Towards Achieving Integrated Battle Command

1. Towards Achieving Integrated Battle Command Presentation for the Information Age Metrics Working Group March 8, 2006 Robert Clemence, Ph.D. Dennis Leedom, Ph.D. Evidence Based Research, Inc.

2. Outline • Fingerspitzengefuhlen • Setting A Context for Integrated Battle Command • A Very Brief History of the Evolution of Military Staffs • A Modern Staff: The Standing Joint Force Headquarters • The Effects Based Approach to Planning and Operational Net Assessment • The Integrated Battle Command Program • The Hypotheses • The Metrics • The Campaign of Experiments • Adventures in Experimentation • Discussion

3. Fingerspitzengefuhlen “Fingertip sense” The leader’s ability to recognize at the precise moment in battle the truth, or in other words, a high level of situational awareness that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection.

4. Context: Military Staff Development “If I attempted to answer the mass of futile correspondence that surrounds me, I should be debarred from all serious business of campaigning…. I shall see that no officer under my Command is debarred, by attending to the futile driveling of mere quill-driving in your Lordship's office, from attending to his first duty—which is, and always has been, so to train the private men that they may without question, beat any force opposed to them in the field.”

5. Context: Military Staff Development • Revolutionary and Imperial France: Evolution from aide de camp and personal staffs to a organization that combined these roles with a planning staff responsible for troop movements, supply and personnel matters. • Prussia and Imperial Germany: Institutionalizing the Military Staff – war academies, permanent corps and division staffs, a focus on the tactical and operational concerns of war

6. Context: The 20th Century Military Staff • The G-1 is the chief of staff for personnel. • The G-2 is the intelligence staff officer. • The G-3 is the chief of staff for plans, operations, and training. • The G-4 is the logistics officer. • The G-5 is the civil affairs or public affairs officer. • The G-6 is the command, control, communications, and computer systems staff officer. • The G-7 is the joint operations staff officer. • The G-8 is the resource management officer.

7. Information Political Infrastructure Vulnerabilities Military Social Links Strengths Key Nodes Economic Weaknesses Relationships Nodes & Effects Context: Understanding the Complexity of the Battlespace DIPLOMATIC INFORMATION MILITARY ECONOMIC Mechanisms ofNational SecurityPolicy DIME Actions FunctionalDimensions ofthe Battlespace Political Military Economic Social Information Infrastructure PMESII

8. Example DIME Actions Multiple Actors including: U.S. military, other government agencies, foreign governments, non-governmental organizations, individuals, etc.

9. Example PMESII Effects

10. Context: A Working Definition of EBO “Operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims.” “An effect is the physical and/or behavioral state of a PMESII system that results from a military or non-military action or set of actions.” Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element) SOP, 14 Jul 04

11. Context: Effects Based Operations

12. Objectives-Based (OBO)(Strategies-to-Task) • Strategies at one level become objectives for next • Focus: objectives at every level • Considers linkages between objectives and • strategies to achieve those objectives Objectives-Based (Strategy-To Task) Target-Based Effects-Based (EBO) • Address causality between actions and effects • Focus: desired effects (physical and behavioral) • Encompass both target and objective-based methods • Models the enemy-as-a-system w/adversary reaction • Considers Direct, Indirect, Complex (synergistic), • Cumulative & Cascading effects Context: EBO in Comparison with other Methodologies Target-Based (TBO) • ID enemy entities, destroy them • Focus: physical effects at target level • Looks at 1st and 2nd order effects only Effects-Based

13. Context: JFCOM Battle Command Initiatives JFCOM INITIATIVE WHAT IT PROVIDES Effects-BasedOperations Extends military planning beyond traditional campaign analysis to consider the full range of PMESII effects within the battlespace Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters Provides proficient staff cadre and knowledge-focused organizational structure upon which to build an effects-based planning and execution process Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters Provides proficient staff cadre and knowledge-focused organizational structure upon which to build an effects-based planning and execution process Operational Net Assessment Provides organized staff work flows, data architecture, and decision products for considering PMESII impact on key nodes and links Collaborative Information Environment Facilitates internal and external staff interactions for collaborative problem solving and knowledge sharing Joint Interagency Coordination Group Provides multifunction advisory element to the Joint Commander that facilitates collaboration and information reach back through other national agencies Joint Fires Initiative Provides system architectural solutions for facilitating joint targeting solutions and tactical-to-operation linkage

14. Future Joint Warfighting Concepts that enable Transformation EBO ONA JIACG CIE Context: A Modern Staff - The SJFHQ (CE) SJTFHQ Deployment Optionsin Support of Regional Combatant Commander • Redesigned JTFHQ • Effects-based, knowledge-driven • Collaborative process • Extensive reach-back EFFECTS TASKING ORDER

15. Context: Operational Net Assessment

16. The Conflict Environment Conducting Future Campaigns Effects based approach to operations Integrated and Interdependent Synergistic and Reinforcing Unified Effects Based Political Military Economic Social Information Infrastructure Other Diplomatic Information Military Economic Other DIME Actions PMESII Effects Theory being developed by JFCOM/DARPA Mentors Transformation Plan Power Obstructionist Legitimate Institutions Intervention is not about totally defeating a Nation-State or Alliance Its about transferring power from a hostile regime to a friendly and democratic regime using all forms of national power available . . . while minimizing the undesired consequences and effects Time Integrated Campaign Plan Achievement of multiple integrated and interdependent/ mutually supporting objectives to shape the environment Major Military Operations Security, Stability, Transition, Reconstruction D-Day Pre-Conflict Time Political-Diplomatic Effort Military Effort Sources The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation, Jock Covey, Michael Dziedzic and Leonard Hawley, editors, United States Institute of Peace Press, May 2005 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, DoD, August 2005 End State Rule of Law Effort Political-Economy Effort And so forth Problem: How to get from the theory to a workable plan? This chart and accompanying notes are Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

17. Outline • Fingerspitzengefuhlen • Setting A Context for Integrated Battle Command • A Very Brief History of the Evolution of Military Staffs • A Modern Staff: The Standing Joint Force Headquarters • The Effects Based Approach to Planning and Operational Net Assessment • The Integrated Battle Command Program • The Hypotheses • The Metrics • The Campaign of Experiments • Adventures in Experimentation • Discussion

18. The Integrated Battle Command Program • The future battlespace will increasingly be characterized by effects-based operations that synchronize the impact of diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) actions designed to influence the will of an adversary within the context of coalition partners and 3rd-party interests • In response, future Joint Task Force headquarters will be transformed along several dimensions: • Organizationally, to better incorporate a broad range of expertise • Procedurally, to better manage the creation of actionable knowledge • Doctrinally, to better focus on key adversary nodes and linkages • The increased level of operational complexity also demands a new generation of supporting technology to assist the commander and his staff in visualizing, assessing, and collaborating operations across multiple dimensions • However, technology required to support the planning and execution of effects-based operations across the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) dimensions of the battlespace has yet to emerge • To this end, the DARPA Integrated Battle Command Program complements current JFCOM transformational efforts by providing an integrated suite of tools to assist the Joint Force Commander in collaboratively visualizing and assessing effects-based operations within the future battlespace

19. PMESII Problem Space(Framework for Assessing Situation Awareness and Understanding) • Key Actors, Protagonists, and Adversaries • Intentions, aims, commitment, and motivation • Near-term actions affecting area of operation • Openness to negotiation and cooperation • Anticipated reaction to preventative diplomacy • Anticipated reaction to coercion • Host Nation Cooperation / International Support • Cooperation of the host government • Cooperation of neighboring states • Support of regional / international organizations • Enforcement of regional / international sanctions • Cooperation / participation of major powers • Anticipated reaction of key nations • Local Conflict • Internal political conflict situation • Ethnic conflict situation • Military conflict situation • Weapons of mass destruction threat • Economic drivers of conflict • Terrorist threat • Risks of Crisis Expansion or Escalation • Possible scenarios of crisis escalation or expansion • Potential risks and adverse threats within region • Potential unintended consequences within region • Major Geo-Strategic Discontinuities • Potential emergent discontinuities that would require reevaluation of policy aims and objectives • Operating Environment (Long Term) • Humanitarian emergency situation • Landmine / unexploded ordnance threat • AIDS / contagious disease situation • Infrastructure destruction and physical environment • Lawlessness, civil order, and public security situation • Border security and control • Collapsed state / local civil administration situation • Rule of law / system of justice situation • Corruption, organized crime, security extortion threat • Health of economic foundation • Local media / public information situation • Human rights abuses / atrocities / war crimes • Prisoner / abductee situation • Community / socio-cultural climate • Initial State / Immediate Entry Conditions • State of fighting • Presence / evacuation of Americans • Immediate humanitarian relief needs • Size / location of war crime victims • Funding sources for armed groups / predatory operations • Coalition participants • Cease-fire agreement / compliance • Spoiler threats and countermoves • Force protection threats • Threats to civilians in armed conflict (per UNSCR 1265) • Condition of key military bases and infrastructure • Public awareness and support for coalition operations • Host nation support for coalition operation • Support of neighboring states and key regional powers • Participation and leadership provided by a lead nation • Proposed Peace Settlement • Suitability of framework for peace process • Openness of conflicting parties to conflict resolution • Identified “spoilers” of the peace process • Possible modes of failure of the peace process Reference: Generic POL-MIL Plan for a Multilateral ComplexContingency Operation, 18 Jul 2002, Len Hawley, US Dept of State

20. JFCOM Battle Command Initiatives(Baseline Framework for DARPA IBC Program) JFCOM INITIATIVE WHAT IT PROVIDES BASELINE RELEVANCE TO IBC PROGRAM

21. Shared Understanding Military Outside Influences NGOs, Industry, UN, Key Groups HQ, Agencies Coalition Economic Outside Influences Diplomatic (Political/Social) Outside Influences Understanding Information Subordinate Units Ability to Act as an Interdependent Team DARPA Integrated Battle Command Program Social System Model Economic System Model Other Systems? Political System Model Military System Model Multidimensional Assessment

22. Inter-Agency Note: Activities within the cognitive cycle occur simultaneously over time Higher Commands DI & E Objectives, Actions, Constraints Centers of Excellence Mission Orders JTFHQ Planning Rhythm Mission Statement Intelligence Agencies Commander’s Guidance & Intent Optimal node-effect pairings Mission Objectives Node-Effects Development Mission Analysis Adversary COGs, Functions, Nodes Link effects to nodes Vet effects X PMESII constraints Prioritize Effects Refine PMESII goals & constraints Effects-Actions Pairing Situation Update Identify: - Operational objectives - Rules of engagement Optimize actions for each effect Compute expected utility of actions Prioritized Effects List PEL Metrics Build / Refine ONA Database Assess critical adversary nodes Identify critical PMESII linkages Identify intermediate objectives Link effects to objective pathway Identify success criteria Sketch 1-3 courses of action COA Development Situation Update Identify goal progress & shortfalls Effects Assessment Assess unintended consequences Project adversary & 3rd-party reactions Refine & select best COA Draft Course(s) of Action Adjust effects & actions to situation COA Wargaming Deconflict effects across PMESII space Synchronize action pathways Operational Feedback Available Units, Platforms, & Resources Mission Execution Effect-Node-Action Synchronization Approved course of action Resource / action pairings Effects Tasking Order Component Services Time-Sensitive Targets Coalition Partners Operational cycles &execution schedules Battle Command Sensemaking Cyclewithin JTF Headquarters

23. Developing Situation Understanding • Visualize adversary nodes and linkages • Collaborate with PMESII experts • Assess DIME effects on adversary nodes KEY HYPOTHESES Better identification of key PMESII vulnerabilities within Area of Operation Better dialog and interaction among relevant PMESII experts (JTFHQ, JIACG, Intell Community, Centers of Excellence)

24. Situation Understanding Metrics Situation Update Key PMESII Vulnerabilities Identified Number of PMESII Experts Engaged inONA Development DARPA Tool Set DARPA Tool Set Baseline Base line

25. Linking Understanding to Action • Visualize DIME actions and constraints • Collaborate with PMESII vetting experts • Assess effectiveness of DIME actions KEY HYPOTHESES Better prioritization and linkage of nodes-effects-actions with Command Guidance and Intent Better vetting and prioritization of effects and actions across DIME options

26. Effect-Action Linkage Metrics Prioritized Effects-Actions Node-Effect-Action Pairs Included in PEL Time Required toDevelop Effect-Action Matrix DARPA Tool Set Baseline DARPA Tool Set Baseline

27. Synchronizing Operations • Visualize DIME action sequences • Collaborate with mission executors • Assess timing of PMESII effects KEY HYPOTHESES Greater % of targets and effects within Daily ETO contribute to Command Intent Lower % of targets and effects within Daily ETO lead to unintended consequences

28. Synchronization Metrics Percentage of Node-Effect-ActionPairs Validly Linkedto Command Intentand Policy Objectives Trials with DARPA Tool Suite Measured Improvement Baseline Trials Percentage of Node-Effects-ActionPairs Producing Unintended Consequences

29. Assessing Impact / Updating Plans • Visualize DIME goals and PMESII outcomes • Collaborate with mission executors • Assess % of Command Intent achieved KEY HYPOTHESES More comprehensive assessment of how Daily ETO effects have contributed to Command Intent Faster replanning of follow-on actions within JFTHQ planning rhythm

30. Assessment and Replanning Metrics Operational Progress Update Percentage of Operational Goal Shortfalls Correctly Identified Time Required toPlan Remedial Actions Baseline DARPA Tool Set DARPA Tool Set Baseline

31. Target Output Hypotheses DARPA IBC Hypothesis Chain Visualization Assessment Collaboration Improved InformationSuperiority and KnowledgeManagement Better identification of actions / capabilitiesrequired for desired effects Better dialog and interactionamong relevant PMESII experts(Hq staff, JIACG, COEs) Better prediction of PMESIIreactions and behaviorswithin Area of Operation Better identification of keyPMESII nodes and linkageswithin Area of Operation Situation Awareness Better prediction of 2nd, 3rd-order effects andunintended consequences Better identification andarticulation of keyPMESII effects More accurate and fasterdevelopment of node-effect-action matrix Situation Understanding PROCESS Improved Effects-Based Planning Process Better prioritization andlinkage of nodes-effects-actionswith Command Intent Better synchronization of effects and actions acrossDIME options Decision Making Greater % of targets andeffects within Daily ETOcontribute to Command Intent Lower % of targets andeffects within Daily ETOlead to unintended outcomes Command and Control Agility More Effective and Synchronized ETO More effective and efficientuse of military force Force Agility FocusedCombat Power OUTCOME “JFCOM Transformation” Perspective Greater synergy in achievingNational Security Objectives “OSD Network Centric Operations” Perspective

32. Knowledge Development Metric Path

33. Build a little, Experiment a little, Build a little more, … Field some Fielded Mission Capability Package Concept Development Concept Refinement MCP Implementation Logistics Knowledge Matures Knowledge Matures Careful Documentation Appropriate Measurement Relevant Hypotheses Experimentation Campaign

34. 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J Phase 0 Phase 1 Phase 2 Framework Development Concept Campaigning Framework Technology Development Basal Capability Comprehensive Capability Extant Capabilities BAA Basal Capability Experimentation Experimentation Experimentation Inaugural Experiment Phase 1 Go/No-Go Phase 2 Go/No-Go Technology Transition Transitioned System Demonstrator (Function, Form and Fit) Joint Personnel Recovery Planner Prototype JFCOM MOA Transition Plan-Draft Transition Plan This chart and accompanying notes are Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited IBC Technical Campaign Plan

35. Adventures in Experimentation FLAWED EXPERIMENTATIONENVIRONMENT FLAWED FORMULATION MEASUREMENTAND ANALYSISPROBLEMS FLAWED PROJECT PLAN POST-EXPERIMENTPROBLEMS

36. Phase 0 – Discovery Experiment • Use of inappropriate or poorly trained test subjects • Lack of experience and expertise with new concepts, technology, etc. will negate any potential benefits • Failure to properly select and train observers / controllers • Training is necessary to sensitize and calibrate their observations • Failure to control for human subjects and organizational variables • Leads to serious confounding of experiment and the inability to attribute specific performance differences to the concept or technology under study • Failure to hold a rehearsal –i.e., last-minute set-up • Rehearsals guard against the inevitable “unexpected” glitches in designs, procedures, and measurement methods • Often leads to failed experiments, wasted resources, and program delays • Reliance upon the “happiness test” instead of empirical data • Common approach taken when experiment is observed by senior officers • Ignores the fact that people commonly “see what they want to see”

37. 2005 2006 Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Visualization Tool Option Exploration Tool Model Importation and Modification Limited Objective Experiments Go/No-Go Test Common adversary and environment Phase 1 Experiments Basal Capability This chart and accompanying notes are Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

38. Go/No-Go Experiment Setup White/Red Cell COCOM Commander State Other Government Agencies Non-Government Agencies Adversary Team C Vignette 3 Team B Vignette 2 Team A Vignette 1 Three teams operated three different tool configurations in three vignettes = nine trails 1 Commander 3 Red/Blue Planner 1 IO Planner 2 MILPOL 2 SOSA Analysts 1 Intel Analyst Configuration 0 Configuration 1 Configuration 2 SJTFHQ CIE Constructive simulation to propagate decisions forward Results Observations Surveys Questions Subject Matter Experts provide the Gold Standard Metric Values Plan Evaluator Metric Estimator This chart and accompanying notes are Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

39. 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J IBC Technology Transition Path Basal Visualization and Collaboration Basal Option Exploration Basal Planning Comprehensive Capability Basal Capability Comprehensive Capability Baseline Capability Basal Capability Exp. Experimentation Experimentation Plan Construction Increment Increment Final Action/Effect Exploration Visualization/ Collaboration Personnel Recovery Planner JPRA JFCOM Standing Joint Task Force HQ (JFCOM and Regional Combatant Commands) Army Network Enabled Battle Command/ Command Post of the Future USFK: TEBO ACTD NATO: Effects Based-TOPFAS (Tool For Operational Planning Force Activation and Simulation ) Distribution uthorized to U.S. Government Agencies and their Contractors

40. Summary • While JFCOM has initiated several transformational efforts in response to the growing complexity of the future battlespace, technologies provided by DARPA’s Integrated Battle Command program may enable these concepts to become a reality. • Quantifiable metrics can be employed to measure the improvement of knowledge products throughout the planning rhythm – thus demonstrating the impact of DARPA’s new technologies on creating the conditions for fingerspitzengefuhlen.

41. Questions?