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Problem-Solving Courts: The Latest Results

Problem-Solving Courts: The Latest Results. Michael Rempel Center for Court Innovation ( mrempel@courts.state.ny.us ) Presented at the 2008 NACM Annual Conference, Anaheim, CA, July 14, 2008. Aims of This Presentation. Participants will gain information concerning:

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Problem-Solving Courts: The Latest Results

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  1. Problem-Solving Courts: The Latest Results Michael Rempel Center for Court Innovation (mrempel@courts.state.ny.us) Presented at the 2008 NACM Annual Conference, Anaheim, CA, July 14, 2008

  2. Aims of This Presentation Participants will gain information concerning: • Whether problem-solving courts work • Why problem-solving courts work (which practices are most effective) • How to critically assess current and future problem-solving experiments

  3. Rise of Problem-Solving Courts • 1989 First drug court opens in Miami (FL) • 1998 347 drug courts < 50 other problem-solving courts • 2008 > 2,000 drug courts > 1,000 other problem-solving courts Source: Huddleston et al. (2008)

  4. Problem-Solving Models (USA) • Drug Courts – adult, juvenile, family, DWI: 2,147 • Mental Health Courts: 219 • Domestic Violence Courts – criminal, juvenile, and integrated: 323 • Community Courts: 32 • Other Models – e.g., homelessness, reentry, truancy, sex offense, child support, and youth courts: > 500 Sources:Drug courts, mental health courts, and “other models”: Huddleston et al. (2008); domestic violence courts: Bradley et al. (2008); and community courts: Karafin (2008).

  5. Unifying Themes • Focus on Underlying Problems • Focus on Outcomes • Rise of the “Proactive Court” • Staffing Meetings • Ongoing Judicial Supervision • Intermediate Sanctions and Rewards • Case Management • Drug Testing

  6. Alternative Models • Rehabilitative: e.g., drug courts and mental health courts • Accountability: e.g., domestic violence courts and sex offense courts • Community Justice: e.g., community courts, truancy courts, and youth courts

  7. The Problem-Solving Space

  8. Today’s Focus • Rehabilitative Models: The Case of Adult Drug Courts • Accountability Models: The Case of Domestic Violence Courts • The Future of Problem-Solving Courts: Community Justice and Other Directions

  9. Part One.Rehabilitative Models:The Case of Adult Drug Courts

  10. Retention in Treatment • Conclusion: Drug court retention rates far exceed • those for the general treatment population. • Treatment Generally: 10-30% one-year retention(e.g., Condelli and DeLeon 1993; Lewis and Ross 1994) • Adult Drug Courts: National average: ~60% one-year retention(Belenko 1998) • Likely Explanation = The Proactive Court: Legal coercion + ongoing oversight

  11. Recidivism Conclusion: Drug courts reduce recidivism when compared with conventional case processing. • Forty-eight of 55 drug courts reduced recidivism (Wilson et al. 2006) • Average reduction was 26% (Wilson et al. 2006) • Impacts exceed three years duration (e.g., Aos et al. 2001; Finigan et al. 2007; GAO 2005; Gottfredson et al. 2002; Rempel et al. 2003) • Magnitude of impact varies by site (from zero to more than 50%)

  12. New York State Impacts * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 Note: Percentages are re-conviction rates. Source: Rempel et al. (2003).

  13. The Role of Graduation Note: Percentages are re-conviction rates. Source: Rempel et al. (2003).

  14. Cost-Benefit Results Conclusion: Studies consistently show net savings. • Washington State: Six sites: $3,892 saved per participant (or $1.74 saved per $1 invested) (Aos et al. 2001) • California: Nine sites (Carey et al. 2002, 2006): • Results by agency: (1) court, (2) pub. defender, (3) prosecutor, (4) law enforcement, (5) treatment, (6) probation, and (7) corrections. • Bottom-line: For every $1 invested, 8 of 9 sites produced savings. • Impact at median site: $3.50 in savings for every $1 invested. • Main explanation: Lower recidivism rates • Victimization Savings(Portland, OR: Carey and Finigan 2003; Maryland: Crumpton et al. 2003)

  15. How Drug Courts Work • Substance abuse treatment • Immediacy (early identification and placement) • Legal incentives to succeed • Judicial supervision • Sanctions and incentives • Perceptions of fairness

  16. Substance Abuse Treatment Conclusion: Treatment generally works if participants are retained. • More time in treatment predicts better post-treatment outcomes (less drug use, lower recidivism, etc.) • At least 90 days of treatment is critical • Long-term heroin users will probably require residential treatment and/or methadone to succeed • Caveats: • Drug court graduation may be pre-condition • Many programs do not follow evidence-based practices(NIJ 2006, reporting on Anspach and Ferguson)

  17. How Drug Courts Work • Substance abuse treatment • Immediacy (early identification and placement) • Legal incentives to succeed • Judicial supervision • Sanctions and incentives • Perceptions of fairness

  18. How Drug Courts Work • Substance abuse treatment • Immediacy (early identification and placement) • Legal incentives to succeed • Judicial supervision • Sanctions and incentives • Perceptions of fairness

  19. Impact of Legal Coercion on Retention (The Brooklyn Treatment Court, N = 2,184) 100% 90% 80% One-Year Retention Rate 80% 66% 70% 60% 47% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Misdemeanor First Felony Predicate Felony Median Jail Alternative: Median Jail Alternative: Median Prison Alternative: 6 months in jail 1 year in jail 3-6 years in prison Legal Coercion: Leverage Source: Rempel and DeStefano (2001).

  20. Legal Coercion: Perceptions • Information: • Number of criminal justice agents (CJAs) who explained program rules* • Number of CJAs who explained consequences of failure to the client* • Number of times client made promises to CJAs to complete treatment* • Monitoring: • A CJA would learn within a week if client absconded from the program* • Number of CJAs who would learn if client absconded from the program** • Enforcement: • Warrant is issued if the client absconds from the program** • Client would be returned to custody in a month or less of leaving treatment* • Severity: • CJA has told client s/he will serve severe penalty for absconding or failing* • Length of time client expects to serve in jail or prison for program failure** (* p < .05 ** p < .01) Source: Young and Belenko (2002)

  21. How Drug Courts Work • Substance abuse treatment • Immediacy (early identification and placement) • Legal incentives to succeed • Judicial supervision • Sanctions and incentives • Perceptions of fairness

  22. Measures of Supervision Source: The Multi-Site Adult Drug Court Evaluation (MADCE), see Rossman and Rempel (2008).

  23. Judicial Supervision 1. Judicial Supervision with Drug-Involved Offenders (not Drug Court): The Washington, D.C. Study • Sanctions docket: drug testing plus regular judicial supervision and sanctions in the event of noncompliance • Standard docket: drug testing without regular judicial supervision or sanctions • *** Both dockets:treatment not required *** • One-year post-program: Sanctions docket had: • Lower re-arrest rate (19% vs. 27%) • Lower rate of “serious” drug use (35% vs. 48%) Source: Harrell et al. (1998)

  24. Judicial Supervision (Cont.) 2. For Whom Does Judicial Supervision Work Best? The Doug Marlowe Experiments • “High risk” participants (anti-social personality disorder and/or previous failed treatment): benefit from biweekly judicial monitoring • “Low risk” participants: perform as well with “as needed” monitoring Source: Marlowe et al. 2003.

  25. Judicial Supervision (Cont.) 3. Role of the Judge • Qualitative Evidence: Focus group participants consistently point to the impact of the judge (Farole and Cissner 2005; Goldkamp et al. 2002) • General Supervision Finding: Engaging offenders in an individualized “process of change” is more effective than simple surveillance (e.g., Farole et al. 2004; Petersilia 1999; Taxman 2002)

  26. How Drug Courts Work • Substance abuse treatment • Legal incentives to succeed • Immediacy (early identification and placement) • Judicial supervision • Sanctions and incentives • Perceptions of fairness

  27. Sanctions Key Behavior-Modification Principles: • Certainty:Each infraction receives a response. • Celerity:Responses imposed soon after the infraction. • Severity:Responses severe enough to deter noncompliance; but do not foreclose more severe future responses • Consistency:Comparable responses always result from comparable infractions. • Drug court significance:Many do not apply these principles rigorously(e.g., Marlowe 2004; Rempel et al. 2003; Roman 2004) Source: For discussion of the principles and how they apply to drug courts, see Marlowe and Kirby (1999).

  28. How Drug Courts Work • Substance abuse treatment • Legal incentives to succeed • Immediacy (early identification and placement) • Judicial supervision • Sanctions and incentives • Perceptions of fairness

  29. Perceptions of Fairness The Multi-Site Adult Drug Court Evaluation Source: The Multi-Site Adult Drug Court Evaluation (MADCE), see Rossman and Rempel (2008).

  30. Towards an Empirical Model Higher Treatment Dosage Perceptions of (Judicial) Fairness Positive Outcomes (less drug use and less criminal activity at six months) Drug Court Participation More Supervision Officer Contacts More Judicial Status Hearings Background Characteristics(demographics, SES, prior drug use, criminal history, etc.) More Required Drug Tests Source: The Multi-Site Adult Drug Court Evaluation (MADCE), see Rossman and Rempel (2008).

  31. Part Two.Accountability Models:The Case of Domestic Violence Courts

  32. Offender Accountability Conclusion: DV courts appear to hold offenders more accountable • Judicial Supervision: More frequent compliance hearings (often monthly)(Gondolf 1998; Newmark et al. 2001; San Diego Superior Court 2000) • Enforcement of Noncompliance: More frequent probation violations and revocations(Harrell et al. 2006)or other sanctions (Newmark et al. 2001; San Diego 2000).

  33. Victim Services Conclusion: DV courts appear to link more victims with services. • Brooklyn: From 55% to 100% of victims linked to advocates after DV court opened(Newmark et al. 2001) • Shelby, TN: From barely any to 56% of victims linked to advocates after DV court opened(Henning and Kesges 1999)

  34. Victim Satisfaction Conclusion: DV courts appear to elicit more positive victim perceptions. • Perceive Improved Case Handling(Eckberg and Podkopacz 2002; Gover et al. 2003; Hotaling and Buzawa 2003) • Perceive Fairer Outcomes(Gover et al. 2003; Hotaling and Buzawa 2003) • Express greater likelihood of reporting future violence and cooperating with future prosecutions (Newmark et al. 2001, Safe Horizon and Courtroom Advocates Project data 2003, Smith 2001)

  35. Recidivism Conclusion: Recidivism results are mixed. • Mixed Results:Of seven recidivism studies: • Three show positive results(Lexington, KY, San Diego, CA, and Dorchester, MA) • Three show no impact(Brooklyn, NY, Shelby, TN, and Ann Arbor, MI) • One shows mixed results(Milwaukee, WI) • Expectations Problem: Are accountability and victim services more attainable than offender behavior change? Sources: Ann Arbor and Dorchester studies (Harrell et al. 2007); Brooklyn study (Newmark et al. 2001), Lexington study (Gover et al. 2003), Milwaukee study (Harrell et al. 2006), San Diego study (San Diego Superior Court 2000), Shelby study (Henning and Kesges 1999).

  36. Role of Batterer Programs Conclusion: Batterer programs cannot be relied on to rehabilitate. • Results:Five Randomized Trials: • Earliest Study(Hamilton Ontario, 1992):Reduction in re-arrests • Four Latest Studies(2000s):None show clear positive impact (Bronx, NY; Brooklyn, NY; Broward Co., FL, and San Diego Navy Base) • Meta-Analysis:Negligible net effect on official re-arrests and zero effect on victim reports of re-abuse (Feder and Wilson 2005) Sources: Hamilton study (Palmer et al. 1992); Bronx study (Labriola et al. 2005); Brooklyn study (Davis et al. 2000), Broward study (Feder and Dugan 2002), San Diego Navy Base study (Dunford 2000).

  37. Role of Judicial Monitoring Conclusion: Judicial monitoring may work if implemented effectively; more research needed. • Suggestive Studies: Higher program completion and lower re-arrest rates after DV court opened – linked to monitoring (San Diego: San Diego Superior Court 2000; and Pittsburgh: Gondolf 1998) • Bronx, NY:Judicial monitoring shows no effect – involved simple “surveillance” (monthly check-ins), with little judicial interaction or sanctions (Labriola et al. 2005)

  38. Role of Probation Monitoring • Accountability: Specialized DV probation units: • More often impose and enforce special conditions(Buzawa et al. 1998; Harrell et al. 2007; Hayler et al. 1999) • Generate higher technical violation and revocation rates(e.g., Klein et al. 2005; Harrell et al. 2006) • Recidivism: • Rhode Island: Intensive DV probation led to lower re-arrest rates among low-risk DV offenders(Klein et al. 2005)

  39. Part Three.The Future of Problem-Solving Courts: Community Justice and Other Directions

  40. Community Impacts • Community Restitution: e.g., Red Hook’s community service mandates contribute > $500,000/year in labor to the local community (Center for Court Innovation, results memorandum, 2008) • Public Confidence in Justice: • Community courts lead to positive stakeholder and resident attitudes toward the court (Justice Education Center 2002; Moore 2004; Sviridoff et al. 2001; Weidner and Davis 2000) • DV court stakeholder meetings lead to increased collaboration, mutual understanding, and confidence in the court (Harrell et al. 2007; Henning and Klesges 1999; and Newmark et al. 2001)

  41. Other Models in Brief • Community Courts – appear to produce: • More use on alternative sanctions and less use of jail(Sviridoff et al. 2001, Soroushian and Hakuta 2008) • Better community service compliance(Sviridoff et al. 2001, Eckberg 2001) • Increased litigant perceptions of fairness(Abuwala and Farole 2008; Frazer 2006) • Mental Health Courts – appear to produce: • Lower recidivism, based on four recent impact studies(Bess 2004; McNeil and Binder 2007; Moore and Hiday 2006; and Cosden et al. 2005) • Improved psychosocial functioning, based on just two recent impact studies(Bess 2004; Cosden et al. 2005)

  42. Other Models in Brief (Cont.) • Family Drug Courts – appear to produce: • Increased treatment retention and completion rates • Increased case length and time to permanency • Increased probability of family reunification Source: Four-site national evaluation: Worcel et al. (2007). • Juvenile Drug Courts – may not reduce recidivism: • Twenty impact studies yield mixed results (see Kralstein 2008): • Seven show lower recidivism • Five show higher recidivism • Eight show zero difference or mixed results by measure • Average recidivism reduction is significantly greater in studies of adult than juvenile drug courts(Schaffer 2006)

  43. The Problem of Scale • Most Problem-Solving Courts: • Serve small fraction of those eligible (Bhati et al. 2008; Zweig and Schaffer 2004) • Require substantial up-front investments (e.g., see Carey et al. 2006; Farole et al. 2004, Farole et al. 2005) • Two Paths: • Expand problem-solving courts: Increase the number of specialized courts or number of litigants served by them • Apply problem-solving methods in conventional courts: • Threat to efficacy: piecemeal application of practices; possible “watering down” of the model • Threat to problem-solving court institutionalization: siphon cases, resources, and political support. • Potential to expand reach: expand benefits to large numbers

  44. For More Information • Center for Court Innovation: www.courtinnovation.org (research page at www.courtinnovation.org/research) • Minnesota Center Against Violence and Abuse: http://www.mincava.umn.edu • National Center for State Courts: http://www.ncsconline.org (problem-solving court resources at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/ProblemSolvingCourts/Problem-SolvingCourts.html • National Drug Court Institute at: http://www.nadcp.org/ • New York City Criminal Justice Agency at: http://www.nycja.org • NPC Research: http://www.npcresearch.com • The Urban Institute at: http://www.urban.org (Justice Policy Center at http://www.urban.org/justice/index.cfm)

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