1 / 8

Unknown Rogue River Spring Chinook Tragedy

Unknown Rogue River Spring Chinook Tragedy. January 23, 2019 Steve Beyerlin. Summary of the Effects of Adverse Management on Rogue Spring Salmon Populations.

plum
Download Presentation

Unknown Rogue River Spring Chinook Tragedy

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Unknown Rogue River Spring Chinook Tragedy January 23, 2019 Steve Beyerlin

  2. Summary of the Effects of Adverse Management on Rogue Spring Salmon Populations • 1972 Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for Lost Creek Project“The project will effectively isolate the upstream drainage area from use by anadromous fish. Maintenance of anadromous and resident fish populations will be dependent upon the fish hatchery (Cole Rivers) for artificial spawning and rearing”. • ODFW and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have failed to adhere to the (EIS) of 1972. By not producing a Hatchery Spring Chinook run of 13,020 adults at the hatchery as directed by the EIS. • Violation of the EIS and Dam Authorization have damaged fish runs and the Rogue basin economy. These violations extend to the contract with local governments and the public. • Faulty but challenged assumptions by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers concerning gravel migration have severely harmed Natural Spawning by not addressing spawning habitat needs. Oregon Strong, LLC

  3. ODFW and USACE has failed to adhere to the steps outlined in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) of 1972. • Cole Rivers Hatchery mitigation requirement per EIS:Produce 13,020 returning Adult Spring Chinook “to the hatchery” Reported Return EIS Required Mitigation Level 13,020 Adults Less Jacks and Wild Return /Adults Only Oregon Strong, LLC

  4. Violation of the Environmental Impact Statement of 1972 and Dam Authorization Have Damaged Fish Runs and the Local Economy. • Hatchery Spring Chinook shortfalls of - 63% over the last 14 years. • 4,881 Adult average return and points to a $4,688,064.00 loss annually. • Only 0.38% of hatchery Spring Chinook releases are returning to hatchery. Hatchery Steelhead from same hatchery avg. 1.4% return (3.7 times higher). • Natural Spawning Spring Chinook, are now - 60% of expected levels of 26,040. • 8,630 avg. return annually over last 20 yrs. (when adjusted for lost habitat)historically 26,040 minus 8,630 = -17,410 @ $576.00 = $10,028,160.00 Loss. • Wild Spring Chinook harvest has virtually stopped with huge economic impacts. • Wild / Natural Spring Chinook populations are shattered by two predictable, but manageable, habitat issues. • Water release temperatures during egg incubation – unavoidable • Lack of spawning habitat – avoidable (address both habitat issues). • EIS “Any flood control plan detrimental to the fishery resource would be unacceptable, both locally and to the Federal and State fishery agencies”. (This statement came from a public meeting in 1956 and followed all documentation forward) Oregon Strong, LLC

  5. Cole Rivers Hatchery returns over last 38 years Oregon Strong, LLC

  6. Spring Salmon Spawning Habitat in the Upper Rogue Basin Oregon Strong, LLC

  7. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Hatchery Mitigation Program • Quote from ODFW Statement on U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Mitigation Programs in Oregon, dated February 8th 2017. • “The Corps actions and failure to communicate, cooperate and collaborate in good faith with Oregon demonstrates their lack of commitment to their mitigation responsibilities. Despite ODFW’s leadership continuously communicating Oregon’s expectations regarding the federal governments’ mitigation responsibilities and the importance of these programs to Oregonians, the Corps leadership has continually failed to understand the role of these programs nor engage ODFW in discussions or negotiations regarding the fate of these programs. They have basically told Oregon what they are going to do, take it or leave it.” Oregon Strong, LLC

  8. Summary and Conclusions • The Final Environmental Impact Statement of 1972 was the official directive for the Lost Creek Dam Project. • We must recognize that the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife together with the Army Corps of Engineers were entrusted to follow the guidelines accepted by all in the EIS to ensure a viable, healthy Rogue River Spring Chinook Salmon populations has likely been forgotten. • When combining Economic Value of Lost Production of both NP/Wild and Hatchery Spring Chinook there is a $366M loss over last 21 years. • The failure to adhere to the steps outlined in the Environmental Impact Statement is both a violation of the EIS and also the Dam Authorization. • The failure to uphold the contract with local governments and the public who supported the project cannot be ignored. Without action decline may continue. Oregon Strong, LLC

More Related