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Negotiations: Yet 10 More Things to Think About

Negotiations: Yet 10 More Things to Think About. Breakout Session # 504 Name: Dr. Mike Criss Date: Tuesday, July 20, 2010 Time: 2:00 pm - 3:15 pm. 1. Negotiations. Yet 10 More Things to Think About. Discuss of Academic Materials from 2008-2010 Negotiation Journal Books

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Negotiations: Yet 10 More Things to Think About

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  1. Negotiations: Yet 10 More Things to Think About Breakout Session # 504 Name: Dr. Mike Criss Date: Tuesday, July 20, 2010 Time: 2:00 pm - 3:15 pm. 1

  2. Negotiations Yet 10 More Things to Think About

  3. Discuss of Academic Materials from 2008-2010 Negotiation Journal Books Negotiation Genius Academic Settings Practical Discussions

  4. One Interpretive Filters: Social Cognition and the Impact of Turning Points in Negotiation Daniel Druckman, Mara Olekalns, and Philip Smith

  5. Events and Perceptions Impact Negotiations Turning Points External Sources Internal Sources Crises Vs. Breakthroughs Interpretive Filters Social Context Internal and External

  6. Events and Perceptions Impact Negotiations Social Climate Power Trust (external) Cooperative orientation (internal) Perceptions of Trust and Power Influence Outcomes – Agreements or Impasses

  7. Two The Structure of Negotiation: Lessons from El Salvador for Contemporary Conflict Resolution Jeffery Pugh

  8. The Structure Mutually Hurting Stalemate Indicators of Ripeness External Intervention

  9. The Conditions Twelve Year Civil War 75,000 Casualties Mostly civilian Strong Willed and Capable Policy Makers On both sides Eventually committed to change Outside Pressure From US Lower aid Cold War implications

  10. Conditions World Interest Jesuit murders Internal Pressures Lack of support by people for the rebels Lack of support by people for military action Vulnerable to Other Outside Influences

  11. Outcome Recognition of Conditions Was the “Indicator of Ripeness” Led to Understanding the “Mutually Hurting Stalemate” Changed Negotiation Environment

  12. Three Managing the Goal-Setting Paradox: How to Get Better Results from High Goals and Be Happy Clark Freshman and Chris Guthrie

  13. What is the Goal Setting Paradox? Set Your Goals High Negotiation is a Process of Compromise Objectives Are Often Not Meet People With Higher Goals Tend to Get Higher Results Tend to be Less Happy than Those With Lower Goals

  14. Coping Strategies Maximize and Expand Approach Expand Self-Awareness Expand Focus Expand Self-Acceptance It’s a Business Life/Career Does Not Depend on a Single Negotiation It’s the Long Game that Counts

  15. Four Gender and Negotiation in the Small: Are Woman (Perceived to Be) More Cooperative than Men? Catherine Eckel, Angela de Oliveira, and Philip Grossman

  16. Do Women Negotiate Different Than Men? Stereotyping Some Differences Not as different as often thought Perceived Differences Are Significant Can have positive or negative results

  17. Findings Women Tend to be More Egalitarian than Men More likely to choose equal distributions Even when cost to do so increases Women Tend to be More Sensitive to Context Especially with relationships Implications for negotiations that include long term relationships

  18. Findings Women Tend to Ask for Less and Accept Less Differences are Small

  19. Five An Exploration of a Model of Social Networks and Multilateral Negotiations Bruce Money and Chad Allred

  20. Context Multilateral Negotiations Negotiation amongst more than two parties Common in international negotiations Social Networks Relationship between individuals and a social system Clique formation – coalition building Centrality – relative power amongst player

  21. Three Characteristics of Multilateral Negotiations Coalitions Form Between Parties Clique Formation Negotiators Tend to Oversimplify the Problem Various Parties Take on Wider Roles Leader, Mediator, Scapegoat

  22. Model Clique formation Collaborative approach Outcome satisfaction Centrality An Exploration of a Model of Social Networks and Multilateral Negotiations, Bruce Money and Chad Allred, Negotiation Journal, V 25, No. 3, July 2009

  23. Outcomes Negotiator’s Perspectives of Effectiveness of Clique Formation Dominate Negotiators Less Satisfied With Outcomes than Weak Negotiators

  24. Six A Decision Making Perspective to Negotiation: A Review of the Past and a Look to the Future Chia-Jung Tsay and Max Bazerman

  25. Behavioral Decision Perspective Decision-Analytic Approach Focus on developing accurate description of opponent. Do not assume rational behavior Individual Biases in Negotiation Inappropriately affected by personal frame Overly optimistic about negotiation results Competitive Biases in Negotiation Allow competitive environment to negative influence negotiations Missed alternatives

  26. Social Psychology Social Relationships The relationship is the thing Sacrifice settlement Egocentrism in Negotiation Overweight views that favor themselves Motivated Illusions in Negotiation Seeing oneself more positively than realistic Attributional Processes in Negotiation Play the game they see rather than objectively

  27. New Directions Ethics in Negotiations Deception Bounded Ethicality Emotions Affect on decision making Lack of cues in electronic communication Negotiator Intuition Good, maybe – not a substitute for information The Natural Negotiator Negative impression

  28. Seven The Negative Impact of Attorneys on Mediation Outcomes: A Myth or Reality? Jean Poitras, Arnaud Stimec, and Jean-Francois Roberge

  29. Hypotheses - Mediation Presence of Attorneys: Reduces Settlement Rates Increases Time Diminish Mediator’s Perceived Effectiveness Diminish Perception that Process is Fair Decrease Level of Parties’ Satisfaction Diminish Confidence in Agreement Reduce Level of Reconciliation

  30. Outcomes Diminish Mediator’s Perceived Effectiveness Reduce Level of Reconciliation All Others Areas were not Impacted by Presence of Attorneys

  31. Recommendations and Practical Applications Explain Mediation Framework Understand negotiating environment Define the Concept of Acknowledgement and Apology Understand the value of intangibles Encourage Direct Dialogue Between parties Communicate

  32. Eight A Theory Matrix for Mediators Archie Zariski

  33. Mediation Theory Matrix Behavioral Focus Scale of Conflict Micro Meso Macro Perception Emotion Cognition Communication Intervention A Theory Matrix for Mediators, A. Zariski, Negotiation Journal, V 26, No. 2, April 2010

  34. Behavior Focus Perception Perceived reality Role of culture “Subjective Worlds” Emotion To be expected Catalyst Positive/Negative

  35. Behavior Focus Cognition Thought – what should be Vs. what is (perception) Instrumental Thought – Thinking to achieve Goals Cognitive Role Reversal Idea Evaluation

  36. Behavior Focus Communication Listening Skills Verbal and Nonverbal Analysis of Communication Strategies Communicative Context Alternative Forms of Communication Intervention Contest of Ideas (Dialectical) Increase competency and capacity to empathize (Developmental) Broaden Context (Dialogical)

  37. Nine and Ten Terms and Concepts Not All New

  38. Terms and Concepts BATNA Best Alternative To (a) Negotiated Agreement ZOPA Zone of Possible Agreement Anchor Diminishing Rates of Concession Logrolling

  39. Terms and Concepts Reservation Value Items Vs. Deal Vividness Bias Parasitic Value Creation

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