Severely wrong or slightly wrong? Sanctions and Moral Behavior

1. Severely wrong or slightly wrong? Sanctions and Moral Behavior Laetitia Mulder Tilburg University, The Netherlands

3. My previous research • Context: social dilemmas • Sanctions’ effect on trust • Alternative behavioral options

4. + _ Sanctions and trust Expectations of cooperative behavior“assurance” (Yamagishi) Sanction Expectations of cooperative intentions “trust” (Yamagishi)

5. No sanction: Trust No sanction “Removing the Sanction” Paradigm Condition: Phase 1: Phase 2: No sanction: Trust No-sanction Sanction: Assurance Sanction

6. Phase 2 trust(data of Study 3, Mulder et al. JESP in press)

7. Phase 2 cooperation(data of Study 3, Mulder et al. JESP in press)

8. My previous research • Context: social dilemmas • Sanctions’ effect on trust • Alternative behavioral options

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26. Paying taxes Tax fraud Moving to Belgium

27. Focus on moderating factors: • Expectations • Authority

28. Alternative defective option

29. Contribution to group(in three—options condition)

30. Conclusions from my previous research • Sanctioning systems may foster negative motivational effects (i.e. distrust in cooperative intentions) • Social decisions more complex than a simple dichitomous decision. Essential for the issue of sanctions.

32. Present research Influence of sanction on moral norms • Sanctions may trigger business-like considerations and induce a business frame (e.g. Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Frey, 1999; Fehr & Falk, 2000) • But may they also trigger moral considerations and induce a moral frame? • When does a sanction trigger a business frame and when a moral frame?

33. First factor of research: sanction size Research question: How does the size of a sanction on a certain rule affect moral considerations? How does it affect moral judgement of how “wrong” breaking the rule is?

35. How sanction size may affect moral judgements • Sanction indicates “how bad” certain behavior is. • Hypothesis: Large sanction higher moral judgments than a small sanction • 2 experiments to test this

36. Experiment 1 • Participant: unknown number of lottery tickets. • “Participants of an other experiment” no lottery tickets (i.e. no chance of winning) • Possibility to donate tickets to participants of other experiment. • Request: “please donate 2 tickets” • “When you donate less than 2 tickets: fine of €0,20 (small sanction) / €2,50 (large sanction)” Control condition: no fine, only the request.

37. Dependent variables Moral dissapproval (5 items): Donating less than 2 tickets… • …seems morally wrong • …is something I would morally dissapprove of • etc. Perceived moral dissapproval of experimenter (4 items): - The experimenters think that donating less than 2 tickets is very unfair - The experimenters morally dissapprove of donating less than 2 tickets to the other participants

38. Results Moral dissapproval: no sanction: 3.41 small sanction: 3.47 large sanction: 4.27 Perceived moral dissapproval of experimenter : no sanction: 3.64 small sanction: 3.86 large sanction: 5.04

40. Experiment 2 The effect of sanction size on social dissapproval of someone who does not follow the rule. Role of authorities: Sanction installed by authority. Therefore sanction shows the moral judgement of the authority. Whether people adopt this judgement, depends on their trust in authorities. Hypothesis: Sanction size influences moral judgements to a greater extent when people have high rather than low trust in the authority.

41. Experiment 2 • General trust in authorities (8 items): • “Generally I completely trust authorities’ decisions” • “Authorities often do not know what they are talking about” • “Authorities usually know what is best for the group” Sanction size: small vs large • Dependent variables: • Social dissapproval (preferring a rule-complier to a rule-breaker) • Moral judgement

42. 10 chips division Allocator: each chip €2 Recipient: each chip €? Experiment 2 • Participant in observer role. Observed the following situation: • Experimentator requested a 3/7 division • Fine of €0,50 or €5 (uncertain whether they would be monitored) • Allocator A (“Susan”) obeyed and proposed 3/7 • Allocator B (“Eve”) disobeyed and proposed 5/5

43. Dependent variables Moral dissapproval (7 items): That divider B donated less than 7 chips… • …I found morally wrong • …is something (s)he should feel ashamed of • etc. Social dissapproval Which would you prefer: - a division of €3/ €3 with you and allocator A (“Susan”) - a division of €4/ €4 with you and allocator B (“Eve”)

44. Results

45. Results

46. Conclusion • Sanctions can increase moral norms. Large sanctions increase moral norms more than small ones. • Especially when people trust authorities

47. Further research • Large sanctions may be excessive/unjust. Effect of sanction size may be moderated by perceived (in)justice of sanction. • Recognizing the goal behind rule/sanction?  Influence self-benefitting or self-sacrificing leadership • Difference sanctions and rewards? • Do sanctions work through anticipated shame? And if so, do rewards work through anticipated pride?