The Mind-Body Relation: Ancient Western Views

1. The Mind-Body Relation: Ancient Western Views Democritus (fl. 450BCE) Lucretius (94-55 BCE) • Materialism: all things (including minds/souls & mental events) are bodies in motion • Dualism: the soul is an immortal life force distinct from the body; its search for truth is moral desire Plato (427-347 BCE) • Aristotle: the soul is the form of a body: the life of plants, the sensation/motion of animals, the mind of human beings (384-322 BCE)

2. The Hindu Self • The experienced part of person (the conscious self and body) differs from the all-pervading divine Self, which is not known or reasoned to • Sankara: The phenomenal world (including selves) does not exist (788-820) • Ramanuja: The phenomenal self is a modification of the inner self (God/Brahman) (1077-1157)

3. Mind-Body Dualism (1596-1650) (1637-78) • René Descartes: human beings are composed of a material body and an immaterial mind that are distinct but linked through the pineal gland • Problem: Interaction. Proposed solutions: • Anne Conway: bodies are not really different from souls; both express different degrees of how reality is organized and expressed

4. Other Proposed Solutions to Mind-Body Dualism (1646-1716) (1632-77) • Baruch Spinoza: mind and body are simply different ways in which God is expressed (dual aspect monism) • G. W. Leibniz: mental and physical events happen independently of one another but are harmonized by God (parallelism)

5. The Mind-Body Relation Dualism: human beings are composed of a material body and an immaterial mind which are distinct from each other (Descartes) Problem: how do minds and bodies interact? Proposed answers: parallelism (Leibniz), occasionalism (Malebranche) Reductive materialism: all so-called mental actions are really nothing more than measurable physical processes (Hobbes)

6. Mind and Body (1904-90) (1596-1650) • Dualism (Descartes): there are two kinds of substances, material bodies and immaterial minds. Operations of mind are infallibly accessible only through introspection • Materialism: • Methodological behaviorism: mental states might exist, but for scientific purposes, we should speak of mentality in terms of behaviors (B. F. Skinner)

7. More Materialist Theories of Mind • Analytical Behaviorism (Gilbert Ryle): mentality is nothing other than behavior. There are no immaterial ideas or minds; they are merely “ghosts in the machine” • Objection: thoughts seem to occur apart from behaviors or even potential behaviors • Mind-Brain (Identity) Theory: states of consciousness & thoughts are simply brain states (“reductive materialism”) • Objection: consciousness & brain states have different properties (e.g., consciousness is not spatial) (1900-76) J.J.C. Smart (1920- )

8. Contemporary Materialist Theories Mind-Brain (Identity) Theory: thoughts and states of consciousness are simply brain states Problem: brain states and consciousness have different (e.g., spatial) properties Behaviorism: to have a mind is to behave or be disposed to behave in certain ways Functionalism: mental states are associations or linkages of sensory stimuli and behaviors Eliminative Materialism: we should replace terms like “thought” with material expressions

9. The Turing Test If there is no difference between the performances of a computer and a human being, the computer can be said to think Objection: thinking involves more than following a program; it involves awareness or consciousness of what following the program means (Searle)

10. Newall: Philosophy of Mind • Mind and body are the same (monism) • Physicalism: physical objects or processes (e.g., neural firings) are “tokens” (examples) of “types” of things (minds or mental events) • Reductive physicalism: minds/mental events are reducible to physical objects/events • Non-reductive physicalism: minds/mental events “supervene on” physical objects and events: that is, they depend on, but are not reducible to, physical objects and processes

11. More Monistic Theories of Mind • Mind-Brain (Identity) Theory: mental states are simply brain states • Objection: brain states and introspective qualia (experiences) have different characteristics • Functionalism:mental states are associations or linkages of sensory stimuli and behaviors • Eliminative Materialism: we should replace terms like “thought” with materialist expressions • Idealism: physical objects/processes are really only mental events or objects of mind

12. Dualistic Theories of Mind • Predicate Dualism: the mental and physical are said to be different kinds of things • Property Dualism: the mental and physical are different characteristics of things • Substance Dualism: the mental and physical are simply different kinds of real things • The major problem with dualism (viz., interaction) concerns how the physical and mental can affect or relate to one another

13. Attempted Solutions to the Challenge of Dualistic Interactionism Epiphenomenalism: bodies can influence minds, but minds cannot influence bodies Objections: why can’t minds influence bodies? Why have the mental at all? Occasionalism: God’s intervention accounts for the interaction N. Malebranche • Parallelism: apparent interaction is due to a pre-established harmony between the physical and mental G. W. Leibniz

14. The Question of Personal Identity The self is continuous (the same) in virtue of: The body The soul or mind (Descartes) Memory (Locke) There is no continuous, unchanging self; it is: an illusion and the source of suffering, desire, and vanity (Buddhism) a bundle of changing perceptions (Hume)

15. Views of Individuality Atomistic: the real self is independent of all external influences (Descartes) Autonomous: freedom and rationality presuppose that the self imposes its own laws on itself and does not depend on others (Kant) Interdependence: the self is defined by its relations with others—for example, to be recognized and respected—particularly in terms of culture (Hegel, Taylor). There are as many “selves” in me as there are groups of others who recognize me (Wm. James)

16. The Problem of Personal Identity: What makes me the same person over time? Rene Descartes (1596-1650) My body Objection: ship of Theseus My immaterial soul or mind (Descartes) Objections: - transmigration of souls - multiple personalities Memory (Locke) Objections: - transitivity problem - unreliable memories - applies only to apparent memories John Locke (1632-1704)

17. Personal Identity (continued) G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) Charles Taylor (1931- ) • Social definition: the self is defined by its relations with others—for example, to be recognized and respected—particularly in terms of culture (Hegel, Taylor). There are as many “selves” in me as there are groups of others who recognize me (James) Objection: personhood can be gained or lost depending on society’s whims William James (1842-1910)

18. Personal Identity: There is no continuous, unchanging self Siddhattha Gautama (565-486 BCE) The self is an illusion, the source of suffering, desire, and vanity (Buddhism) • The self is simply a bundle of changing perceptions (Hume) David Hume (1711-76)

19. Theories of Human Nature Psychological Egoism: human beings are simply physical bodies in motion; they always act in self-interested, aggressive ways (Freud, Hobbes, Schlick) Traditional Western view: all human beings have an enduring, rational, independent, spiritual self separate from the body Rationalist view: reason can achieve happiness by controlling our appetites and aggression (Plato, Aristotle) Religious view: through love of God and others, we can be happy by fulfilling our call to be God-like (Augustine)

20. Challenges to the Traditional Views of Human Nature $ Evolutionism: like other animals, human abilities have evolved due to random variation and natural selection, not because of purposeful design (Darwin) Objections: evolution could be divinely directed; and human reason and language are qualitatively unlike anything found among animals

21. Challenges to the Traditional Views of Human Nature Existentialism: we freely choose to create our essence or nature; to choose to believe we cannot choose due to genetics, upbringing, or unconscious motives is to act in “bad faith”; our existence precedes our essence (Sartre) Feminism: feeling and emotion are just as important as reason in defining human nature

22. Personal Immortality: Arguments Socrates (470-399 BCE) Rene Descartes (1596-1650) • Socrates/Descartes: unlike the body, the soul is simple, immaterial, & does not come apart • Objection: death is not dissolution of material parts, only the end of bodily (brain) activity • Peter van Inwagen: God re-creates our same body after we die • Objection: no re-creation would be identical (1942- )

23. Personal Immortality:Arguments (continued) Kant • If there is a loving God, he would give us more than the brief span of our time on earth Objection: this assumes that there is such a God • Kant: morality requires that the injustices of this life be balanced in an afterlife Objection: morality does not require happiness to match virtue; so eternity is unnecessary

24. Personal Immortality:Arguments (continued) • The fact that the belief in an afterlife is found almost universally argues in its favor Objection: this shows only widespread desire • Reports of “near death experiences” are too common, similar, and accurate to ignore Objection: such reports are explainable in purely psychological terms

25. Personal Immortality:Arguments (continued) • Reports of reincarnation are also widespread Objections: why don’t babies remember their past lives? Furthermore, not enough people have lived in the past to account for everyone today • Reports of communication with the dead and “miracles” are likewise widespread Objection (Hume): these are due to wishful thinking and deception David Hume

26. The Self as Chosen: Søren Kierkegaard (1813-55) • The self is the unity of what we necessarily are and what we choose to be • The nobility of the human condition consists in despair/anxiety: (1) having to acknowledge that we are put into a situation (by God) where we have to make real, un-guaranteed choices; and (2) having to make the choices whereby we become selves

27. The Self as Worker:Karl Marx (1818-85) • Human beings are naturally inclined to work and be sociable. What distinguishes us as human is our freely chosen, creative labor • Capitalism alienates us from the products of our labor and thus alienates us from ourselves and one another • By controlling property, the ruling class controls thought. Only communal ownership of property can counteract social alienation

28. The Self as Will to Power: Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) • Nobility consists in the exercise of will. The pessimistic all-too-human reliance on God, religion, and morality is a crutch for the weak • The true self (the overman) transcends the “last man,” the person who takes no risks and seeks equality, complacence, and happiness

29. The Self as Part of a Whole Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948) • Hinduism: all individuals are really only expressions of one divine, eternal self. We cannot really possess anything privately as our own, and should affirm the totality of the world as our sacred reality • Taoism: all things express the order and cycle of reality. We should embrace the way or harmony of nature as our own

30. The Non-Human-Centered Self: Deep Ecology Arne Naess (b. 1912) • My true self includes all beings in the world • We maximize self-realization by identifying with and promoting the welfare of all of nature • We should avoid the selfish consumption of resources and destruction of natural diversity not because such acts are immoral but because they inhibit our joyful experience of nature

31. The Self as Evolved Animal:Charles Darwin (1809-82) • Physical similarities between humans and other animals indicates our links to them • Intellectual and emotional differences between humans and other animals are minor and can be explained as products of random variation, adaptation, natural selection, and conditioning

32. More 20th Century Theories of Mind • Eliminative Materialism: we should replace terms like “thought” with purely material expressions Paul Churchland (1942 - ) • Functionalism: mental states are “types” of patterned associations of sensory stimuli and behaviors; these associations are not tied to particular “tokens” of anatomical mechanism Jerry Fodor (1935 - )

33. Minds and Machines • Epiphenomenalism: “conscious” activity is simply the result of physical organization Thomas Huxley (1825-95) • Objection against all metaphysical attempts to describe mind: to say that a being thinks or feels pain is not to describe anything; it merely reveals how we speak (which is linked to a network of other beliefs) Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)

34. Materialist Accounts of Mind: Problems • Subjectivity: the experience of thinking and having a point of view seems not to be captured in materialist accounts • Mental activity (e.g., consciousness) does not have physical properties (e.g., location). Even if mental activity is correlated with physical activity, that does not prove they are identical • Intentionality: consciousness is always “of” or “about” things (even things that don’t exist); physical objects/events lack such intentionality

35. 20th Century Views on Mind and Body • Logical Behaviorism (Gilbert Ryle): “mind” refers simply to a way of speaking about behaviors (1900-76) • Mind-Brain (Identity) Theory: states of consciousness & thoughts are simply brain states (“reductive materialism”) • Problem: consciousness & brain states have different properties (e.g., consciousness is not spatial) J. J. C. Smart (1920- )

36. More 20th Century Theories of Mind • Eliminative Materialism: we should replace terms like “thought” with purely material expressions Paul Churchland (1942 - ) Functionalism: mental states are patterned associations of sensory stimuli and behaviors; these associations are not tied to any particular anatomical mechanism Jerry Fodor (1935 - )

37. Minds and Machines • Epiphenomenalism: “conscious” activity is simply the result of physical (“automatic”) organization Thomas Huxley (1825-95) • Objection: to say that a being thinks or feels pain is not to describe anything; it is to reveal how we speak (which is linked to a network of other beliefs) Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)

38. Can Computers Think? • Turing test: if a computer performs like a human being, it can be said to think Alan Turing (1912-54) • Thinking or understanding involves more than syntax (i.e., following a program or manipulating symbols according to rules as in the Chinese Room); it involves a semantics, being aware of what following the program means or interpreting an intended action John Searle (1932 - )

39. Is Artificial Intelligence Possible? • If computers were programmed in the same way humans are raised, their functional behavior might be intentional Bill Lycan (1945 - ) • Computers could be said to engage in intentional (thoughtful) behavior only if they are conscious and able to think of things as meaningful or important (which they cannot do) John Haugeland (1945 - )