Post-Election Ukraine: Summary & FOrecast

1. Post-Election Ukraine: Summary & FOrecast ViraNanivska November 20, 2012

2. The unresolved political conflict in Ukraine has provided ideal conditions for radical political reform. The question is, will reforming democratization be the goal of the opposition’s united efforts

3. Thought on the election (1) • The international democratic community has assessed this election as a “step back from democratic standards” • Still, this negative assessment does not mean that the door to dialog with Ukraine’s Government has been closed • It put an end to repeated calls for democratic values to be entrenched in everyday life in Ukraine

4. Thought on the election (2) In terms of movement towards democratization on a scale from totalitarianism in 1992 to democracy, ICPS rates this election “satisfactory.” • Elections are not merely the process of voting and establishing the results of the vote, they are also the response of the participants and voters to the way the results are established. • From this point of vies, this election has demonstrated considerably greater maturity and greater capacity to learn from past mistakes. This was true both of the opposition and of the ruling party. • Party of the Regions is doing its level best to demonstrate its commitment to democratic values. • The opposition does not believe it and is not prepared to concede in return for promises; voters don’t believe it, either, and they support the opposition. • Those in power will have to put considerably more, and more specific, efforts into restraining themselves and not losing their dialog with the EU.

5. Negative lessons from Election 2012 • The government has missed the opportunity to take advantage of massive financial, human and intellectual resources for meaningful, fair competition. The results of a meaningful election campaign would continue to have an impact long after the last ballot was cast. • On some level, the international democratic community is a kind of Supervisory Board that has not managed to clearly and transparently state what its functions are in relation to Ukraine. • The international democratic community has found itself in a dead end in Ukraine. • Instead of penalizing violations, tossing violators out of the game, and continuing the game in the role of trainer or judge, donors are losing their collective cool and threatening to stop the game altogether.

6. Positive lessons from Election 2012 • In addition to political confrontation, political competition has emerged, although the dividing line is still blurry. Confrontation is inevitable and legitimate when it comes to freedom and democracy, competition is when parties compete over how to reach a common goal. • The government has proved a very fast learner and has quickly gotten used to using democratic rhetoric, to public confrontation, and to making concessions in favor of the opposition. Of course, there is widespread suspicion of the depth of these convictions: Do they really want this? The fact is that they have little choice: they must. • Ukrainian society is beginning to really understand what an insurmountable force public consolidation is. • Awareness is growing of the terribly obvious contrast between ever-new legislation and programs and a complete incapacity to carry them through.

7. Forecast (1) • The general trend towards deeper democratization can be seen in the undoubtedly successful progress in democratizing the electoral process and the mindset—before, during and after the election—that was evident in the opposition’s capacity to consolidate and the government’s swift reaction in recognizing the priority of democratic principles. • However, this is not enough for a real shift from antagonistic, uncompromising conflict that precludes any possible cooperation to democratic competition • A new round of disillusionment among voters is inevitable: brilliant public opposition figures will not be able to make good on their promises because of a lack of knowledge, skill and experience in lawmaking and the lack of professional support in the system. Party of the Regions has the competitive advantage here. • The opposition will succeed in reversing certain violations, but not all of them, nor will it see the perpetrators immediately punished. It will also raise the question of legislative changes, although it will fail to include institutional changes—the very instrument that will ensure that the standards of good governance are met.

8. Forecast (2) • The opposition will be very active and more effective than its Orange predecessors, but not sufficiently effective to continue to gain public support. The main reason for the opposition’s inability to lead the democratic reform process is its overly academic approach to reforms. • The breadth of knowledge of individual opposition politicians will not prove an unwavering tenet for all opposition politicians. • Moreover, having a clear, unanimous vision of the specific nature of individual reforms will fail to become a political objective of absolute importance: Why do we need this? What problems will it resolve? What specific steps need to be taken to ensure that the agreed priority reform objectives are actually met? • The opposition will inevitably have a falling out because of its inability to agree to a single candidate for the Presidential election.

9. Recommendations(1) For civil society: • Continue to pressure the government from all sides with the demand that laws be properly upheld. For the opposition: • Joining forces to take decisive, cohesive steps to institute reforms. For those in power: • To undertake work similar to the famed “Project Brunei” under which the budget of the State of Brunei was separated from the budget of the King of Brunei. • To institute European standards for Public Internal Financial Control systems (PIFC) • To undertake the reform of democratization in all spheres of public administration, which means removing the remaining detritus of the stalinist state machine.

10. Recommendations(2) For donors: • To identify the gaps in Ukraine’s democratization. For instance: • There is no all-encompassing system of public internal financial control (PIFC) that cannot be evaded • There is no single system for mandatory consultations with stakeholders and interest groups the rules of which, when violated, inevitably lead to punishment. • To set up new kinds of projects called Informed Advocacy Campaigns (IACs). • To support these new project types with a new kind of support for civil society that develops synergy between activist groups and experts/analysts.