Integration of psychological knowledge in dialectical psychology: possible approaches

1. Integration of psychological knowledge in dialectical psychology: possible approaches Elena E. Sokolova

2. Among the most actively discussed issues in the contemporary literature on the methodology of psychology is the problem of integration of psychological knowledge. Two approaches towards its solution have emerged: (i) eclectic merging of concepts and theories developed within various scientific schools into a «network»; (ii) a way proposed by Lev Vygotsky long ago, but yet not fully implemented: a dialectical synthesis of different positions into a new system. Apparently, such a synthesis does not suggests a simple summation of various viewpoints, but rather their sublation (Aufhebung), i.e. fundamental revision and incorporation into a qualitatively new whole. This paper aims at demonstrating how this approach has been successfully implemented in dialectical psychology developed by the L.S.Vygotsky-A.N.Leontiev-A.R.Luria school by way of solution of certain fundamental problems of the science of psychology.

3. Long ago in the psychology of consciousness (introspectively understood) two alternative schools emerged: structuralism and functionalism. In the theories proposed, both schools managed to specify two fundamental aspects of consciousness: representational (structuralism) and processual (functionalism). Just as structuralism treated consciousness as a constellation of sensations, representations, etc., functionalism interpreted it as a subject's activity, as a unity of intentional acts or functions, and so forth. The L.S.Vygotsky-A.N.Leontiev-A.R.Luria school inventively revised these two viewpoints with due consideration of the achievements of both approaches rather than merging them eclectically. Furthermore, the very conceptualization of the nature of consciousness and human mind as a whole had been cardinally transformed.

4. The mind was not considered an isolated and self-contained world of mental phenomena (representations or processes) any more. Henseforth it was treated as a “functional organ” of human activity, initially material and practical. The responsibilities of such a functional organ are the subject's orienting in the world, construction of the world's image (model) as a result of orienting and regulation of the subject's activity on the basis of the constructed model of the world. Accordingly, the mind is again considered as a unity of process (which is always an activity) and representation. However, in the doctrine proposed in the L.S.Vygotsky-A.N.Leontiev-A.R.Luria school this unity is pretty much specified: genetically (in terms of the origin) the process “forestalls” representation and determines its features; on the contrary, functionally (in terms of actualgenesis) the representation precedes the subject's current activity and therefore foreruns consciousness (mind) as a process. Thus, for representatives of this school the main opposition in psychology is not the opposition of consciousness and activity, but rather the opposition of “representation” and “process”. This point is emphasized in many A.N. Leontiev's works where he repeatedly described the representation as containing the whole process in it, i.e. the subject's past experience of interaction with the world (in recent decades, this idea has been elaborated by Vladimir Zinchenko). In this respect, the process is always more revolutionary, as it develops on the basis of the current conditions of interaction. However, the more “conservative” representation is also necessary to secure interaction under repeating circumstances.

5. Similar ideas have been proposed in cognitive psychology, e.g. by UlricNeisser, who pointed out the urge of treating perception as an active and constructive process guided by schemata which in turn are being continuously modified by the stream of incoming information obtained in the subject's interaction with the environment. And still it should be noted that such ideas emerged in the L.S.Vygotsky-A.N.Leontiev-A.R.Luria school as early as in the 1930-es. Moreover, understanding of the very process of “interaction” proposed in this school substantially differs from cognitive psychology (although this issue requires separate in-depth analysis).

6. In the present-day psychology, there is an opposition of approaches characteristic of natural sciences and humanities. In the conceptual framework of the school in question, there was basically no such dichotomy. As far back as in an early paper devoted to the historical meaning of the crisis in psychology Lev Vygotsky, when discussing the necessity of development of “scientific psychology”, never meant the simplified understanding of “scientific” characteristic of the present-day psychology. For him, it was a synonym of “academic”. That is why he considered Marx's theory of social development a “scientific” one.

7. Later A.N. Leontiev, when discussing the need of bridging the gap between nomothetic and idiographic approaches (adopted by psychologists oriented towards natural sciences and humanities, respectively), resorted to the category of personality and proposed to introduce a concept of deed as a unit of analysis. Of course, as a free and responsible manifestation of personality, the deed deserves investigation in terms of the state-of-the-art studies of self-determination and personality choice in humanities. However, we should also keep in mind other “levels” of analysis of a deed, which could be explored within the well-known framework of the structure of activity (separate activity, action, operation) down to the level of psychophysiological functions. The latter, studied by researchers oriented towards natural sciences, also contribute to the realization of the deed. Therefore, the integrity of investigation of the deed as a multilevel unity is achieved due to the integrity of the structure of human activity, thus challenging the dichotomy of approaches oriented towards natural sciences and humanities.

8. There is one more dichotomy – a study of an individual within either “subject-object” or “subject-subject” relations – which has lately been sublated by cultural and activity psychology in the doctrine of the impossibility of subject-to-subject communication and interaction devoid of an object as well as of the impossibility of activity as a subject-to-object relation not mediated by another subject. The specific implementation of this idea as applied to child development had been proposed by DaniilElkonin. In his opinion, a child is never face to face with an object, but rather sees this object as viewed by an adult and is guided by a model of action with the object, proposed by the adult. The latter action is always performed either together with the adult or as an accomplishment of the adult's commission. Likewise, the interaction with another person is always object-mediated. However, at each stage of human ontogeny, subject-subject and subject-object relationships are represented in a qualitatively distinctive combination. There are stages (for the European culture, these are infancy, preschool childhood and adolescence) when mainly modes of communication and interaction with other people develop, whereas during early childhood, primary school age and juvenescence mostly object-related actions are formed and trained.

9. Dialectical method of construction of a new holistic system making allowances for the achievements of various positions to be included in it as revised components has also been applied by Alexander Luria in the area of neuropsychology. Luria's doctrine of systemic dynamic localization of higher mental functions in the human brain is based on the dialectical “sublation” of two alternative approaches towards the localization problem: “narrow localizationalism” and “antilocalizationalism”.

10. Thus, in the dialectical psychology proposed by the L.S.Vygotsky-A.N.Leontiev-A.R.Luria school for the solution of certain fundamental problems of psychology, the principles of a concrete research methodology have been realized, which, if appropriately developed, could become an instrument of the further integration of psychological knowledge into a unitary holistic system. This means that theoretical achievements of the school in question do not only belong to the history of psychology, but require special exploration and implementation in the development of a new system of psychological knowledge.