Fikret Berkes: Local-level Management and the Commons Problem A study of Turkish Coastal Fisheries. Argument: Informal “law of the sea” devised by communities of users of coastal resources is relevant to the solution of the national commons problem.
Argument: Informal “law of the sea” devised by communities of users of coastal resources is relevant to the solution of the national commons problem.
Converting International Commons to a national one, and then to a local-level management one may reduce the scope of the problem to a manageable level.
Local arrangements constitutes a kind of informal law of the sea.
(e.g. Many freshwater/coastal marine stocks of fish are not exploited on an open access level when community regulates access to the resource.)
e.g. A) => Open Ocean
e.g. B) => Coastal Fisheries
Case Study (1) : Ayvalik-Haylazli
Case Study (2) : Tasucu Bay
Case Study (3) : Alanga Property
Case Study (4) : Bodrum
Case Study (5) : Bay of Izmir Property
Evidence of effective local management in the first three case studies.
What is the main characteristic that make these first three successful in preventing resource degradation?
Resource in not open access, but fall under author’s definition of common property. This is most obvious in CS (1), right to fish is legally defined. Right to fish is defined in (2) and (3), but definition is fragile, and cannot be formalized.
Argument: Local rules seem to work well when the resource is used by one community of users. (Homogeneity of parties argument).
“You must live in the community to use this resource”
Question: How would living in the community help to create effective local management of coastal fisheries (or any commons problem).
Famous Bumper Sticker in coastal San Diego: “If you don’t surf here, don’t build here.”