Conflict resolution and peace settlements

1. Conflict resolution and peace settlements Wk4 W2P

2. Questions • Is conflict resolution/peace-building worth pursuing? • What is it? • What are the assumptions? • Do peace settlements work? • Does the nature of the conflict affect the type of settlement? • Can universal templates be applied? • How do we measure successes and failures?

3. Terminology

4. Peace-building vs. Peace Processes (Selby 2008)

5. Liberal Peace-building (Selby 2008)

6. Treaty of Versailles

7. Signed June 1919 after WW1 with allies and Germany. • President Wilson outlined 14-point plan for lasting peace January 1918, emphasising the importance of transparency, free trade, the right of self determination etc • Point XIV : “A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”

8. Wilson’s points resisted at Paris peace conference preceding the Treaty of Versailles. • Treaty imposed strict conditions on defeated Germany - was forced to pay substantial reparations and lost 13% of its territory. • Financial, structural, and physiological upheaval experienced by Germany as a result of the treaty commonly seen as contributing factors to the rise of the Nazi party.

9. Contemporary Peace Accords • Peace negotiations involve multiple actors including: belligerent groups, national and regional government organizations, third party states, NGO’s, international financial institutions and the UN. • Successfully implementing contemporary peace agreements requires overcoming two challenges: • 1) Material challenges (usually economic and structural) • 2) Challenges related to reconciliation and justice. • Ensuring a sense of ownership at both the national and local level is vital to processes of reconciliation

10. Contemporary peace making as problem solving • “The universalist ethos of peace research becomes operationalized into identification with the interests of the existing international system, that is the interests of those who have power in the international system. So peace research becomes a factor supporting the status quo of the international power structure, providing the decision-makers of the system with knowledge for control, manipulation and integration of the system.” -Schmid

11. The Liberal Peace • Post-Cold War the liberal peace-building model promoted open markets and liberal democratic governance as a means to securing lasting peace. • Critics of liberal peace-building argued the lack of ‘political will’ and dominance of neoliberal conceptions of peace lead to agreements that support dominant elites at national and international levels. • By failing to address underlying causes of conflict, peace agreements break down or generate future tensions.

12. How do we measure? 1.1 (Licklider 1995)

13. How do we measure? 1.2 (Licklider 1995) • Peace arising from negotiated settlements is less likely to last than that which follows military victories

14. How do we measure? 1.3 (Licklider 1995) • Identity and political-economic civil war have a similar pathology

15. How do we measure? 1.4 (Licklider 1995) • Military victories in identity civil wars are more likely to end in genocide……

16. How do we measure? 2.1 (Oberg 2009)

17. How do we measure? 2.2 (Oberg 2009)

18. How do we measure? 2.3 (Oberg 2009) Example finding from Olberg 2009 • 35 cases where no measures were taken, 9 (23%) conflicts resulted in war. • 32 cases where measures were taken, 17 (32%) conflicts resulted in war • Therefore, preventative measures are not effective.

19. How do we measure? 2.4

20. El Salvador – civil war 1980-1992 Between military government and the left-wing FMLN USA supported the dictatorship Notorious human rights abuses during the conflict 75,000-100,000 died 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords signed after UN-led negotiations

21. Achieving Peace • Negotiations between the two sides were sporadic throughout the conflict • Formally suspended by FMLN/FDR in protest of the assassination of the head of the human rights commission • Negotiations recommenced in April 1991, by which time FMLN had captured parts of San Salvador • UN became involved in 1991 to monitor the negotiations, at the request of both sides

22. Chapultepec Peace Accords • 20 months of UN-monitored negotiations • Had been several failed partial settlements during the previous ten years • Comprehensive Peace Accords signed Jan 1992; UN involved in monitoring until 1997 • There was a ceasefire; demob of both military and guerrilla forces; establishment of FMLN as political party; reintegration of combatants into society

23. UN and Peace Accord • Verified implementation of peace accords • Contributed to institution-building • Mediated impartially • Set up Truth Commission – very important considering human rights abuses • Three stages to peace – military; institutional reform; evaluation – UN involved in all • Importantly, UN was invited into the peace process.

24. “Post-Peace” El Salvador • Has been no return to civil war/all out conflict • But, homicide rate double the rest of Latin America • Institution-building efforts failed to overcome pre-war/civil war political legacies • Political roots of violence not successfully tackled by peace process – DDR was not effective • Death squads – vestige of war but now seen as “crime” • Extensive amnesty for those involved in human rights abuses • So, negotiated settlement to the war – but peace has not necessarily led to a reduction in the violence

25. Sierra Leone – 1991-2002 • Initially RUF (backed by Taylor/Liberia) against government • Over 50,000 dead, many more maimed • Seen to typify the “new war” thesis • Involved many external actors – Taylor, Executive Outcomes, UN, UK etc.

26. Attempts at Peace • Several near peace agreements • Civilian govt. elected March 1996, retreating RUF (following EO action) signed Abidjan Peace Accord • Under int. pressure, EO pulled out before accord implemented, fighting started again • May 1997 coup by parts of army – Koroma govt. declared war over • ECOMOG intervened, retook Freetown • Jan 1999 – int. diplomatic pressure restarted negotiations • March 1999 Lomé Peace Accord – gave RUF govt. positions and diamond fields in return for disarmament monitored by UN

27. Result ofLomé Accords • RUF disarmament was slow – by mid-2000, rebels were nearing Freetown again • Despite strengthened UN mission, lacked power to coerce RUF – 500 held hostage, weapons stolen, rearming rebels • UK Operation Palliser – expanded mandate; rebels were repelled from Freetown area • Guinea launched strategic airstrikes • UN resolution demanded Liberia stop support of RUF • These pressures led to RUF signing new peace treaty

28. Post-War • July 2002 – UK forces withdrew, leaving small training force • 2002 – UNAMSIL began gradual withdrawal, all gone by 2005, replaced by UNIOSIL • Truth and Reconciliation Commission – part of Lome accords, to facilitate healing • Special Court for Sierra Leone – from 2002, for those with most repsonsibility • Leaders of RUF indicted for war crimes; leaders of SLA were “reallocated”

29. Current situation

30. Conclusion • Idea of liberal peace-building – depends on what liberal and whose peace • Difficult to judge whether negotiated settlements “work” – even with accurate data, could not tell what would have happened with/without one in specific situation • Is the concept of liberal peace-building flawed or simply current practice? • If we disagree with liberal peace-building, does that mean we would countenance letting a genocidal civil war fight itself out?