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The Post-Cold War Era And the Global War on Terror

The Post-Cold War Era And the Global War on Terror. THE PROBLEM. How to conceptualize the connection between the global arena and U.S.-Latin American relations in the wake of the Cold War? And then 9/11? Widespread view: little if any connection

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The Post-Cold War Era And the Global War on Terror

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  1. The Post-Cold War Era And the Global War on Terror

  2. THE PROBLEM • How to conceptualize the connection between the global arena and U.S.-Latin American relations in the wake of the Cold War? And then 9/11? • Widespread view: little if any connection • My contention: the connection exists but is complex and contradictory

  3. READINGS • Smith, Talons, chs. 9-11 • DFC, Contemporary, chs. 1, 3

  4. After the Cold War: The Global Arena • Collapse of the Soviet Union • U.S. military primacy: the “unipolar moment” • “The End of History”? • Transnationalization and non-state actors • Process of “globalization” • Shift from geo-politics to “geo-economics” • Economic multipolarity: Europe, Japan, others?

  5. GEO-ECONOMICS: RULES OF THE GAME 1. Presumably “peaceful” competition 2. Positive-sum, not zero- or negative-sum 3. Goal: increase or guarantee share of economic benefits—without destroying (or even defeating) rivals 4. Strategy: Maintenance of global “stability” 5. Tactic: formation of “open” blocs

  6. RULES OF THE GAME (cont.) • Competitive arenas: • Consumer markets, natural resources (energy, water, etc.) • Technology • Financial markets • State roles: • Direct participation • Shaping of incentives • Legitimacy on basis of “market discourse” • Regional integration: • Strong seek to perpetuate primacy • Weak seek to avoid exclusion • Thus asymmetrical bargaining

  7. North American Free Trade (NAFTA/1994) • U.S. Perspectives: • Supplement to FTA with Canada • Support for neoliberal reforms in Mexico • Growing Mexican-American population within U.S. • Incentives for Mexico: • Exhaustion of alternatives • Need to stimulate growth • Perpetuation of Salinista policies • Key Characteristics: • Uneven levels of development • Cultural and political variation • Hub-and-spoke arrangements (with U.S. at center) • Absence of supranational authority (preservation of sovereignty)

  8. NAFTA: POLITICAL DIMENSIONS • The Public Assertion: Free Trade = Democracy • The Silent Bargain: International Dimensions • Political stability and social peace • Access to petroleum • Leverage vis-à-vis economic rivals • Compliance on foreign policy

  9. The Politics of Free Trade • NAFTA (1994) • FTAA process (R.I.P.) • Bilaterals and minilaterals: • U.S.-Chile (2004) • U.S.-Central America + D.R. (2005) • U.S.-Peru (2007) • U.S.-Colombia (2011) • U.S.-Panama (2011) • Alianza del Pacífico (Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru + others?) 4. ALBA-plus

  10. BUSH AND THE WAR ON TERROR • PHASE 1: BEFORE 9/11 • High level of presidential interest • Relationship with Mexico • (and Vicente Fox) • Near-agreement on immigration reform (?) • Support for FTAA • Administrative team • Isolation of Cuba • PHASE 2: AFTER 9/11 • Change in regional priorities • Unilateralist impulses • End of wholesale immigration reform

  11. RESPONSES FROM LATIN AMERICA • Broad sympathy; scores of own citizens • Occasional satisfaction • OAS support for action “as appropriate” • Appeals for proportionality • Fidel Castro: against terrorism and against war • Preferred option: the sidelines • Entanglements at the UN

  12. GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:THE RULES OF THE GAME • Nations can respond however they choose—including the use of indiscriminate force. • Preventive action is appropriate and acceptable. • There is no need to adhere to international treaties or conventions. • Alliances are formed around one central issue—the anti-terror campaign under U.S. leadership. Support is black-white. Democracy and human rights are secondary issues. • Spectator nations must tread cautiously.

  13. U.S. LOSS OF “SOFT POWER”

  14. U.S. PRESTIGE IN LATIN AMERICA

  15. CHANGING VIEWS OF U.S. • Distaste for Abu Ghraib, Haditha, “collateral damage” and loss of life • Solidarity with innocent civilians, hidden admiration for Osama bin Laden • Rejection of American society, not just U.S. foreign policy • Resentment of unilateral approach • Distrust of democratic crusade

  16. TWO-LEVEL GAMES • Geo-economic game + new geopolitical game, superimposed and simultaneous • Geopolitics > geo-economics if necessary • Low priority for region • Benefits of inattention (benign neglect?) • National preferences: which game to play? • Examples: • FTAs on basis of geopolitics • Reluctance on immigration reform • Allies in wars on drugs • Contradictions and trade-offs

  17. …AND BARACK OBAMA? • Redefinition of war against terror • Afghanistan > Iraq • Al Qaeda ≠ Taliban • Rules of game more subtly applied • Re Latin America, changes in rhetoric and emphasis rather than substance • Immigration • Drugs and drug trafficking • FTAs • Lingering effects

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