1 / 40

The Role of Governments in the Insurance Industry

The Role of Governments in the Insurance Industry. Royal Institute for International Affairs London, U.K. 2 December 2002. If you would like a copy of this presentation, please give me your business card with e-mail address Download at http://www.iii.org.

foden
Download Presentation

The Role of Governments in the Insurance Industry

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. The Role of Governments in the Insurance Industry Royal Institute for International Affairs London, U.K. 2 December 2002 If you would like a copy of this presentation, please give me your business card with e-mail address Download at http://www.iii.org Robert P. Hartwig, Ph.D., CPCU, Senior Vice President & Chief Economist Insurance Information Institute 110 William Street New York, NY 10038 Tel: (212) 346-5520 Fax: (212) 732-1916 bobh@iii.org  www.iii.org

  2. Presentation Outline • Changing Role of Government in Insurance • Historical/Traditional Role of Government • Is Role of Government Expanding/Contracting? • Role & Rule of Government Beyond Direct Regulation • Is ‘Insurance Regulation’ Obsolete or Marginalized? • Summary & Conclusions • Q & A

  3. HISTORICAL ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN INSURANCE • Fundamentals of Insurance Regulation

  4. Traditional Ancillary Fiscal Political Solvency Pools Taxes/Fees & Assessments Public Policy Rate/Form Guarantee Funds Stimulative Political Agenda Consumer Protection (Re)insurer of Last Resort Income Redistribution Mitigation/ Safety Expanded View ofInsurance Regulation Source: Insurance Information Institute

  5. Rationale for Insurance Regulation • Why Should Insurance be Regulated? • Contrary to public belief, there is no “right” to insurance • Therefore need justification for existence of regulation • Frequently cited reasons are market imperfections (e.g., ruinous competition), consumer protection (licensing), systematic risks (e.g., investment risk) • Regulation has probably extended well-beyond these bounds in some jurisdictions

  6. IS ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN INSURANCE EXPANDING OR CONTRACTING? • Evidence of Expansion • Evidence of Contraction

  7. Expansionary Influence of Government on Insurance • Government Expansion & Defense of the Status Quo • Terrorism • Health Care • Social Insurance (Elderly, Disabled, etc.) • Recent Institution of Strict Regulation (e.g., Texas?) • Defense of Local Control over Federal Regulation • US: State vs. Federal Regulation Debate • EU: Member states slow to adopt regulations/harmonize

  8. Governments InsuringTerror Risk • Government Backed Terrorism Insurance Programs Terrorism Risk Insurance Country Provider Details United Kingdom Pool Re Created in 1990’s due to IRA terrorism losses. Spain Consorcio Covers “Extraordinary Risks” such as Earthquake, Volcanic Eruption, Flood, Storm, Terrorism and Civil Commotion South Africa SASRIA Created in 1929 due to political climate in South Africa - still in existence today. Israel PTCF Covers losses triggered by politically motivated violence (including terrorism). France GAREAT Created post September 11, pool with state guarantee for terrorism coverage. Germany Extremos Created post September 11, pool with state guarantee for terrorism coverage Australia XXX Proposed in November 2002 Source: Swiss Re Focus Report: Terrorism

  9. Industry Losses Under Proposed Federal Backstop Using 9/11 Scenario(as proposed/interpreted from Act signed Nov. 26, 2002) Total Ind. Loss: $14.25B $19.675B $10.875B $0.925B Industry Co-Share $1.75B Industry Co-Share $2.0B Industry Co-Share $0.125B Industry Co-Share Assumes $30B Commercial Prop & WC Loss, $125B “At Risk” Commercial DPW Source: Insurance Information Institute.

  10. US Health Care Expenditures by Source (2000) US health care expenditures totaled $1.3 trillion in 2000. Nearly half (45%) of expenditures are from govt. sources Source: U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Health Care Financing Administration, III.

  11. US Health Care Expenditures as a % of GDP Expenditures as a % of GDP Expenditures ($ Billions) Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Insurance Information Institute.

  12. Government Share of Health Care Costs is Increasing Govt. share= 46.8% Govt. share= 24.9% Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Insurance Information Institute.

  13. US Public Health Expenditures as Percentage of Total Government’s share of health expenditures has nearly doubled from 24.9% in 1965 to 46.8% in 2003 (est.) Source: U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Health Care Financing Administration, III.

  14. US Old-Age, Survivors & Disability Insurance Expenditures as % GDP(“Social Security” Program) Government outlays for social security as a % of GDP will increase by 52% by 2035 Bush plan to “privatize” social security on indefinite hold. Time is “not ripe.” Source: Social Security Administration

  15. The Texas Takeover & Maryland Maneuver • Dramatic Examples of Expansion of State Control • Texas: Dysfunctional homeowners insurance market • 3.5 million HO policyholders • Historically most expensive state to insure home (severe windstorm, hail, tornado threat; high freq. of water claims) • 95% homes insured via “county mutuals”: not rate regulated • ‘Toxic’ mold problems crisis of availability/affordability • Became major issue in campaign for governor • Proposals to ban county mutual/implement rate regulation • Maryland • State forced struggling insurer to provide terror coverage on state property

  16. Contractionary Influence of Government on Insurance • Govt. Contraction/Liberalization/Harmonization • EU Directives • Japanese “Big Bang” (1996) • Harmonization efforts in US after Gramm-Leach-Bliley • Opening of Chinese market (esp. post-WTO) • Support of ART (generally), esp. captives • Strong interest in some states in domestic captives (e.g., Vermont)

  17. ROLE/RULE OF GOVERNMENT BEYOND DIRECT REGULATION • Monetary/Fiscal Policy • Regulation of Securities Industry • Judicial System • Taxation • Trade Policy • National Security & Defense

  18. U.S. Net Investment Income Investment income is directly affected by monetary policy policy, but insurance regulators are powerless to affect. Billions (US$) Facts 1997 Peak = $41.5B • = $40.7B • = $37.7B • E = $35.8B Source: A.M. Best, Insurance Information Institute

  19. U.S. Interest Rates: Lower Than They’ve Been in Decades • Historically low interest rates are the primary driver behind lower investment yields. There is little insurers can do about this. • 66% of the industry’s invested assets are in bonds *Average for week ending November 1, 2002. Source: Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System; Insurance Information Institute

  20. Falling Interest Rates Mean Lower Bond Yields for Years to Come Interest rates are down globally. More room to fall in Europe than in US or Japan Source: Blue Chip Economic Indicators, October 2002.

  21. Insurance Industry Stock and Bond Holdings, 2001 Total Industry Holdings = $3.3 Trillion Total $1531 In Billions P/C $194Life $1,337 Total $1120 P/C $185Life $935 Total $438 P/C $131Life $307 Total $209 P/C $188Life $21 Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Report as of Dec. 31, 2001.

  22. U.S. Federal Budget Deficit/SurplusFY1990-2010* % GDP Employment (Millions) Budgetary policy affects insurers directly, but insurer/ins. regulators have no influence. *FY1990-2001 actual values; FY2002-2010 are CBO forecasts. Source: Congressional Budget Office, Insurance Information Institute.

  23. Economic Outlook for Major Economies (Real GDP Growth, %) Economic outlook for 2003 is mixed/weakening for major economies, esp. US, W. Europe, Japan Source: Blue Chip Economic Indicators, October 2002.

  24. U.S. Real GDP Growth Fiscal & Monetary policy have direct impact on pace of economic activity. (first recession since 1990/91) Source: US Department of Commerce, Blue Economic Indicators 10/02, Insurance Information Institute.

  25. The Tragedy of Corporate Governance: Insurers Held Hostage • Enron was tip of an iceberg • Major implications for insurers (p/c and life)

  26. Corporate Governance: Expensive and Hard-Learned Lessons • Crisis of Confidence—skepticism is on the rise • Ratings agencies Analysts Regulators • Investors/Creditors Employees Lawmakers • Regulatory/Legislative Fallout Unclear • SEC is “rudderless” • Enormous number of investigations under way • SEC, State Attorneys General, IRS, DoJ, etc. • Most new SEC cases are against large companies • Many competing reforms from Congress, SEC, A.G.’s., NYSE, NASDAQ, etc. • Collectively are likely to help, at least somewhat • SEC, Administration & Congressional proposals vary • Surge in shareholder suits well underway

  27. Financial Restatements Filed The number of financial restatements is rising even thought the number of publicly traded companies is falling. *Approximate Sources: Huron Consulting Group

  28. Serious Implications for Insurers • Insurers exposed to a wide variety of risks: • Investment risk (as institutional investors) • Insurance risk (surety, D&O, E&O, etc.) • Litigation risk (as both plaintiff & defendant) • Accounting Risk • Regulatory risk • Outcome of corporate governance issue hinges most critically on regulatory reform and enforcement in the securities industry: • Insurers have little, if any, say in this debate

  29. Enron-Related Losses for Insurers Total Exposure (Life & Non-Life): $3.796 Billion • Enron is the biggest bankruptcy in US history ($31B+) • Equity/debt widely-held as S&P 500 company • Biggest impact in institutional investors/creditors • 11 Congressional investigations • 56 suits against officers & directors • Will spark similar suits Source: Loss estimates from Morgan Stanley as Feb. 8, 2002; Insurance Information Institute.

  30. Average U.S. Jury Awards1994 vs. 2000 Source: Jury Verdict Research; Insurance Information Institute.

  31. Cost of U.S. Tort System($ Billions) Tort costs consumed 2.0% of GDP annually on average since 1990, expected to rise to 2.4% of GDP by 2005! Tort costs equaled $636 per person in 2000! Expected to rise to $1,000 by 2005 Source: Tillinghast-Towers Perrin; Insurance Information Institute estimates for 2001/2002 assume tort costs equal to 2% of GDP. 2005 forecasts from Tillinghast.

  32. Who Will Pay for the US Asbestos Mess? Estimated Total US Settlements & Expenses = $200 billion $78 billion $60 billion $62 billion Source: Tillinghast-Towers Perrin; Insurance Information Institute

  33. Non-Malignant Asbestos Claimants File Most Claims, Get Most $$$ ALLOCATION OF COMPENSATION 1991-2000 DISTRIBUTION OF CLAIMS 1991-2000 Source: RAND, Tillinghast-Towers Perrin

  34. National Security & Defense Issues More Important in Post 9/11 Era Terrorists & Terrorism Insurers forced to cover losses over which they have no control, little knowledge and that properly rest with public sector No regulatory “compass” for this issue. War on Terrorism Expansion of War Is Iraq Next?

  35. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS IN IN INSURANCE IN THE21ST CENTURY • Is Traditional’ Regulation is Archaic? • Focus on Convergence of Sectors • Conclusions

  36. Is Insurance Regulation Becoming Marginalized • Are Insurance Regulators Overshadowed? • Efforts to modernize insurance regulation progressing more slowly than world in which insurance operates • Approaching time when non-insurance regulators have more influence over insurance industry than non-insurance regulators • Impact of non-insurance policy (war on terror, Iraq) & non-insurance regulatory decisions (e.g., SEC) on industry becoming more pronounced (corp. governance) • Monetary/fiscal policy decisions are more critical than ever to insurers (esp. life) in convergent world

  37. Core Principals ofInsurance Regulation (IAIS) • System of insurer licensing • Standards for corporate governance • Standards for capital adequacy/solvency • Rules governing assumption of risk by insurers • Authority to monitor/conduct on-site inspections • “Principles” applicable to intl./cross border nature of global insurers • Power to take remedial action at problem insurers Source: Holfeld, Knut, “Comments of Global Regulation,” Geneva Paper on Risk and Insurance, January 2002.

  38. Focus on Regulatory Convergence is Insufficient • Are Insurance Regulators Overshadowed? • Much of the focus on modernization of insurance regulation in recent years has focused on convergence • While convergence proceeds (domestically and internationally) there is no push for a global “super regulatory authority” • Practical/political impossibility even within US/EU for now • Regulatory modernization is a necessary but not sufficient condition for regulatory relevance

  39. Conclusions • Maintaining Relevance in the 21st Century • Cross-sectoral efforts are underway (acknowledges realities of convergence), and work with groups like Basel Committee, IMF and World Bank are important, but… • Sphere of insurer regulatory influence is under siege by outside forces—often beyond regulator control • Regulators must achieve a delicate balance of achieving effective regulation without stifling innovation in insurance • Many government policymakers/lawmakers and non-insurance regulators know very little about the insurance industry—must be educated.

  40. Insurance Information Institute On-Line WWW.III.ORG Download or view this presentation at: http://www.iii.org

More Related