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Take 5 for Safety

Take 5 for Safety. E. Lessard April 4, 2017. Work as Imagined vs Work as Done at Macondo Well on the Deep Water Horizon Rig. Incident Synopsis: Drilling Rig Explosion and Fire. April 20, 2010 Ignited Macondo well blowout 11 deaths

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Take 5 for Safety

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  1. Take 5 for Safety E. Lessard April 4, 2017

  2. Work as Imagined vs Work as Done at Macondo Well on the Deep Water Horizon Rig

  3. Incident Synopsis: Drilling Rig Explosion and Fire • April 20, 2010 • Ignited Macondo well blowout • 11 deaths • 17 airlifted for critical physical injuries; many others injured – burns, broken bones, anguish… • Evacuation of 115 individuals from the rig • Worst oil spill in US history • Sinking of the Deepwater Horizon— Transocean (TO)-owned rig; BP-leased

  4. Focus of This 5-Minutes is on Primary Cause – Failure of Blowout Preventer (BOP) Blind Shear Ram (BSR) – Cuts and seals drill pipe Casing Shear Ram (CSR) - Cuts casing wall but does not seal drill pipe

  5. Macondo Gap (Deepwater Horizon) “The limitations of the Blind Shear Ram shearing capacity should be known and understood, and a documented risk assessment shall be in place to address any such limitations”—BP “the Blind Shear Ram must be capable of shearing the highest grade and heaviest drill pipe…in one operation.”—TransOcean

  6. Blow Out Preventer Emergency Systems • Emergency Disconnect System (EDS): • Manually initiated by the crew • Mode 1—closes the Blind Shear Ram (BSR) • Mode 2—closes the Casing Shear Ram (CSR), then BSR • AMF/deadman: • Automatically activated; • Not capable of the 2-step CSR/BSR closure • Autoshear: • Automatically activated • Not capable of the 2-step CSR/BSR closure

  7. “How could I get the chart in this attachment to change color on the 4614 psi for shearing the 6.625 [6 5/8”] pipe to RED. Would Cameron have to edit this chart? That is what Rod wants. He says if we can’t shear it then it should be RED…” Majority of well drilled with 6 5/8” drillpipe January 10 email January 31 Deepwater Horizon arrives

  8. TransOceanSenior Subsea Supervisor Testimony Q. […] so you were concerned about whether those [BSR] were within the proper zone in the calculations, right? A. Right. Q. So what was -- what was the end result of this discussion […]? A. The end result was that […] as long as we knew we were—we had 6-5/8 pipe through the stack, we would have to be in the EDS mode 2 for the casing shear rams because they would cut it where the blind shear rams wouldn't. Q. And so there was a -- a considered decision on how to handle that issue of cutting through the tubulars if they were the 6-5/8? A. Yes.

  9. Work-as-Imagined Work-as-Done • “the BSR must be capable of shearing the highest grade and heaviest drillpipe…in one operation.”—TO • “The limitations of [BSR] shearing capacity should be known and understood, and a documented risk assessment shall be in place to address any such limitations”—BP • Rig personnel created 2-step workaround which accommodated BP’s drilling plan • Unintended Consequence • 2 of 3 emergency systems were not capable of this two-step process

  10. Application to C-AD • Safety systems in the Accelerator Safety Envelopes must be implemented as they were described in the safety analysis • If not possible to implement as described, then field changes to shielding, interlocks, soil caps, activity-in-process, HSSD systems, etc. (Credited Controls) must be checked using C-AD’s formal change control systems to ensure the safety analysis remains technically sound

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