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Effects of Campaign $ on Public Attitudes

Effects of Campaign $ on Public Attitudes. The argument. Competitive US elections communicate with ‘negative’ information $4b on TV ads People ‘learn’ that candidates, representatives, and Congress up to no good There are consequences of this

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Effects of Campaign $ on Public Attitudes

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  1. Effects of Campaign $ on Public Attitudes

  2. The argument • Competitive US elections communicate with ‘negative’ information • $4b on TV ads • People ‘learn’ that candidates, representatives, and Congress up to no good • There are consequences of this • Not yet sure if they are interesting or important….

  3. What effects of electoral competition (ad spending)? • Beneficial effects • Accountability (monitor, reward, punish…less corruption) • More information for public, deliberation • More information = better information • Mobilization, engagement • Broader policy appeals

  4. What effects of electoral competition (ad spending)? • Less beneficial effects • Winner-take-all, more losers • Negativity, demobilization • ‘Corruption’ of candidates, parties motivated by re-election • They must seek/find campaign resources

  5. Expectations about electoral competition (2 party system) • Competition (spending) ‘should’ produce effects on: • 1) Ideological position of parties • Convergence • 2) Candidate recruitment / candidate entry • Quality

  6. Non competitive district, one party’s voters dominant

  7. Competitive district, each party same # of voters: Convergence

  8. Candidate recruitment & $$ • “Quality challengers” and strategic entry • Fundraising experience • Emerge in competitive races where best chance to win • Parties recruit aggressively to field quality candidates in competitive districts • Send them funds

  9. Context of competitive districts in US Congressional elections • More likely to be populated by moderate incumbents (??) • More likely to attract campaign spending • By candidates • By parties • By outside groups • More spending, more negative information • Also changed over past 15 years: Fewer marginal districts.

  10. Congress, 2006: Narrow Margin = Moderate Representative In 2006 (etc.) incumbents in most expensive races more moderate

  11. Expensive 2006 races (examples) • Nancy Johnson, CT 4th least conservative GOP ($7.6m) • Rob Simmons, CT 5th least conservative GOP ($5.6m) • Curt Weldon, PA 8th least conservative GOP ($6.0m) • Chris Shays, CT 9th least conservative GOP ($6.8m) • Jim Gerlach, PA 10th least conservative GOP ($7.6m) • Clay Shaw, FL 14th least conservative GOP ($9.4m) • Jon Porter, NV 23rd least conservative GOP ($4.5m) • Heather Wilson, NM 35th least conservative GOP ($8.3m)

  12. Expensive 2010 races (examples) • CT Senate, Blumenthal (D) v McMahon (R) $48m • FL Senate, Crist (I) v. Rubio (R) $40m • CA Senate, Boxer (D) v. Fiorina (R) $30m • AR Senate, Boozman (R) v. Lincoln (D) $15m • FL22, $11.8m • NM 1 $8.8m • PA 15 $7.9m • SC 2 $7.9M • FL 8 $7.3m • CA 9 $6.1m

  13. Expensive 2012 races (examples) • 1) MA Senate, Brown (R) vs. Warren (D) $82.4m • 2) CT Senate, McMahon (R) vs. Murphy (D) $65.4m • 3) OH Senate, Mandel (R) vs. Brown (D) $43.5m • 4) MO Senate, Akin (R) vs. McCaskill (D) $38.4m • 4) CT 5 $12.9m • 5) CA 30 (Dem vs Dem) $11.9m • 6) CA 33 (Dem v Ind) $11.0m • 8) NY 27 $8.8m • 9) IL 10 $8.5m

  14. Spending as negative information • More money spent overall • Fewer competitive seats • Change in tone in 2000s • Little reason to inform votes other guy is OK, similar to opponent

  15. Campaign information • 2006 DCCC against Chris Shays • Clay Shaw ad 2006 • DCCC hit on Shaw • DCCC hit on Sweeny • DCCC attack on Ozinga • Debbie Halvorson gun attack ad • Aikin hit on McCaskil • McCaskil hit on Aikin • Rove hit on Warren • Warren as Che • Scott Brown kills kids • Tea Party for Brown

  16. Campaign information in competitive setting • X = extremist, not one of us • X = the bad guys • X =‘special interests’ • X raised taxes to pay her salary • X is a liar • X is not X, X= [George Bush; Bin Laden, etc] • [If Xinc.], Then Congress sucks • Y = extremist, not one of us • Y = the bad guys • Y =‘special interests’ • Y didn’t pay her taxes but is rich • Y is a liar • Y is not Y, Y = [Nancy Pelosi, Che Guevara, etc.]

  17. Expectations • Awareness of candidates • Less approving of candidates • Perceptions of candidate’s ideology as distant • From respondent • From rival candidate

  18. Data: Cooperative Congressional Election Study • 2006, 2010 CCES • 2006, ideological placement of candidates, approval of Congress • 2010: Assessment of candidate competence, integrity • 2012 CCES • Experiments on perceptions of campaign finance • Attitudes about influence of campaign funds, Approval of representative, Congress

  19. Much shown with 2006 data could be endogenous: What about effects on challengers? Perceptions of challengers should suffer as well (despite ‘quality’ bias)

  20. Summary of (apparent) effects • Information: To know them is to loath them • Awareness of candidates • Able to rate candidate ideology (accurate or not) • Candidates seen as more ideologically distant • Candidates seen as less competent, less integrity

  21. Other consequences • 2006 CCES • What is the most important problem facing the nation today? • War in Iraq • Terrorism • Corruption • More likely response in competitive districts • 2010 CCES • Do you approve of Congress as an institution? • Respondents in competitive districts more likely to disapprove

  22. Effects of expensive campaigns • Extend beyond the targets of the campaigns • Expensive campaigns highlight that candidates chase money • Being inundated with ads may trigger perceptions of quid pro quo corruption • Exposure to campaigns associated with perceptions of representation, corruption of public officials

  23. % saying corrupt if campaign money gets to the candidate

  24. % saying corrupt if corporate money gets to candidate

  25. Mostly corrupt if money spent independently, on behalf of candidate

  26. So, • If people think campaign finance is corrupt, what if they are exposed to greater campaign spending? • Assume some ‘know’ TV is not cheap; candidates need & receive financial support to pay for it • How then, do campaigns affect perceptions of representation / institutions?

  27. Possible consequences (other than mobilisation) • Perceptions of politics are affected • Accountability…not possible w/o competition • Institutional legitimacy – do these perceptions matter? • Political polarization • Why keep running moderate candidates?

  28. So what…. • Suggests people make distinctions about what sources of $$ are more ‘corrupt’ (whatever that means) • Suggests perceptions of institutional legitimacy and corruption affected by real events • Meaningful variation in cynicism • Highlights a paradox: more information = less legitimate institutions

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