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HBS: A Single-Key Mode of Operation for Deterministic Authenticated Encryption

HBS: A Single-Key Mode of Operation for Deterministic Authenticated Encryption. Tetsu Iwata (Nagoya University, Japan) Kan Yasuda (NTT Corporation, Japan) FSE 2009 2009 Feb. 25, Leuven, Belgium. Table of contents. Background and motivation Authenticated encryption (AE)

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HBS: A Single-Key Mode of Operation for Deterministic Authenticated Encryption

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  1. HBS: A Single-Key Mode of Operation for Deterministic Authenticated Encryption Tetsu Iwata (Nagoya University, Japan) Kan Yasuda (NTT Corporation, Japan) FSE 2009 2009 Feb. 25, Leuven, Belgium

  2. Table of contents • Background and motivation • Authenticated encryption (AE) • Deterministic AE (DAE) • Previous work: SIV • HBS (Hash Block Stealing) • How it works • Its efficiency and security

  3. Background (AE) • Blockcipher modes of operation • Two goals: • To establish authenticity(data integrity) • To preserve privacy(data confidentiality) • Authenticated Encryption (AE) • Concurrently achieves the two goals

  4. Background (AE, nonce-based) • AE • CCM, GCM, OCB, … • Usually uses a randomized salt or state-dependent value • Formalized as nonce-based AE [Rogaway 2001, 2002, 2004] • Nonce • Never repeat the same value, or lose all security

  5. Table of contents • Background and motivation • Authenticated encryption (AE) • Deterministic AE (DAE) • Previous work: SIV • HBS (Hash Block Stealing) • How it works • Its efficiency and security

  6. Background (DAE) • Nonce misuse • Settled by Deterministic Authenticated Encryption (DAE)[Rogaway – Shrimpton 2006] • DAE • “Secure” even if the same value is used (all an adversary can do is to detect the repetition)

  7. Background (How DAE works) • Deterministic algorithms • Encryption • Input: (Header H, Message M) Output: (Tag T, Encrypted Msg C) • Decryption • Verifies (H, T, C) • Outputs either  or M

  8. Security definition of DAE H, M H, T, C H, M H, T, C Enc Dec Random  ?  / M T, C  $$$ Cannotdistinguish Ideal Real Adversaries

  9. Table of contents • Background and motivation • Authenticated encryption (AE) • Deterministic AE (DAE) • Previous work: SIV • HBS (Hash Block Stealing) • How it works • Its efficiency and security

  10. SIV mode of operation • A concrete DAE mode [Rogaway – Shrimpton Eurocrypt 2006] • “MAC-then-Encrypt” • Entirely blockcipher-based • Uses CMAC* (vectorized CMAC) for authentication • Uses CTR mode for encryption • Requires two keys

  11. Motivation: • Can we construct a single-keyDAE mode?

  12. Table of contents • Background and motivation • Authenticated encryption (AE) • Deterministic AE (DAE) • Previous work: SIV • HBS (Hash Block Stealing) • How it works • Its efficiency and security

  13. HBS (Hash Block Stealing) • The HBS mode • Single-key • Also “MAC-then-Encrypt” style • New polynomial-hashing for MAC • “Odd” CTR (counter) mode for Enc

  14. Vector-input (VI) polynomial hashing • Motivation: • Two different inputs (H,M)  (H’,M’) • We may have H || M = H’ || M’ • Cannot use string-input polynomial hash • New notion: VI-–AXU hash functionFor any (H,M)  (H’,M’) and Y Pr[ HashL(H,M)  HashL(H’,M’)=Y] ≤  Pr is over random hash keys L

  15. How to construct VI--AXU hash • Finite-field polynomial • L = EK(0n) is the hashing key • For header H = H0H1H2 andmessage M = M0M1M2hash value S = L7 L5H0 L3H1 LH2 L8  L6M0 L4M1  L2M2 • Use odd for header and even for message • Note the additional leading terms

  16. Produce tag and “Steal” hash Header Message PolynomialHash S Steal the hash “block”and use it as IVfor the CTR mode EK Tag

  17. “Odd” CTR mode  XOR<x> Integer x rep. as bit string S  <1> S  <2> S  <3> EK EK EK Necessary forthe securityof HBS   M0 M1  M2 C0 C1 C2

  18. Table of contents • Background and motivation • Authenticated encryption (AE) • Deterministic AE (DAE) • Previous work: SIV • HBS (Hash Block Stealing) • How it works • Its efficiency and security

  19. Efficiency comparison Header h blocks, message m blocks

  20. Security of HBS mode • Secure under the assumption that the blockcipher E is a SPRP • Security theorem:AdvDAE(HBS) ≤ AdvSPRP(E) + 33q2(1+h+2m)2/2n • q max # of queries • h max length of each header • m max length of each message

  21. Thank you very much.

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