Initial findings from the TEC

1. Initial findings from the TEC

2. A word of caution! • Very much initial findings. • Not all the TEC’s 30+ different reports and surveys are yet available, even in draft form. • The main report for the work of the TEC will be the Synthesis Report, due in April 2006 • More information on the Tsunami response is being published every day as we near the anniversary • More detailed study of the individual TEC and other reports, may lead to a different interpretation and emphasis in the Synthesis Report

3. Flows: Management Coordination Evaluation Reports Core Management Group for theTsunami Evaluation Coalitionand thefive joint thematic evaluations Theme: Coordination led by OCHA ALNAP Secretariat Hosts the TEC and manages the writing of the Synthesis Report. TEC staff include: Evaluation Advisor & Coordinator (EAC), Researcher & Deputy Coordinator (RDC), and TEC Administrator Theme: Needs Assessment Led byWHO, SDC&FAO Individual Agency Evaluations (TEC Members) Impact Assessment led by IFRC with the Global Consortium Theme: International Community’s Funding Response led by Danida Theme: Impact on Local & National Capacities Led by UNDP by DMI Initial Findings Report written by the EAC Longer term Studies (from ’06) Theme: LRRD Led by Sida Synthesis Report Written by the Synthesis Primary Author with contributions from the EAC and the RDC. TEC Online Forum(includes the Evaluation Map)

4. Relief was effective • Overall the relief phase went well, through a mixture of: • local assistance in the immediate aftermath • international assistance in the first weeks after the disaster • There seems to have been little or no significant examples of avoidable deaths or suffering.

5. Response scale unprecedented • The disaster was not the biggest but the scale of the generous public response was unprecedented: • in the amount of money raised (over $13 internationally) • in the speed with which money was donated • in which it was channelled (NGOs and RC). • The scale of funding not only exceeded the capacity of the humanitarian system but it has acted as a giant lens, highlighting many of the existing problems in the humanitarian systems.

6. Local capacity is a key capacity • Although local capacity is key to saving lives, this capacity is: • overlooked by the international media. • underestimated and undervalued by the international aid community. • International agencies did not engage sufficiently with local actors, particularly in the vital initial phase.

7. Funding system is deeply flawed • Funding for any one crisis is not related to needs.

8. Funding system limits system capacity • Systems develop for their normal level of demand.

9. Corporatism versus accountability • Corporatism puts the interests of the agency first, accountability puts donors or recipients first • Agencies focus too much on their own institutional needs and not enough on the needs of the affected populations. • Agencies are still not transparent enough or accountable enough to the people they are trying to assist. • In come cases agencies are also not sufficiently accountable to those providing the funding.

10. Recovery is harder than relief • While the relief phase went well, the recovery phase is encountering many problems due to: • the greater complexity of recovery • the demands that such complexity places on the aid agencies. • There are broadly agreed standards for relief, but no such standards for recovery. • Aid recipients happier with relief phase than with recovery.

11. The response changed over time • The nature of the tsunami response changed quite significantly during 2005. • What was true of the initial phase of the tsunami response, for example, competition between agencies for “turf”, was not true of the later phases.