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1800 K Street, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1.202.775.3270 Fax: 1.202.775.3199 Web: www.csis.org/burke/reports Military Cooperation in the Gulf: Action Rather than Words and Intentions Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy October, 2008

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Military cooperation in the gulf action rather than words and intentions l.jpg

1800 K Street, NW

Suite 400

Washington, DC 20006

Phone: 1.202.775.3270

Fax: 1.202.775.3199

Web:

www.csis.org/burke/reports

Military Cooperation in the Gulf: Action Rather than Words and Intentions

Anthony H. Cordesman

Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

October, 2008




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Comparative Iran vs GCC Spending: 1997-2007

$413.7 Vs. $55B: GCC Spent 7.5 times as much

4

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008


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Comparative New Arms Orders: 1988-2007

5

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008



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Comparative Military Manpower in 2008

7

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008


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Comparative Total Armor Strength By Category

8

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008


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Comparative Total Gulf Tank Strength versus

High Quality Tanks

9

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008



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Comparative Gulf Total & High Quality Combat Air Strength

40-60% of Iran’s Total holdings are not Operational

12

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008



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Comparative Major Naval Combat Ships

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008

14




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Most Likely Foreign Threats

Are Not Formal Conflicts

• Direct and indirect threats of using force. (I.e. Iranian

efforts at proliferation)

• Use of irregular forces and asymmetric attacks.

• Proxy conflicts using terrorist or extremist movements

or exploiting internal sectarian, ethnic, tribal, dynastic,

regional tensions.

• Arms transfers, training in host country, use of covert

elements like Quds force.

• Harassment and attrition through low level attacks,

clashes, incidents.

• Limited, demonstrative attacks to increase risk,

intimidation.

• Strike at critical node or infrastructure.


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Some Tangible Examples

• Iranian tanker war with Iraq

• Oil spills and floating mines in Gulf.

• Libyan “stealth” mining of Red Sea.

• Use of Quds force in Iraq.

• “Incidents” in pilgrimage in Makkah.

• Support of Shi’ite groups in Bahrain.

• Missile and space tests (future nuclear test?).

• Naval guards seizure of British boat, confrontation with US Navy, exercises in Gulf.

• Development of limited “close the Gulf” capability.

• Flow of illegals and smuggling across Yemeni border.


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The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps

  • 125,000+, drawing on 1,000,000 Basij.

  • Key is 20,000 Naval Guards, including 5,000 marines.

    • Armed with HY-3 CSS-C-3 Seersucker (6-12 launchers, 100 missiles, 95-100 km), and 10 Houdong missile patrol boats with C-802s (120 km), and 40+ Boghammers with ATGMs, recoilless rifles, machine guns.

    • Large-scale mine warfare capability using small craft and commercial boats.

    • Based at Bandar e-Abbas, Khorramshar, Larak, Abu Musa, Al Farsiyah, Halul, Sirri.

  • • IRGC air branch reported to fly UAVs and UCAVs, and

  • control Iran’s strategic missile force.

    • 1 Shahab SRBM Bde (300-500-700 km) with 12-18 launchers,1 Shahab 3 IRBM Btn (1,200-1,280 km) with 6 launchers and4 missiles each.


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“Closing the Gulf”

• 3 Kilo (Type 877) and unknown number of midget (Qadr-SS-

3) submarines; smart torpedoes, (anti-ship missiles?) and

smart mine capability.

• Use of 5 minelayers, amphibious ships, small craft,

commercial boats.

• Attacks on tankers, shipping, offshore facilities by naval

guards.

• Raids with 8 P-3MP/P-3F Orion MPA and combat aircraft

with anti-ship missiles:(C-801K (8-42 km), CSS-N-4, and

others).

• Free-floating mines, smart and dumb mines, oil spills.

• Land-based, long-range anti-ship missiles based on land,

islands (Seersucker HY-2, CSS-C-3), and ships (CSS-N-4, and others). Sunburn?

• IRGC raids on key export facility(ties).


The entire gulf breaking the bottle at any point l.jpg
The Entire Gulf: Breaking the Bottle at Any Point

21

Source: EIA, Country Briefs, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, January 2008


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Hormuz: Breaking the Bottle at the Neck

  • 280 km long, 50 km wide at narrowest point.

  • Traffic lane 9.6 km wide, including two 3.2 km wide traffic lanes, one inbound and one outbound, separated by a 3.2 km wide separation median

  • Antiship missiles now have ranges up to 150 km.

  • Smart mines, guided/smart torpedoes,

  • Floating mines, small boat raids, harassment.

  • Covert as well as overt sensors.

Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/hormuz_80.jpg





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Lashkar A’bad

Sites circled in red

unknown pre-mid 2002

Ardekan

Gachin


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Bunkered underground

production halls

Vehicle Entrance Ramp

(before burial)

Admin/engineering

office area

DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image

20 SEP 02


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Vehicle Entrance Ramp

(after burial)

Bunkered underground

Centrifuge cascade halls

Helicopter

pads

New security

wall

Dummy building

concealing tunnel

entrance ramp

Admin/engineering

office area

21 JUL 04

DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image



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30

The Range of Delivery Options

30







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Planning for Conventional Warfare

  • Integrate C4, battle management, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.

  • Integrate air and air defense systems.

  • Interoperable mine warfare, ASW, and counter anti-ship missile, conventional missile options.

  • Create own conventional deep strike air (and missile?) options.

  • Create collective defense options for land forces.

  • Develop interoperable capabilities to deal with threats to tankers, shipping, offshore facilities and coasts.

  • Emphasize joint warfare approaches that tie in paramilitary and security forces..

  • Show can work effectively with US, UK, France.

  • Forward defense cooperation with Iraq, facilities in Saudi and Kuwait.

36


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Keeping a Decisive US Qualitative Edge in US Forces and Arms Transfers to the Gulf ($10.5B in FY087 & FY09)


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Planning for Asymmetric Warfare Transfers to the Gulf ($10.5B in FY087 & FY09)

  • • Deterrence and conflict prevention as critical as defense.

  • • Again, need integrated GCC force planning and war planning efforts.

  • Must show GCC will act together. Cannot divide or exploit weakest link.

  • . Exercise realistic “red-blue” war games to determine common options and requirements.

  • • Follow-up with realistic CPXs and FTXs.

  • • Emphasize joint warfare approaches that tie in paramilitary and security forces.

  • • Demonstrate have exercised a retaliatory capability.

  • • Show can work effectively with US, UK, France.

  • • Strike at critical node or infrastructure.

38


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Planning for WMD Warfare Transfers to the Gulf ($10.5B in FY087 & FY09)

  • Collectively emphasize diplomacy and arms control options.

  • Coordinated and integrated missile and air defense, border security, and specialized counterterrorism assets.

  • • Seek US guarantees on extended deterrence.

  • Consider full impact of Israeli-Iranian level of deterrence.

  • Make it clear that GCC states will act in unity; collective defense and deterrence.

39


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Options for Missile Defense Transfers to the Gulf ($10.5B in FY087 & FY09)

40


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Planning for Counterterrorism (CT) Transfers to the Gulf ($10.5B in FY087 & FY09)

  • Interoperable quick reaction forces.

  • Interoperable (integrated) intelligence, data bases, human factors, immigration, law enforcement data.

  • • Integrated infrastructure and petroleum defense, repair, recovery.

  • Expand pipelines, LOCs to Indian Ocean and Red Sea.

  • Cooperation, training, exercises in using internal security and military forces in counterterrorism missions. Common approach to border and coastal security.

  • Integrated CT staff in GCC headquarters.

  • Integrated cooperation with UN and friendly state CT operations.

41



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