Development of Media Psychology Theory

1. Development of Media Psychology Theory Early history

2. Mass culture • Individuals unprotected from propaganda • Propaganda able to move masses, leads to radical action • Media powerful and broad-based, leading to a number of negative social outcomes

3. The new propaganda war • The Nazi Party in Germany, in its attempt to gain power and to spread its ideology, applied propaganda techniques from WWI as well as a new set of techniques • Seemed to have spectacular success in the latter 1930s, capturing the government and fomenting widespread hatred toward a number of groups--especially Jews

4. Characteristics of the mass • Great numbers • Aggregates of men widely dispersed over the face of the earth • Heterogeneous members • Anonymous individuals • No common customs or traditions • Open to suggestions • Behavior is “capricious and unpredictable” • Consists of unattached individuals • Do not play roles in a group

5. Other research and theory that supported powerful effects • Robert Merton (a major figure in American sociology) studied a radio program with Kate Smith that was very successful in getting people to buy war bonds • Concluded that Smith’s celebrity status and image as patriotic were crucial to success.

6. Then, in 1938 . . . • An event that seemed to prove all the worst fears people had about the startling power of the media.

7. War of the Worlds • An accidental occurrence seemed to validate some of the worst fears about mass society and the power of the newest mass medium, the radio • Orson Welles’ Mercury Theater of the Air’s broadcast of an adaptation of H.G. Wells’ War of the Worlds on Halloween eve, 1938

11. Research on the broadcast • The invasion from Mars: A study in the psychology of panic (1940: Princeton University) • Cantril, Gaudet, Herzog

13. The invasion from Mars: Radio panics America • Hadley Cantril (1940) • Personal interviews, scientific surveys, analysis of newspaper accounts and mail • Attempts were made to answer: • 1. What was the extent of the panic? • 2. What about this specific broadcast was so frightening? • 3. why did it frighten some people and not others?

14. Two questions (p. 67) • Note: “Even this broadcast did not affect more than a small minority of listeners.” • Why did this broadcast frighten some people when other fantastic broadcasts do not? • Why did this broadcast frighten some people but not others?

15. Why were people frightened? • Realism of the program • “sheer dramatic excellence” of the program • Use of ‘experts’ • Use of real places • early parts of the broadcast “fell within the existing standards of judgment of the listeners” • “If a stimulus fits into the area of interpretation covered by a standard of judgment and does not contradict it, then it is likely to be believed.”

16. Standards • “Radio as accepted vehicle for important announcements.” • “Prestige of speakers.” • astronomers • military men • Secretary of the Interior • “Specific incidents understood.” • colloquial English/bureaucratese • real places, buildings, highways

17. Standards • “Everybody baffled.” • on-air personalities claim bewilderment • “The total experience.” • projected environment • “experienced as a unit” • individual features of broadcast not adequate to explain reaction

18. Tuning in late • CBS survey found that 42% of audience tuned in late • after intro • strong relationship to belief that broadcast was news report rather than play • “Contagion the excitement created” • Someone suggested respondent tune in after show had begun [21% in AIPO survey; 19% in CBS survey]

19. Effect of late tune-in

20. Personal characteristics

21. Not paying attention to first announcements • “widespread habit” • station IDs and advertising • accounted for about 10% of those who misinterpreted the broadcast • actual n quite small (10% of 54 people who thought it was news reports)

22. Personal characteristics of listeners • Possession of ‘critical ability’ • Strong religious beliefs • Personality factors such as emotional insecurity, phobic personality, lack of self confidence, fatalism

23. Not paying attention to first announcements • most were casually scanning for something to listen to--not looking for Mercury Theater • Competing with Charlie McCarthy • vastly more popular than Mercury Theater • (34.7 to 3.6) • 18% of McCarthy listeners said they heard WOW, of which 62% said they changed after the first act (“Eddie Cantor effect”)

24. Classifying listeners • Researchers chose following scheme from among a wide array of possible classifications: • Those who analyzed the internal evidence of the program and knew it could not be true. • Those who checked up successfully to learn that it was a play. • Those who checked up unsuccessfully and continued to believe it was a news broadcast. • Those who made no attempt to check the authenticity of the broadcast.

25. Checked internal evidence • Did not remain frightened • 1. “Specific information they possessed and were able to project into the situation” • knew it was Mercury Theater • recognized Orson Welles • knew that time changes were too fast • knew that there weren’t three regiments of infantry in area • just recognized the events as too fantastic

26. Successfully checked the broadcast against other information • Checked other stations (most common) • “I turned to WOR to see if they had the same thing on and they didn’t so I knew it must be a fake.” • Looked up program in newspaper • “I tuned in and heard that the meteor had fallen. Then when they talked about monsters, I thought something was the matter. So I looked in the newspaper to see what program was supposed to be on and discovered it was only a play. • Asked friend, looked out window • (1 respondent each)

27. Unsuccessfully checked broadcast against other information • “Difficult to determine from interviews why these people wanted to check anyway” • seemed to be checking whether they were in personal danger yet rather than whether reports were authentic • Type of checking behavior was “singularly ineffective and unreliable”

28. Unsuccessful checks • Methods • Look out window or go outdoors (employed by 2/3 of this group) • Called friends or ran to consult neighbors • Telephoned police or newspapers • “Only one turned his radio dial. Only one consulted a newspaper.”

29. Reasons checks were unsuccessful • New information only verified their interpretation • “I looked out of the window and everything looked the same as usual so I thought it hadn’t reached our section yet.” • “I went outside to look at the stars. I saw a clear sky but somehow was not reassured.”

30. Reasons checks were unsuccessful • Observed data were interpreted as additional evidence that the broadcast was true • “We looked out of the window and Wyoming Avenue was black with cars. People were rushing away, I figured.” • “We tuned in to another station and heard some church music. I was sure a lot of people were worshiping God while waiting for their death.”

31. “I looked out of my window and saw a greenish-eerie light which I was sure came from a monster. Later on it proved to be the lights in the maid’s car.”

32. Others felt unable to trust their own observation, believing others knew more about the situation than they did. • Trusted the announcer on the radio as a source • “My son came home during the excitement and I sent him out to find one of the elders in the church to see what it was all about.”

33. Made no attempt to check the broadcast • “Over half of the people in this group were so frightened that they either stopped listening, ran around in a frenzy or exhibited behavior that can only be described as paralyzed.”

34. Reasons for not checking • So frightened they never thought of checking • “We didn’t try to do anything to see if it were really true. I guess we were too frightened.” • Adopted an attitude of complete resignation • “I didn’t do anything. I just kept listening. I thought if this is the real thing you only die once--why get excited?”

35. Reasons for not checking • Some felt they needed to take action. They prepared immediately for escape or death. • “My husband said we were here for God’s glory and honor and it was for Him to decide when we should die. We should prepare ourselves.” • “I couldn’t stand it so I turned it off. I don’t remember when, but everything was coming closer. My husband wanted to put it back on but I told him we’d better do something instead of just listen, so we started to pack.

36. Some remained constantly tuned in to see how to escape

37. The establishment of the ‘limited effects’ paradigm End of the ‘powerful effects’ model of media influence

38. Limited effects model • Beginning in the mid-1940s and lasting until the mid-1960s a very different view of media effects came to prevail—one that assigned a much more limited impact to the mass media • The American Soldier • Mr. Biggott studies • The People’s Choice and Voting • Klapper’s Effects of Mass Communication

39. Persuasion • Persuasion studies are really propaganda research that tends to take an effects approach • Persuasion really could be considered propaganda • Varies from single exposure individual effects studies to time-based campaign studies of population change

40. WWII American Soldier studies • Part of a large-scale social science investigation of American soldiers recruited or drafted for service in WWII • This part especially interested in the effects of Frank Capra’s propaganda films on the morale of new recruits/draftees • Why We Fight • Documentary explanation of the buildup to and early years of the war

41. WWII American Soldier studies • Part of a large-scale social science investigation of American soldiers recruited or drafted for service in WWII • This part especially interested in the effects of films developed to prepare soldiers for military duty • Why We Fight • Directed by Frank Capra • Documentary explanation of the buildup to, and early years of the war

42. Hovland • Experiments on mass communication: Persuading the American soldier in World War II • Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield (1949) • Studied the impact of showing Frank Capra’s propaganda films in “Why We Fight” series to American soldiers in a training camp • Many were draftees and did not want to fight

43. Films were intended to foster: • A firm belief in the right of the cause for which we fight • A realization that we are up against a tough job • A determined confidence in our own ability and the abilities of our comrades and leaders to do the job that must be done • A feeling of confidence, insofar as possible under the circumstance, in the integrity and fighting ability of our Allies • A resentment, based on knowledge of the facts, against our enemies who have made it necessary to fight • A belief that through military victory, the political achievement of a better world order is possible

44. Episodes taken from Why We Fight • Prelude to War • The Nazis Strike • Divide and Conquer • The Battle of Britain

45. Method • Show groups of soldiers different treatments, ask questions before and after to see if exposure led to change • Manipulated exposure, type of media used, movie with and without additional content presentation, etc. • Before-after control-group design • Interested in learning of information, change in attitudes and change in interest in fighting

46. Channel • The main study here tends to indicate that interpersonal channels are more effective at changing attitudes than are mass media channels.

47. Performance by medium

48. In-person presentation and movie effectiveness

49. Battle of Britain • Men in two camps--some exposed to film, some not • 2100 in one camp (before/after control group) • 900 in another camp (before/after control group) • 1200 (after-only control group) • Sampling by company units • Units matched on several demographic variables

50. Battle of Britain • Before and after questionnaires were slightly different • Tried to distract men from wondering why answering twice by writing “revised” on the questionnaire • One week between exposure and after measure • Anonymity was assured