” • (i.e. How to avoid bad analysis from Vietnam, Iran, collapse of the Soviet Union, Iraq, and 9/11 etc. etc.) __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

11. Individual Recommendations (4) • Adopt and Promote a Common Culture of Awareness and a Shared Sense of Responsibility • “…globally distributed, decentralized, and adaptive approaches to monitor and address the misuse of technologies …should be developed.” • “Specifically, a network of scientists who can recognize when technologies are being misused should be created…and report such activities to national authorities when the risk seems high.” (How well does whistle blowing work in the military research community ?) __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

12. Strengthen the Public Health Infrastructure • “An effective civil defense program requires a well-coordinated public health response, and this can only occur if there is strong integration of well-funded, well-staffed, and well-educated local, state, and federal public health authorities.” (The 2008 Midwest flooding showed little has changed since Katrina…) • “Despite substantial efforts since September 11, 2001, there is still no infrastructure in place to deal rapidly, effectively, and in a clearly coordinated manner when faced with a catastrophic event such as a large-scale bioterrorism attack.” (Needs a lot of money…) Individual Recommendations (5) __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

13. Conclusion “The global technology landscape is shifting so dramatically and rapidly that it was simply not possible for this committee—or any committee—to devise a formal risk assessment of the future threat horizon, based on the possible exploitation of dual-use technologies by state actors, nonstate actors, or individuals.” __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

14. Conclusion • We’re disbanding now and hope someone else carries on our recommendations… • Some of the group continue informal links through the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity http://www.biosecurityboard.gov/ __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

15. What’s Happened Since… • According to one of the report’s coordinators: • “Many of the recommendations are being considered by the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity… though the board hasn't implanted them yet.” • "threat spectrum" -- is being actively considered by the diplomatic and intelligence communities... related to compliance and verification regimes under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention…” __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

16. What’s Happened Since…(2) “security community to strengthen its S&T expertise -- have been acted on by the intelligence and national security communities…” “common culture of awareness and shared responsibility among scientists -- has been incorporated in statements ranging from the Royal Society and the InterAcademy Council to other scientific and public policy organizations” __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

17. Contradictions • Dictatorships don’t play by the rules and are already investing heavily in enabling technologies. • “National security” and “scientific openness” don’t mix. • Companies don’t like to be open or share information. • The mad scientist in a garage usually isn’t very open. • Technology outpaces regulation. An example is nuclear weapons where hundreds of open air tests occurred before stopping them. By comparison, the first “open air test” of a nano-bioweapon could be catastrophic. __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

18. The Inevitable Conclusions Cryonic-enabled life extension won’t help us if billions get wiped out by a bioweapons catastrophe or the technology is hijacked by dictatorships, wealthy individuals or private companies. To prevent this, these technologies require a globalized management regime. However, current weapons control mechanisms won’t work for advanced nanobiotech. Developing new mechanisms does not enjoy broad support. 3. There is no sense of urgency because the world is pre-occupied with food costs, fuel and climate changes, not nano-threats. __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

19. Are Nanotech or Green NGOs Working On A Nanobiotech Management Regime? Lots of talk, many published papers and some conferences. Issue addressed by CRN, Foresight, Singularity Institute. But not much effective action. Regulatory regimes focus on nanoparticles not molecular assembly. e.g. thousands of web pages on “risks of nanotechnology” but very few on “risks of molecular nanotechnology.” __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

20. Has Anybody Proposed Something New? Yes. Martine Rothblatt. Years ago. __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

21. The Strategy “Alternative Models for Managing Self-Replicating Nanotechnology…Applied to Land, Sea & Space-Based Scenarios In Which Self-Replicating Nanotechnology Is Necessary” Rothblatt 2005 __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

22. “InterRep, International Self--Replicating Technology Organization. Via treaty, to make this organization be exclusive, give it exclusive worldwide rights to self-replicator production rights.” Every country and corporation can be a member. This organization would finance itself by selling to its members the products and the benefits of self-replicating technology for resale. It would also, in turn, as part of the treaty, if you want to be part of InterRep, you have to agree that InterRep can monitor companies within your country that are doing molecular nanotechnology.” Core Concepts __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

23. Core Concepts (2) “Labs… set up in Asian, American, and Euro-African land masses so there could actually be competitive juices flowing at the different labs within InterRep… would be set up to compete with each other, so that we could move the technology forward as much as possible, all under the InterRep umbrella. Responsibilities if you sign up: you've got to enforce the InterRep self-replication exclusive nationally.” __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

24. Would It Work ? Anybody have a better idea ? Given the risks, contingencies for catastrophic failure are essential. __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008

25. Next Steps ? Develop the InterRep concept by reading Rothblatt’s presentation then establish a strategy to get it adopted in the globalized community. Set up mechanism to distribute to every government, bioweapons treaty organization, and nanotech organization as a proposal. Success requires leadership, infrastructure support and organization. __________________________________ Douglas Mulhall Terasem Presentation July 20, 2008