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Post-War Electoral Reform and Peace Duration Following Negotiated Settlements

This research examines the impact of electoral reforms on the duration of peace following civil wars. It explores how reforms can reduce the risk of civil war recurrence and ensure stable post-war elections. The findings suggest that implementing electoral reforms signals a commitment to the peace process, making it more difficult for dissidents to renege on the agreement.

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Post-War Electoral Reform and Peace Duration Following Negotiated Settlements

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  1. Post-War Electoral Reform and Peace Duration Following Negotiated Settlements Eric Keels Ph.D. Candidate Department of Political Science University of North Texas erickeels@my.unt.edu

  2. Building Peace after Civil Wars • Negotiated settlements are often unstable • Post-civil war peacebuilding and civil war recurrence • Peacebuilding security objectives • Successful Agreements • Reduce Commitment Problems (Walter 2002; Fortna 2004; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003) • Share Information (Mattes and Savun 2010) • Raise costs for Defection (Mattes and Savun 2009) • Peacebuilding and democratization • Incompatibility between security and democracy objectives

  3. War-to-Democracy Dilemma • Democratization may generate post-civil war instability • Paris (2004), Jarstad and Sisk (2008), Autesserre (2009), Brancati and Snyder (2013) • Democracy objectives may undermine post-war security • Security objectives may undermine post-war democracy • How can post-war governments maintain security while instituting democratic reforms?

  4. False Dichotomy • Post-Civil War Democratization and Security • Joshi et al (2015) • Primary focus on elections rather than democracy more broadly • Democracy Requires: • Broad participation • Open competition • Meaningful translation of votes into national representation

  5. Theory: Electoral Reform and Peace Duration • Revisions to electoral laws act as a signal to opponents that the incumbent government is committed to the peace process • Revisions to electoral laws make it more difficult for dissidents to renege on peace process

  6. Theory: Electoral Laws • Electoral laws have historically been a way for governments to limit political competition • Laws determine who is allowed to participate (vote or run for office) and how votes are translated into representation (electoral systems) • Post-war elections may occur under the old electoral system which limits competition

  7. Theory: Reform as a Signal • Electoral reforms are costly for elites in the incumbent government • Past systems may have ensured access to goods and services • Elites shoulder considerable risk by alienating their supporters • Implementing these reforms act as a costly signal that elites are interested in the peace process • H1: The implementation of electoral reforms called for in peace agreements reduces the risk of civil war recurrence.

  8. Theory: Reform as a Deterrent • Electoral reforms should make the initial post-civil war election more stable • Armed militant groups have an incentive to abandon the peace process after losing (Brancati and Snyder 2013) • Militant groups rely on some civilian support • Electoral reforms make conventional participation more attractive than supporting violent dissent • H2: First post-war elections that occur after electoral reforms are implemented reduce the risk of civil war recurrence as compared to first post-war elections that occur when no electoral reform has taken place.

  9. Research Design • Post-Civil War Comprehensive Peace Agreements from 1989-2010 • UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz 2010) • UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Högbladh 2011) • Peace Accords Matrix (Joshi and Darby 2012) • Dependent Variable: Civil War Recurrence (0,1) • Independent Variable: Electoral Reform • 0=No reform implemented, 1= Reform initiated, 2=Partial implementation, 3=Fully implemented • Independent Variable: First Post-War Election*Electoral Reforms

  10. Research Design cont. • Controls • Agreement Provisions: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. Transitional Power-Sharing and Peacekeeping • Conflict Variables: Conflict Intensity, Conflict Duration, Ethnic Conflict, Incompatibility with Government • Government Controls: Polity II • Economic Controls: Logged GDP Per Capita • Unit of Analysis: Post-war Country Year • Model: Weibull Duration Model • Robustness checks with Cox Proportional Hazard Models and LogLogistic Duration Models • Used Selection Models for robustness

  11. Results: Electoral Reforms after Full Implementation

  12. Impact of Electoral Reforms cont.

  13. Graphical Illustration • Figure I: The Impact of Electoral Reforms on the Survival of Peace Following Negotiated Settlements

  14. Further Robustness Checks • Examine rates of Pro-Government and Antigovernment violence after civil wars • SCAD dataset (Salehyan et al 2011) • Peace agreements in Africa and Latin America • Measured simple inclusion of Electoral Reform in peace agreements • Reduced rates pro-government violence by 76.8% • Reduced rates of antigovernment violence by 81% • Results remain robust when only looking at election violence

  15. Substantive Findings and Conclusion • Post-Civil War Electoral Reforms • Reduce the risk of civil war recurrence • Implementing these costly reforms signals a willingness to abide by the peace process • Ensures that post-war elections are stable • Reduces the ability of dissidents to abandon the peace process by allowing conventional participation • Results remain robust when looking at post-war event data

  16. Thank you for your time • Questions? • Eric Keels Ph.D. Candidate Department of Political Science University of North Texas erickeels@my.unt.edu

  17. Descriptive Statistics

  18. Full Model Coefficients Listed. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

  19. DDR Robustness Check Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

  20. Selection Model (whether reforms are implemented) Robust standard errors in parentheses. Inverse Mills Ratio measures degree of selection effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

  21. Selection Model (Whether reforms are included in peace agreement) Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

  22. SCAD Data Coefficients listed. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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