1 / 19

Urban dynamics in metropolitan areas The case of Barcelona (Economics, planning and corruption)

Urban dynamics in metropolitan areas The case of Barcelona (Economics, planning and corruption). Vicente Royuela (AQR-IREA, UB). Barcelona December 17th 2007. For many people corruption equals economic speculation: too much market on the housing market What can we say as economists?.

mckile
Download Presentation

Urban dynamics in metropolitan areas The case of Barcelona (Economics, planning and corruption)

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Urban dynamics in metropolitan areas The case of Barcelona (Economics, planning and corruption) Vicente Royuela (AQR-IREA, UB) Barcelona December 17th 2007

  2. For many people corruption equals economic speculation: too much market on the housing market What can we say as economists?

  3. Outline: • Economics • Planning • Corruption • Several examples on the province of Barcelona and Catalonia will arise

  4. Economics • Individual behaviour • Space segmentation • Non homogeneity in space

  5. Economics • Individual behaviour

  6. Economics • Individual behaviour (Duglas, 1997, Wall, 2001) • Where: • U: Utility of individual k in location i • A: Amenities in location I • E: Economic factors in location I • ik: Idionyncratic factors of individual k in location i • Finally, people migrate from i to j if Uj>Ui, after considering a list of costs

  7. Economics • 2. Space segmentation • Housing market area determination. Two usual choices: • - TTWA (Coombes et al 1997) – commuting data • - Jones (2002) – migration data • Usually these areas depend on the level of self-containment (75%, 60%) and a minimum size threshold (3,500 workers, 20,000 inhabitants) • In Royuela and Vargas (2006), these procedures are combined with the Cournot definition of a market area (uniform price) in order to determine the right level of self-containment.

  8. G G L L B B T T • Economics • 2. Space segmentation Commuting Migration

  9. Economics 3. Non homogeneity in space: it can arise as a consequence of: urban-rural segmentation, urban hierarchies, residential segregation, spatial disequilibrium

  10. Planning 1956: The law conceded instruments to municipalities to develop local planning, but national policies prevailed, and corruption was quite important. 1978-1997: The Constitution and several sentences conceded policies to regions. Regions develop territorial planning and municipalities urban planning, supervised by the former. Catalonia: the region holds, beside territorial planning, sectoral planning, like Housing planning. The only obliged territorial scope is administrative. Nowadays: new laws concerning territory and urbanism.

  11. Corruption Transparency International (2007) defines “Corruption”: abuse of a public position for private benefits. We understand that these benefits can “help” private persons, political parties, or even one municipality in contrast to an entire region. For many people corruption equals economic speculation: too much market on the housing market

  12. Corruption Spain Spring-2007. The maps of corruption

  13. Corruption Spain Spring-2007. The maps of corruption

  14. Corruption Recently: Fundación Alternativas (2007) classified 1,339 denounced cases of corruption related with urbanism in Spain between 2001 and 2006, and classified them by topic and region.

  15. Corruption Recently: Fundación Alternativas (2007) classified 1,339 denounced cases of corruption related with urbanism in Spain between 2001 and 2006, and classified them by topic and region.

  16. Conclusions • Many times, corruption comes as a consequence of a lack of controls. • These controls would work much better if the are related to the right territorial framework. • Economics may help to define and to evaluate urban and territorial planning. • More economically efficient planning processes help to reduce possibilities of corruption.

  17. Conclusions • Many times, corruption comes as a consequence of a lack of controls. • These controls would work much better if the are related to the right territorial framework. • Economics may help to define and to evaluate urban and territorial planning. • More economically efficient planning processes help to reduce possibilities of corruption.

  18. Conclusions • Many times, corruption comes as a consequence of a lack of controls. • These controls would work much better if the are related to the right territorial framework. • Economics may help to define and to evaluate urban and territorial planning. • More economically efficient planning processes help to reduce possibilities of corruption.

More Related