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Secure Civil Navigation and Timing. Todd Humphreys | Aerospace Engineering The University of Texas at Austin MITRE | July 20, 2012. Acknowledgements. University of Texas Radionavigation Lab graduate students Jahshan Bhatti , Kyle Wesson, Ken Pesyna , Zak Kassas , and Daniel Shepard
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Secure Civil Navigation and Timing Todd Humphreys | Aerospace Engineering The University of Texas at Austin MITRE | July 20, 2012
Acknowledgements • University of Texas Radionavigation Lab graduate students JahshanBhatti, Kyle Wesson, Ken Pesyna, Zak Kassas, and Daniel Shepard • Mark Psiaki, Brady O’Hanlon, Ryan Mitch (Cornell) • Brent Ledvina(Coherent Navigation) • Aaron Fansler(Northrop Grumman)
4:00 AM May 2, 2000 Meters Error UTC Hours
Commandeering a UAV via GPS Spoofing Target UAV Receive Antenna External Reference Clock Spoofed Signals as a “Virtual Tractor Beam” Control Computer Internet or LAN Transmit Antenna GPS Spoofer UAV coordinates from tracking system
Surprises (1/2) • RAIM was helpful for spoofing: we couldn’t spoof all signals seen by UAV due to our reference antenna placement, but the Hornet Mini’s uBlox receiver rejected observables from authentic signals, presumably via RAIM • Overwhelming power is required for clean capture: A gradual takeover leads to large (50-100 m) multipath-type errors as the authentic and counterfeit signals interact • The UAV’s heavy reliance on altimeter for vertical position was easily overcome by a large vertical GPS velocity
Surprises (2/2) • Not possible even to station keep with a captured UAV based on visual position estimates: GPS capture breaks flight controller’s feedback loop; now spoofer must play the role formerly assumed by GPS. Implication: An accurate radar or LIDAR system would be required for fine “control” of UAV via spoofing • Compensating for all system and geometric delays to achieve meter-level alignment is challenging but quite possible • In high-stakes situations, graduate students are steadier than assistant professors
Recommendations • Requirenavigation systems for UAVs above18 lbs to be certified “spoof-resistant” • Require navigation and timing systems in critical infrastructure to be certified “spoof-resistant” • “Spoof resistant” defined by ability to withstand or detect civil GPS spoofing in a battery of tests performed in a spoofing testbed
Spoofing Defenses Non-Cryptographic Cryptographic SSSC on L1C (Scott) J/N Sensing (Ward, Scott, Calgary) Stand-Alone NMA on L2C, L5, or L1C (MITRE, Scott, UT) All-Signals Defense (DARPA, BAE, UT) SSSC or NMA on WAAS (Scott, UT) Single-Antenna Spatial Correlation (Cornell, Calgary) Signal Forensics (TENCAP, Ledvina, Torino, UT) P(Y) Cross-Correlation (Stanford, Cornell) Networked Multi-Antenna Defense (Keys, Montgomery, DLR, Stanford)
Public-Key Signal Authentication: Receiver Perspective Code Origin Authentication Code Timing Authentication • Wesson, K., Rothlisberger, M., and Humphreys, T. E., “Practical Cryptographic Civil GPS Signal Authentication,” • NAVIGATION: The Journal of the Institute of Navigation, to be published.
Security Code Estimation and Replay Detection Inside the Spoofer: Security Code Chip Estimation Inside the Defender: Detection Statistic Based on Specialized Correlations
Security Code Estimation and Replay Detection: Hypothesis Testing During an Attack Humphreys, T. E., “Detection Strategy for Cryptographic GNSS Anti-Spoofing,” IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, to be published.
Operational Definition of GNSS Signal Authentication • GNSS signal is declared authentic if since some trustedinitialization event: • logical output S has remained low, and • logical output H1 has remained low, and • output PD has remained above an acceptable threshold
Nagging Concerns • Hard to characterize the null hypothesis for a crypto defense on a dynamic platform – hard to keep false alarm rate under control • All crypto defenses ineffective against near-zero-delay meaconing (entire band record and playback) timing attacks • Civil GPS crypto defenses will probably be funded and implemented just before the heat death of the universe • Is envisioning widespread adoption of non-crypto defenses just wishful thinking?
