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Critical Infrastructure Protection / Resilience Simulator

Critical Infrastructure Protection / Resilience Simulator. May 29, 2009. Shane Cherry Midge Simpson. Stuart Walsh: 208.526.4246 Stuart.Walsh@inl.gov. Agenda. CIPRsim Background and Genesis Technology Objectives Modeling and Simulation Framework Potential Applications. CIPRsim Genesis.

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Critical Infrastructure Protection / Resilience Simulator

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  1. Critical Infrastructure Protection / Resilience Simulator May 29, 2009 Shane Cherry Midge Simpson Stuart Walsh: 208.526.4246 Stuart.Walsh@inl.gov

  2. Agenda • CIPRsim Background and Genesis • Technology Objectives • Modeling and Simulation Framework • Potential Applications

  3. CIPRsim Genesis Initially Developed to Support Larger DoD Effort • Build high fidelity model of cellular and power grid interdependencies • Offer extensible critical infrastructure M&S framework • Predict failure of key nodes and cascading events by scenario & geographic area

  4. Key CIPRsim Concepts • Proven Standard Simulation Framework • Distributed Architecture Using IEEE 1516 protocols: High Level Architecture (HLA) • Federated Design, built for Extensibility, Scalability and Compatibility • Utilize Best Available Models Whenever Possible: Legacy and New • Physics Based Simulations • Compatible with existing COPs (iCAV, TRITON, Google Earth, etc.) • Simultaneous Simulation Interactions • Real-Time and Faster than Real-Time Asynchronous Simulation Communication • Cascading Events and Predictive Assessments

  5. Basis for Federated Design Concept • No Single Simulation Can Satisfy Needs of All Users • Users Differ in Interests and Requirements for Fidelity and Detail • Simulation Developers Vary in Their Knowledge of Domains to be Simulated • No Single Set of Developers is Expert Across All Details Even in One Domain • No One Can Anticipate All the Uses of Simulation and All the Ways Simulations Could be Fully Combined • Future Technology, Tools and Improved Models Must be Incorporated Kuhl, Weatherly and Dahmann - 1999

  6. DoD Sim Framework & Visualization Scene Generation Power Grid Modeling Wireless Communication Modeling PC Tides Disaster Models Modeling, Simulation - Infrastructure Emulation HSIP Gold FERC Industry Data

  7. Restoration Response Analysis Preparation Planning Operational Utility • Real World Assessment • Crisis Response Planning • Course of Action Analysis • Prepare and Train Forces • Manage Crisis • Restore Operations

  8. Geographical Area Asset Data RTDS and Application Server Operations Command Post Wireless Model Threat Event Threat Model Distributed – Federated - Simulation

  9. EARTHQUAKE - PGA Sim time: 24 hrs HURRICANE WINDS STORM SURGE AND FLOODING WILDFIRE PROPOGATION Hazard Simulation and Visualization

  10. COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE INFRASTRUCTURE COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION AND STATUS Cascading Effects and Infrastructure Status ELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

  11. “Play-by-Play” Simulation Results

  12. Supported JFCOM Noble Resolve 08 • Generated Area of Interest Specific Models for Indiana to Support Noble Resolve Experiment • Earthquake and After-Shock Models • Electrical Infrastructure Model • Wireless and Emergency Communications Model • Utilize Unified Vector Data Set – HSIP Gold – As Primary Data Supporting Electrical and Communications Model Inputs • WMS Feeds to iCAV, TRITON, KML to Google Earth

  13. TRITON DHS iCAV Google Earth MAK Stealth Compatibility

  14. Sim time: 24 hrs Extensibility • Multiple Hazard Models – Potential Framework for an “All Hazards Environment” Utilizing “Models of Choice” • Hurricane – U.S. Navy PC Tides 2.0 • Earthquake – USGS Boone, Joyner, and Fumal 1997 • Wildfire – U.S. Forest Service FARSITE • Cyber Threat Emulation • Manually Initiated Effects • CI / KR Sectors and Components • Electric Power • Wireless Communications • Process Control Systems • Others coming…

  15. Scalability • INL Model Assets • Electrical Infrastructure • Switchgear • Breakers • Transformers • Tampa / St. Petersburg Model Assets • Electrical Infrastructure • Substation • “High” Voltage Transmission Lines

  16. Power System Status Data Feeds RTDS: High-Fidelity, Component Level Simulations Regional Level Power Simulations Enhanced Predictive Grid State Analysis Potential Applications – FY09 • Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense – Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs (OASD-HD&ASA), Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) • Enhance Electric Grid Simulation and Situational Awareness Capabilities

  17. DoD Support to Civil Authorities DoD Assets Connected to Civilian Infrastructure Networks Potential Applications – FY09 • Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense – Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs (OASD-HD&ASA), Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) • Disaster Response: Improving Security of DoD Communications Systems and Networks During Support to Civil Authorities Introduced Vulnerabilities to DoD Networks

  18. Cascading Effects: Real World Depiction Hardware-in-the-Loop Cyber Threats Interactive Play Network, Control System and Infrastructure Models Virtual World Depiction Potential Applications – FY09 • DHS National Cyber Security Division (NCSD), Control System Security Program (CSSP) • Simulate Cyber Vulnerability Exploits to Industrial Control Systems and Resulting Cascading Effects on Critical Infrastructure Sectors

  19. Back Up Slides

  20. Damage Assessment • Failure of actual assets is stochastic • Standard methodology – fragility models • Data from a variety of sources

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