Abstract

1. Shenhav, A., Rand, DG, Greene, JD (2012). Divine intuition: Cognitive style influences belief in God.  JEP: General, 141, 423-428. Abstract Some have argued that belief in God is intuitive, a natural (by-)product of the human mind given its cognitive structure and social context. If this is true, the extent to which one believes in God may be influenced by one’s more general tendency to rely on intuition versus reflection. Three studies support this hypothesis, linking intuitive cognitive style to belief in God. Study 1 showed that individual differences in cognitive style predict belief in God. Participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), which employs math problems that, although easily solvable, have intuitively compelling incorrect answers. Participants who gave more intuitive answers on the CRT reported stronger belief in God. This effect was not mediated by education level, income, political orientation, or other demographic variables. Study 2 showed that the correlation between CRT scores and belief in God also holds when cognitive ability (IQ) and aspects of personality were controlled. Moreover, both studies demonstrated that intuitive CRT responses predicted the degree to which individuals reported having strengthened their belief in God since childhood, but not their familial religiosity during childhood, suggesting a causal relationship between cognitive style and change in belief over time. Study 3 revealed such a causal relationship over the short term: Experimentally inducing a mindset that favors intuition over reflection increases self-reported belief in God.

2. Shenhav, A., Rand, DG, Greene, JD (2012). Divine intuition: Cognitive style influences belief in God.  JEP: General, 141, 423-428. Study 1: Correlation between individual differences in cognitive style (intuitive vs. reflective) and belief in God Study 2: Same as Study 1; controlled for cognitive ability and personality Study 3: Effect of experimentally induced mindset on belief in God

3. Sloane, S., Baillargeon, R., & Premack, D. (2012). Do infants have a sense of fairness? Psychological Science, 23, 196-204. Abstract Two experiments examined infants’ expectations about how an experimenter should distribute resources and rewards to other individuals. In Experiment 1, 19-month-olds expected an experimenter to divide two items equally, as opposed to unequally, between two individuals. The infants held no particular expectation when the individuals were replaced with inanimate objects, or when the experimenter simply removed covers in front of the individuals to reveal the items (instead of distributing them). In Experiment 2, 21-month-olds expected an experimenter to give a reward to each of two individuals when both had worked to complete an assigned chore, but not when one of the individuals had done all the work while the other played. The infants held this expectation only when the experimenter could determine through visual inspection who had worked and who had not. Together, these results provide converging evidence that infants in the 2nd year of life already possess context-sensitive expectations relevant to fairness.

4. Sloane, S., Baillargeon, R., & Premack, D. (2012). Do infants have a sense of fairness? Psychological Science, 23, 196-204. Study 1: Infants’ expectations about allocation of resources Study 2: Infants’ expectations about dispensation of rewards

5. The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment: Testing Three Principles of HarmFiery Cushman, Liane Young, and Marc HauserPsychological Science, 17 (12), 1082-1089 Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether these principles are invoked to explain moral judgments, we found that subjects generally appealed to the first and third principles in their justifications, but not to the second. This finding has significance for methods and theories of moral psychology: The moral principles used in judgment must be directly compared with those articulated in justification, and doing so shows that some moral principles are available to conscious reasoning whereas other are not.

6. Are the action principle, the intention principle, and the contact principle conscious or nonconscious? • Scenarios • Is it permissible for Evan to pull a lever that drops a man off a footbridge and in front of a moving boxcar in order to cause the man to fall and be hit by the boxcar, thereby slowing it and saving five people ahead on the tracks? (action, intended harm, no contact) • Is it permissible for Jeff not to pull a lever that would prevent a man from dropping off of a footbridge and in front of a moving boxcar in order to allow the man to fall and be hit by the boxcar, thereby slowing it and saving five people ahead on the tracks? (omission, intended harm, no contact) • Results • People supported action principle, the intention principle, and the (physical) contact principle • However, they only could only sufficiently verbally justify the action principle. They could not express the intention principle, and they could express the contact principle, but didn’t think that it was very moral justified • Conclusion • The action principle is consciously held and applied. The intention principle is nonconscious. The contact principle is between—people can understand their reasoning, but can’t morally justify it. • Concerns—post hoc justifications for moral decisions may not be the same as the original rational for them.