Susan Wolf: “Moral Saints”

1. Susan Wolf: “Moral Saints” “…our values cannot be fully comprehended on the model of a hierarchical system with morality at the top” p. 232

2. What is a moral saint? • Wolf’s definition: Someone “whose every action is as morally good as possible.” • “…moral perfection, in the sense of moral saintliness, does not constitute a model for personal well-being toward which it would be particularly rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive.” (p. 221)

3. Issues of the argument • [What’s at stake in her argument? One way to understand the argument is that it is about the priority and scope of morality.] • “Either we must change our moral theories in ways that will make them yield more palatable ideals or we must change our conception of what is involved in affirming a moral theory.” • Is it: Morality is too demanding? • Or: Morality (too much, anyway) is not appealing.

4. 2 Kinds of Moral Saints • (1) The Loving Saint: Concern for others plays the role that is played in most of our lives by more selfish…less morally worthy concerns. (A utilitarian saint.) His/her happiness lies in others’ happiness. • (2) The Rational Saint: “Pays little or no attention to his own happiness in light of the overriding importance he gives to the wider concerns of morality.” (A Kantian saint.) p. 222

5. What the moral saint is like • May be “more or less jovial, more or less garrulous, more or less athletic…but must have and cultivate those qualities which are apt to allow him to treat others as justly and kindly as possible…He will be patient, considerate, even-tempered, hospitable, charitable in thought as well as deed…” p. 222/421 PDF • Does this sound like a desirable way to be?

6. So what’s the problem? • “For their comes a point in the listing of virtues that a moral saint is likely to have where one might naturally begin to wonder whether the moral saint isn’t, after all, too good…at least too good ofr his own well being…” • “…the moral virtues are…all present in the same individual, and to an extreme degree” and so “are apt to crowd out the non-moral virtues, as well as many of the interests and personal characteristics that we generally think contribute to a healthy well-rounded, richly developed character…” (p. 222/421)

7. Why devotion to moral values crowds out non-moral values • Time pressures: “…if the moral saint is devoting all his time to feeding the hungry or healing the sick or raising money for Oxfam, then necessarily he is not reading Victorian novels, playing the Oboe, or improving his backhand…” • Conflicts with morality: …a moral saint can’t cultivate a cynical or sarcastic wit, or a sense of humor that appreciates this kind of wit or attitude of resignation or pessimism…” Can’t enjoy Marx Bros. or G.B. Shaw • Self-regarding: E.g., the saint can’t be a fan of gourmet cooking.

8. MS misses out on non-moral goods • There are goods that are frivolous or use resources that morality might demand, e.g., gourmet cooking. • A moral saint will have to be very, very nice and therefore dull-witted, humorless and bland.

9. Supremacy of morality • If moral values are supreme, then why would there be a reason to pursue something more than we pursue moral values? • Why would we “strive for Katherine Hepburn’s grace, Paul Newman’s ‘cool’…” (p. 223) • Less upright characters are often preferable…Father Brown to St. Francis.

10. Rational preferability • We don’t prefer a world of moral stains: “One prefers the blunt, tactless and opinionated Betsy Trotwood to the unfailingly kind and patient Agnes Copperfield…” (423) • We prefer a world where people have personal excellences that might conflict with their moral saintliness. • So this suggests perhaps that morality should not be the supreme value? What might it say about Herman’s Kantian response to Williams where morality is the dominant project?

11. The objection • “…there is a limit to how much of any single value, or any single type of value, we can stand…[the objection] would apply to any life that can be so completely characterized by any extraordinarily dominant concern….” • Does this seem correct? • How do people develop excellences? • Morality won’t be like the acquisition of other excellences like being “an Olympic swimmer” or “concert pianist.” Why? • Wolf: Because it is not a ‘stronger’ desire but a ‘higher’ desire that subsumes or demotes other desires.

12. 2 saints • The Loving Saint is missing out—”blind to what the world has to offer…” • The Rational Saint: Seems to have “a pathological fear of damnation or…extreme form of self hatred that interferes with his ability to enjoy the enjoyable in life…” (424) • A life where morality dominates seems to deny “the existence of an identifiable, personal self.” • Is this only true of impartial morality? Does it matter how morality is motivated for the saint?

13. Wolf’s Objection Applied to Utilitarianism • Utilitarianism doesn’t want a world of moral saints but the utilitarian would ‘privately’ have a commitment to moral sainthood. • The amount of suffering one could alleviate by helping the ‘sick, the downtrodden, the starving, the homeless’ would dwarf whatever overall happiness is promoted by developing the interesting non-moral characteristics. • But W. says you’d have to hide your moral saintliness & value for non-moral is ‘one thought too many.’

14. Wolf’s Objection Applied to Kantian Theory • Kantian: Moral worth requires acting on the motive of duty and treating persons always as ends and never as means only. • Therefore, it is less demanding when it comes to every action. • However, duties ‘are unlimited in the degree to which they may dominate a life.’ • [For Williams, the issue is with conflict. Sometimes morality *shouldn’t* win, e.g., when it conflicts with a categorical desire.]

15. Upshot • “…it is misleading to insist that one is permitted to live a life in which the goals, relationships, activities and interests that one pursues are not maximally morally good…” “…a person may be perfectly wonderful without being perfectly moral…’ • Moral philosophers must “examine explicitly the range and nature of…non-moral values, and…ask how the acceptance of a moral theory is to be understood and acted upon…” p. 232

16. Moral point of view v. Personal excellence • The point of view of individual perfection=the point of view from which we consider what kinds of lives are good lives, and what kinds of persons it would be good for ourselves and others to be. • Gives us reasons independent of moral reasons to take up certain valuable activities, etc.