1 / 16

Dorset Voluntary Agreement

Dorset Voluntary Agreement. Colin Green, Christophe Viavattene, Simon McCarthy, Joanna Pardoe Flood Hazard Research Centre Middlesex University. Berlin, 26 th January 2012. “Voluntary” agreement - Dorset. Groundwater in England. Groundwater limited resource in England

justin
Download Presentation

Dorset Voluntary Agreement

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Dorset Voluntary Agreement Colin Green, Christophe Viavattene, Simon McCarthy, Joanna Pardoe Flood Hazard Research Centre Middlesex University Berlin, 26th January 2012

  2. “Voluntary” agreement - Dorset

  3. Groundwater in England • Groundwater limited resource in England • Current abstraction 7 million m3/day from groundwater • 9% total groundwater abstraction in SW region • 30% of supply in SW is from groundwater • Majority of boreholes that have been closed are because of cryptosporidium • 146 sites closed since 1975; loss of 425,000 m3/day (approx domestic consumption of 2.4 million households) • 15% monitoring sites nitrates exceed limits • Majority of nitrogen load is organic? • Annual capital expenditure to deal with groundwater c£15 -36 million; all costs since 1975 c£40 million/year i.e. low compared to all water supply costs

  4. Potential N load

  5. Transaction costs • Costs of ‘ex’change • Costs of exchange are why individuals cannot optimise resources • Costs of exchange are why markets are not resource efficient • Attention is absolutely scarce • Internal (cognitive) efficiency does not result in external (resource) efficiency

  6. Exchange surplus Surplus from exchanges that do take place Frictional cost Quantity

  7. Exchange surplus Surplus from exchanges that do take place F1 Transaction costs A Frictional costs after innovation B If A > B then change worthwhile Quantity

  8. Surplus from exchange What is the ‘Surplus’ from the exchange? Consumer Surplus + Producer Surplus In a perfectly competitive market this reduces to the Consumer Surplus Quantity Q – quantity available

  9. Maximum it is worth spending to get efficient allocation What are these costs? Surplus from exchange Quantity Q – quantity available

  10. Institutions • Rules are about power • “Rules over” define incentives • “Rules to” define action space • Institutional mapping • Privatisation carried out without concern for economic efficiency • Companies lack incentives to promote demand management, SUDS, etc • Have incentives to install ‘end of pipe’ solutions

  11. Policy issues • Priorities • Difficulty of change – dependency on Primary Legislation

  12. Characteristics • “Voluntary” agreement is actually means of reducing information costs so that farmers can use resources efficiently • Changes that cost farmers money require subsidy – paid under the table • Intervention by water company and not by the regulator (Environment Agency)

More Related