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Directorate for Manpower, Personnel and Administration (ECJ1)

Directorate for Manpower, Personnel and Administration (ECJ1). Coalition Information Sharing… Stronger Together. Steve Ewell EUCOM Exec Director J-6. 1 December 09. The overall classification of this briefing is UNCLASSIFIED. Topics.

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Directorate for Manpower, Personnel and Administration (ECJ1)

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  1. Directorate for Manpower, Personnel and Administration (ECJ1) Coalition Information Sharing… Stronger Together Steve Ewell EUCOM Exec Director J-6 1 December 09 The overall classification of this briefing is UNCLASSIFIED

  2. Topics • EUCOM Strategic Vision for C4ISR Interoperability/Info sharing • MNIS concerns • EUCOM Interaction with NATO

  3. The Challenge NATO and Coalition Forces MUST interoperate The alternative is UNACCEPTABLE

  4. Fratricide British soldier was killed in Afghanistan by 'friendly fire' Corporal Danny Nield was 31 years old. A British soldier killed in Afghanistan last week was hit by a rocket- propelled grenade in a “friendly-fire” incident. Corporal Danny Nield, 31, died after an explosion during an attack on the Taleban in Helmand province. He was serving as a forward air controller, the role filled by Prince Harry when he was in Afghanistan. An investigation has begun but the Ministry of Defence said yesterday that the cause appeared to be a rocket-propelled grenade fired by a soldier of the Afghan National Army. “At this time it is not known whether this was caused by a weapon misfire or a malfunction of the ammunition,” an MoD spokesman said.

  5. Fratricide U.S. Forces Kill 6 Afghan Police Officers by Mistake KABUL, Afghanistan — United States forces killed six Afghan police officers and one civilian on Wednesday during an assault on the hide-out of a suspected Taliban commander, the authorities said, in what an American military spokesman called a “tragic case of mistaken identity.” Thirteen Afghan officers were also wounded in the episode. A statement issued jointly by the American and the Afghan military commands said a contingent of police officers fired on United States forces after the Americans had successfully overrun the hide-out, killing the suspected Taliban commander and detaining another man. The statement said the Americans had already entered the hide-out, a building in Qalat, the capital of the southern province of Zabul, when they came under attack by small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades from “a compound nearby.” “Multiple attempts to deter the engagement were unsuccessful,” the statement said.

  6. Fratricide TWO DANISH SOLDIERS KILLED LAST WEEK IN AFGHANISTAN Two Danish soldiers killed last week in Afghanistan may have been shot by friendly fire from another international squadron. The two Danish soldiers killed in Afghanistan last week during a long battle with Taliban forces may have been hit by fire from another battalion of the International Security Assistance Force, according to the British military. A huge offensive in the country’s Helmand province that began on 19 September resulted in two Danish casualties, Mikkel Keil Sørensen and Thorbjørn Ole Reese, and three other soldiers wounded. Original reports indicated that the two soldiers were killed when Taliban forces conducted an evening attack against Danish forces camped in the ‘Green Zone’ along the Helmand river. The British military and Danish military police are investigating the circumstances of the battle and the soldiers’ deaths.

  7. Sharing in Afghanistan… “how not to do it”… or better put… “learning how to do it” Future coalitions will be little different… ISAF coalition made up of 40 nations, 14 non-NATO • Reported 2500 NGOs working in Afghanistan • Major command structures… bring diversity (chaos?) • NATO, U.S., and National networks • Predominant Networks • NATO Secret, ISAF Secret, NATO Unclassified, USA SIPRNET, USA NIPRNET, CENTRIXS Diverse information sharing categories in ISAF • NATO/ISAF Military and Civilian Personnel • Coalition Forces Personnel • NATO/ISAF contractors • Local Contractors • NON-ISAF Military and CIV personnel (ANSL, PAKMIL) • International Community (NGO, UN, Red Cross) • Others Lessons and disconnects • Nations will bring divergent and non-compatible contributions • Nations will guard their information and sources • Power of networked environment built on ability to share, and relies on that attribute to improve information/knowledge by collective processes and cross-fertilization

  8. Key Closing Thought… up front We Must be WILLING and MOTIVATED to share, even if by carrier pigeon… Policy and CONOPS must be addressed simultaneously with new technology…

  9. Traditional Battlefield Interoperability… Equipment, Concepts, and Policy will always be with us… Joint Fires ASM – Air-to-Surface Missile AWACS – Airborne Warning and Control System CSAR – Combat Search and Rescue DCA – Defensive Counter Air GBAD – Ground Based Air Defense JSTARS – Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System MLRS – Multiple Launcher Rocket System Multi-NAT – Multiple Nations OCA – Offensive Counter Air SEAD – Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses SOF – Special Operations Forces UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

  10. Non-Traditional Interoperability… New Thought… New Requirements…Stability vs. Warfighting Interoperability focused on partners… not DoD • Not achieved by issuing common equipment • Gained by continuously working to tie cultural, procedural, technical and policy aspects of militaries and governments together • Not a single shot effort… nor can results be gained quickly • Interoperability first about policy… then technology Information and technology sharing as tools to influence foreign policy • USG policy is “unity of effort” … our actions are protectionist • Convince policy makers sharing creates U.S. strategic advantage • As FMF dollars dwindle… leverage value of technology as policy tool • Enhance data usability (USG fails to embrace international data standards) Focus is not warfighting . . . it’s on creating security

  11. Command and Control Interop Boards Bi-Lateral forum to advocate C4 and weapon system interoperability 60% policy … 40% in military standards, equip, and procedures Bring agencies and acquisition communities together with international counterparts EUCOM Strategic Initiatives… Promoting Interoperability … Building Capacity International Interoperability: COCOMs can provide insight to policy and acquisition communities • Combined Endeavor • Enabling nations to deploy interoperable C4 capabilities in support of multinational crisis response ops • Influencing national C4 architectures of partner nations • EUCOM generates national C4 joint concept of operations • Guide FMS and Direct Commercial Purchases of partners • Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration • JCS/J6 sponsored, JFCOM executed • Coalition Task Force  new technology demo • UK informed capability development • NATO  National system to system testing • NORTHCOM  HS/HD Venue to test technology “maturity” prior to Milestone B decision

  12. At the end of the day . . . Traditional Interoperability & Info Sharing • Advocate for international standards/coalition interoperability • Observation… existing DoD forums avoid international interop issues • Reduce “resistance” to incorporate international tech into U.S. systems • Weapon and IT technology…many DoD governing groups, no “senior among peers” • Competing organizational policies prevent interoperability Interoperability & Info Sharing in new Security & Stability Environment • Differences exists between “warfighting” and “stability” information sharing requirements • Iraq and Afghanistan models driving Multi-National warfighting requirements • Day to day global information exchange guided by connect and collaborate model • Monolithic systems create internal and international policy restrictions • Intersection between governments, militaries, NGOs and interagencies is the Internet Leverage COCOM’s “International” Initiatives & Expertise • Sounding board to address international technology shortfalls and transition opportunities • COCOM-sponsored venues to engage partner nations on policy & interop issues • Advocate to promote policy and procedural changes required in Stability and Security ops New international C2 model… focus not on Command and Control but on “Connect and Collaborate”

  13. A New NATO… 21st Century Roles will drive new info sharing requirements Home Missions • Deterrence & Defense • Transatlantic Resilience • Europe Whole and Free at Peace Away Missions • Crisis Prevention and Response • Stability Operations • Working effectively with Partners These mission share common requirements • Improved capabilities that are deployable • Better synergy between NATO & partners, including NGOs • Cooperation between Civil and Military authorities • Requires allies match means to agreed upon missions • Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century

  14. Information Sharing for Security and Stability… New Challenges“C2” vs Traditional C2 Connect and Collaborate • How to integrate organizations we do not command and control for planning and execution? • Lack of standardized, integrated information • How to integrate knowledge and expertise from Interagency, NGOs, Academia, and other non-traditional centers of excellence? • Utilize INTERNET based… open source, equipment and applications • Balance RISK of sharing against the GAINS of sharing … educate DoD policy makers • Leveraging the Internet, its supply networks, architectures and standards enables DoD and other government agencies to build global capacity for international information sharing… on international terms… not U.S. terms

  15. Information Sharing Space Multinational partners (SECRET-Rel Networks) • Mission-specific (ISAF, MCFI) • Standing alliance (NATO) • Bilateral • Ad Hoc (Georgia) OGA/NGO/IGO (non-classified, UNCLASS and FOUO) Cross-domain requirements Historical Focus on Systems instead of Sharing

  16. Proliferation of Networks 44 CENTRIXS/multinational US networks • Including bi-lats • Growing: ISAF, Thailand, Mexico, etc. NATO classified networks (US BICES) Multiple UNCLAS sharing capabilities (HarmonieWeb, APAN, Intelink, etc.) Instead of facilitating Information Sharing we have created multiple Information Silos

  17. “Eating the Elephant” MNIS… an immense amount of complexity… all have been working on “our piece of the elephant” What’s missing… ? Clear guidance… • A CONOPS for Information Sharing: • To guide faster deployment and uniform employment • ADHOC coalition networks in days not months • Off the shelf GOTS and COTS solutions • To drive industry to respond to requirements • To specify how we will implement Suite “B” • To provide long-term vision We must enable an Enterprise Cross-Domain Provider

  18. CENTRIXS Model Presently U.S focused, but . . . we need to change… • Information Sharing CONOPS “musts”: • Define information exchange requirements first • Adopt interoperability standards in partnership • Be more responsive and much faster • CENTRIXS-ISAF - model for the future? • Peer network relationship with NATO • Some common applications and data • Evolving to fully integrated systems

  19. Summary • Current policies = too hard to share required information • Bridge multiple information silos via Cross-Domain Solutions • Adopt policies to embrace and empower our partners’ capabilities • Adopt standards for reciprocal trust • Establish a single DoD entity to oversee all multinational/multi-agency Information Sharing capabilities

  20. Established Communication Flow with NATO OSD JCS US Del to Mil Com USMILREP MC CoCOM ACT ACO USNMR USNLR SHAPE, Mons, BE SACT, Norfolk, VA, US Direct Info Flow Liaison Info Flow

  21. Increase Interactivity with NATO Problem Areas • No EUCOM Staff Synchronization Dealing w/ NATO • Lack Of Unified Coord Between EUCOM & SHAPE Staff • Lack Of Formal USNMR /USNLR Relationship w/EUCOM • Lack Of IT Access Both Directions • Lack Of NATO General Knowledge Among Staff

  22. Increase Interactivity with NATO Solution • Add EUCOM LNO at USNMR (SHAPE) • Add EUCOM LNO at USMILREP (Brussels) • Designate O-6 NATO Issue Coordinator in J5 • Hold Quarterly AO Lvl Issue Meetings • Continue Annual GO/FO Staff Exchange • Staff EUCOM/NATO Training • Increase Use & Availability of NATO Secure Systems At EUCOM • Desired Effects • Increase Relations w/NATO • Formalize Relationships • Synchronize Staff Efforts (Enhance SC & BPC Effect) • General Knowledge of NATO as a Staff Core Competency • Open IT Lines Of Communication

  23. Future Interaction CONTINUE ADD ADD EUCOM LNO to USMILREP at Brussels, BE O-5 GO/FO Annual Staff Exchange USMILREP EUCOM NATO Issue Coordinator Stuttgart (ECJ5) US NMR USEUCOM J-STAFF O-6 ADD EUCOM LNO to USNMR at SHAPE O-5 Same LOCs Work For ACT I.D. NATO Issue Team (WG) Reps SHAPE J-STAFF • OPEN LOC AS REQUIRED • IT Solutions • NATO Core Competency Tng ADD • Builds NATO Knowledge Core Competency • Formalizes Contacts • Synchronizes Staff • Allows For Continued AO Interaction Quarterly Issue Coord Meeting

  24. Key Closing Thought We Must be WILLING and MOTIVATED to share Policy and CONOPS must be addressed simultaneously with new technology…

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