T he C ombating T errorism C enter

1. Influence Warfare: Countering Al Qaida’s Efforts to Shape Perceptions The CombatingTerrorismCenter atwest point Dr. James Forest, Director of Terrorism Studies

2. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense. http://www.ctc.usma.edu

3. Outline • Terrorism is a product of individual choice, surrounded by causes and facilitators • Terrorist groups and governments compete against each other to influence a person’s choice whether or not to engage in terrorist activity (including providing material support for groups) • Like all terrorist groups, al-Qaida focuses a great deal of time and energy trying to shape perceptions • Based on al-Qaida’s “perception shaping” objectives, let’s explore some ideas that could be pursued as part of our counter-influence strategy.

4. 1. Research on Causes and Facilitators of Terrorism OA I = Individual Characteristics O = Organizational Characteristics PC = Precipitant Conditions ET = Environmental Triggers OA = Opportunities to Act GE = Global Environment I O PC ET GE

5. 2. Influencing the Decision = Individual influencers like family, friends, small groups, clubs, diasporas, religious leaders, education, etc. i i i i i i I Radicalization Nexus Intersection of individual characteristics and a terrorist organization’s characteristics leads to his/her affiliation with (or at least some support for) that organization Radicalization for terrorism is an interactive process that begins with communication . . . O o o o = A terrorist organization’s characteristics (leadership, reputation, history, etc.) that contribute to the resonance of its ideology among target audiences and influence an individual’s willingness to embrace (or reject) terrorism as a reasonable course of action o

6. AQ Wants & Needs to Shape Perceptions Like all terrorist groups, al-Qaida focuses a great deal of time and energy trying to shape perceptions Al-Qa`ida’s leaders and propagandists work hard to shape perceptions that will benefit their strategic goals & objectives (including recruitment, support, influencing decisions of enemies, etc.) Self-perception of group members and potential recruits is key (“we’re righteous warriors, not murderous terrorists”) Much of al-Qaida’s rhetoric seeks to deflect attention from their own faults, focus the spotlight on others to blame for problems in the Muslim world (including the problems caused by salafi-jihadists)

7. What kinds of Perceptions? 1) Al-Qa`ida serves God’s will - “we are pious and pure Muslims, following the one true, authentic Islam . . .” • Fatwas, religious rulings and decrees issued in support of salafi-jihad purity • Use excerpts from the Qur’an, Hadith etc. - without context - to try and justify what they believe God wants them to do

8. 2) The world is a perpetual battlefield between faith and unbelief; no coexistence or compromise allowed Koran: Islam is the one and only way of ruling mankind that is acceptable to God Saudi royal antics, Mubarak autocracy, etc. show that current regimes are apostate, must be deposed Islam is under siege and only we (the “pure” defenders of Islam) can lift it. Utopian goal: phased process to build ideal society, governed only by the shari’a Jihad required until all lands are under Muslim control: reestablish the caliphate What kinds of Perceptions?

9. 3) Al-Qa`ida is a competent, powerful movement, with cells, affiliates and supporters everywhere Occasional attack terrorist attacks feeds this perception Failed attempts and disrupted plots also feed a perception of a vibrant enemy with global reach – e.g., Dallas, Denver/NYC, Chicago, Detroit (Christmas 2009). Regular audio, video tapes; website and blog posts, etc. What kinds of Perceptions?

10. Inconvenient Truths Equally important, al-Qaida tries to protect its image, to dominate the discourse and shape what people say and think about them What kinds of things do al-Qaida’s leaders not want people – especially potential supporters – to hear, think or believe? If we could read their minds, hear their thoughts, what would we hear them worrying about?

11. Inconvenient TruthsTheme 1: Righteous Confidence “Our interpretation of Koranic passages used to support our violent ideology might be wrong” “God may not want us to do what we are doing” “We are afraid; We are less afraid of the Americans and their UAVs than the interrogators in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, etc.” “We are afraid of being honest; we know our faults and ideological contradictions make it harder to attract new recruit or financial support” “Our “future vision” of an Islamic caliphate is really unlikely to work in the modern age of globalization, economically interdependent nation-states, etc.”

12. “Our strategy of creating local, stable jihadist regimes is doomed. There are no historical examples of a fundamental, salafi-jihadist regime having stability or success.” “We argue among ourselves, often, over issues of strategy, tactics, and especially money” “We do not understand Americans as much as we sometimes believe we do; perhaps the 9/11 attacks were a big mistake; The West, our enemies, are far more resilient and far less vulnerable than we want to admit” “The strategy of locally focused terrorism has proved ineffective. Attacks in Muslim countries not only fails to mobilize the masses, it creates substantial coalitions seeking to suppress the jihadists.” Inconvenient TruthsTheme 2: Strategic Competence

13. Inconvenient TruthsTheme 3: Fighting a Just War, Justly “We have killed 8 Muslims for every 1 non-Muslim infidel we have killed; we don’t really value Muslim life” “We are the only Muslim organization in the world that routinely kills hundreds of innocent children each year” “We are the only Muslim organization in the world that routinely celebrates when others kill innocent children” “Through our actions, we have generated and strengthened an anti-jihadist response from Muslim populations worldwide” “Our enemies aren’t really evil; in fact, the U.S. has been, mostly, a force for good in the world”

14. Inconvenient TruthsTheme 4: Money “We are desperate for cash because none of us have jobs and bin Laden is broke; we’re not much different from the homeless pan-handlers you see on the streets each day . . .” “We need affiliate groups not only to conduct operations on our behalf, but also to send us money” “A primary objective is to acquire money and political power” “Without adequate long-term support, we will probably atrophy and self-destruct, just like almost all terrorist groups throughout history”

15. Inconvenient TruthsTheme 5: Integrity “We don’t believe that all Muslims are created equal; some deserve preferential treatment, even within our organization” “We leaders of al-Qaida don’t want or expect our family members to be martyrs” “We think that many extreme Islamist groups are stupid and ineffectual, including Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood” “There is corruption and malfeasance within Al Qaida’s rank and file; a lot of money has been stolen; members have engaged in all kinds of criminal activity”

16. Inconvenient TruthsTheme 6: Operational Capability “Al Qaida’s founders and the Arab mujahideen had very, very little to do with the Soviets leaving Afghanistan in 1989” “We are armed amateurs – former engineers, doctors, taxi drivers, students – not true, disciplined ‘holy warriors’” “Most new recruits to al Qaida bring nothing of value: no military training, no specialized skills or knowledge, just a desire to do something” “Gathering useful intelligence on our enemies is much harder than most people think it is, even with the Internet”

17. Inconvenient TruthsTheme 7: Relevance “We fear the perceptions of inaction; without actions to back up our words, people will begin to suspect us of being either gutless or incompetent” “Our biggest fear is being seen as irrelevant” That’s their biggest fear . . . One day Osama bin Laden will issue his 450th proclamation, and no one will really be listening. - - Brian Michael Jenkins[1] [1] James Kitfield, “How I Learned Not To Fear The Bomb: The Rand Corp.’s Brian Michael Jenkins on facing the threat of nuclear terrorism.” The National Journal (Saturday, Oct. 18, 2008). http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/id_20081018_2856.php

18. Summary States and terrorists struggle to shape perceptions in a war of ideas, surrounded by important layers of context (motivators and facilitators) Terrorist groups needs people to make a choice, in their favor Influencing “street perception” of an organization is a powerful component of an overall counterterrorism strategy Themes to address could include religious legitimacy, strategic and operational competence, financial integrity Key is understanding what perceptions matter most to the terrorist organization What other facts/perceptions might AQ find “inconvenient”?

19. Questions? The CombatingTerrorismCenter atwest point http://www.ctc.usma.edu Lincoln Hall, 122 Dr. James Forest, Director of Terrorism Studies