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M/V BARKALD. Self-discharging bulk freight vesselSteel hull; 623 ft in length; 28,912 gross tonsCrew of 30 plus NY Pilot Equipped with 4 deck cranes mounted on starboard side; conveyor belt apparatus mounted on port sideTransiting from Bridgeport anchorage enroute Nova Scotia. S/V ESSENCE. Pleasure yacht / auxiliary sailing vesselFRP hull; 92 ft in length; 95 gross tonsCrew of 3 / no pax ? licensed Master, unlicensed Mate, U.S. licensed CookTransiting from Newport to Greenwich.
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1. M/V BARKALD and S/V ESSENCE Collision
Long Island Sound
September 20, 2006
2. M/V BARKALD Self-discharging bulk freight vessel
Steel hull; 623 ft in length; 28,912 gross tons
Crew of 30 plus NY Pilot
Equipped with 4 deck cranes mounted on starboard side; conveyor belt apparatus mounted on port side
Transiting from Bridgeport anchorage enroute Nova Scotia
6. S/V ESSENCE Pleasure yacht / auxiliary sailing vessel
FRP hull; 92 ft in length; 95 gross tons
Crew of 3 / no pax – licensed Master, unlicensed Mate, U.S. licensed Cook
Transiting from Newport to Greenwich
8. Weather Conditions Clear skies
Visibility +10 miles
North-northwest winds at 10 kts
2 - 4 foot chop
Air temp 70 degrees F
9. M/V BARKALD Bridge Team Pilot: Captain James Mahlmann, NY Pilot for NY Harbor and LIS – licensed for LIS in August ’06 – this was his 3rd solo trip through LIS – had sailed BARKALD in past
OOW – 2nd Mate – licensed Officer – 3 months on board
AB and OS on helm & throttle controls
Master and Cadet on bridge, not on watch
10. S/V ESSENCE Unlicensed Mate on watch / had been ill day before – 2 yrs on board – 1st trip through LIS
Cook sleeping in pilot house
Master asleep below in main salon on port side
VHF, GPS, radar & chart plotter energized
Nav lights energized – running lights, masthead light & stern light
Motor sailing – both engines and mainsail set
11. Lookouts On ESSENCE – Mate on watch
On BARKALD – Pilot, OOW, AB & OS
No dedicated lookout on BARKALD
Pilot stated he requested a bow lookout for LIS transit during Pilot/Master exchange
Master stated Pilot never asked and he never offered
12. Collision Vessels on nearly reciprocal courses
BARKALD making 14 kts
ESSENCE making 8 kts
All nav lights energized and working properly on both vessels
All nav systems and ship systems operating properly on both vessels
Visual contact made by ESSENCE at 10+ miles
Visual contact made by BARKALD at .2 miles
13. Collision Radio comms initiated by ESSENCE
No specific meeting arrangement was made
ESSENCE reported to BARKALD that BARKALD’s port light was out, and made slight turn to starboard
Pilot did not respond to port light comment
ESSENCE affirmed he would stay clear & made hard turn to starboard, crossing BARKALD’s bow
14. Communication Details Comms initiated by ESSENCE 1 minute and 17 seconds prior to collision
“Motor vessel off my port, motor vessel off my port, sailing yacht ESSENCE, come in please, over.”
BARKALD responds after second call
“Yes, this is the motor vessel off your port side.”
ESSENCE responds
“Hi, I’m sailing yacht ESSENCE. Um, I just wanted to let you know, I don’t know if you know this, but, um, your – your port light is not working only the starboard is shining, over.”
BARKALD responds
“Okay, so are you going to stay clear of my vessel?”
ESSENCE responds
“Ya, I’m staying clear of your vessel.”
BARKALD responds
“You’re talking to a large cargo ship, correct?”
ESSENCE responds
“That’s you ahead.”
15. Collision BARKALD maintained course and speed at all times
Pilot was on the starboard bridge wing at the time of the collision; 2nd Mate was in pilot house
ESSENCE crew survived collision
BARKALD deployed life boat after collision
CG Station New Haven launched 25’ rescue boat
CG rescued ESSENCE Mate and Cook
BARKALD lifeboat rescued ESSENCE Master
16. Conclusions of CG InvestigationPrimary Cause The failure of the Mate on the ESSENCE to properly identify the aspect of the lights of the BARKALD and his position in relation to the BARKALD.
He failed to take proper action to avoid collision – Rule 8.
He effected a 70 to 90 degree turn to starboard, crossing the BARKALD bow, resulting in the collision.
17. Conclusions of CG Investigation Contributing Causes The failure of the Mate on the ESSENCE to determine that risk of collision existed with BARKALD – Rule 7
The failure of the bridge team on the BARKALD to make visual contact and/or radar contact with ESSENCE in sufficient time to determine whether risk of collision existed – Rule 7
The failure of the Pilot and 2nd Mate of BARKALD to determine a head-on situation existed with ESSENCE – Rule 14
18. Conclusions of CG Investigation Contributing Causes The failure of the Pilot and 2nd Mate on the BARKALD to maintain a proper lookout – Rule 5
The bridge team on the BARKALD failed to comply with company policy to post a lookout on the bridge as required during the hours of darkness
Improper communications
19. QUESTIONS? Dawn Kallen, Marine InvestigatorDawn.M.Kallen@uscg.mil(203) 468-4506