Synthetic Biology and Illegal Weapon D evelopment

1. Synthetic Biology and Illegal Weapon Development Promises, Promises Brett Edwards

2. Overview • Synthetic Biology and misuse concern • Promises about Synthetic Biology and governance • Underperformance and narrowing of focus • The next steps: Re-invigoration or distraction?

3. Synthetic Biology (1) • Defined initially by funding councils and research communities • Promissory • Interdisciplinary • Controllable Biology • Application of engineering Principles?

4. Synthetic Biology (2) • Six subfields (Lam et al 2009) • DNA circuits • standard biological parts • Synthetic metabolic pathways • biological synthesis of chemicals • Proto-cell creation • model of a cell • Unnatural components • New proteins, with functions • Synthetic microbial consortia • Cells, working together

5. Range of misuse concerns

6. Why So much Synthetic Biology Chatter? Synthetic Biologists National Security ELSI Community Gene Synthesis Industry Non-proliferation Bio-hackers

7. Early Anxieties 2003-2006 Concerns about Gene- Synthesis technology 2003 US/ UK government and emerging US SB community Concerns integrated into US NSF funding Criteria for SynBERC - Concerns broadened to include: State, terrorist and amateur misuse Concerns integrated in to EU then UK funding Criteria for Synthetic Biology research networks Concerns prominent in ethics reports SB community and industry identified as central in forward looking responses

8. National focus of response • Dual-use research • i.e identification of experiments of concern • Dual-use Technology • I.e Industry screening of DNA sequences • Dual-use techno-science • i.e changing innovation practices and relationship of fields with existing governance systems

9. Key Promises • Action of a responsible scientific community in developing responses • Eventual response by state • Significant driver of self-governance response, also added legitimacy • Anticipatory responses to ensure safe development.

10. Policy developments and narrowing (2006-2012) • Risk assessment and policy response activities in the US and UK • Narrowed to focus on terrorism and Laboratory biosafety and biosecurity • Slow moving Federal Response US on both research and tech concerns • Stalled response from UK government

11. Main out come • Over-reach • US and UK institutions better at articulating concerns than responding to them • NSABB/ Community/ Ethics bodies • Externalisation of long term trend and militarization concerns • Government adopts scientists/ industry responsibility and biosafety framing.

12. Examples Forward looking concerns narrowed • Sloan report: • Problem definition ‘feed back’ • Industry outpaces government • Absence of support for screening- uncertainty over future of screening

13. Consequential myths • Belief that issue has ‘already been dealt with’ within some aspects of the community • Belief that there has been a separate government strand of policy development • Belief that Industry and Scientific community can identify fully respond to early ethical concerns (2003-2006)

14. Possible Contradictions • Low substantive knowledge within much of the scientific community • Absence of international agreement on gene-synthesis industry • Continued case by case focus • Embryonic dual-use/ethics review in military investors • Absence of risk assessment criteria. • Struggles to implement ‘up-stream’ engagement • Synbio communities • Regulators

15. Outcome • We are waiting for the next ‘big thing’. • Threat/ incident/ tech-advance

16. Positives • Synthetic Biology has become a ‘test- case’ often referred to at international level • Evidence of awareness raising outreach • Expressed positions by key institutions to some aspects of the field

17. New project www.Biochemsec2030.org

18. Thanks! Brett Edwards bwie20@bath.ac.uk