The Political-Bureaucratic Interface (Conclusion):

1. The Political-Bureaucratic Interface (Conclusion): The Relationship in Changing Contemporary Circumstances

2. The Changing Relationship • relationship is in flux • effects of changing contemporary circumstances cuts both ways • different resources each brings to the relationship are shifting in importance • bureaucrats not necessarily more powerful than was previously the case

3. The Changing Relationship • clearest change – official anonymity in decline • more aggressive media • freedom of information • less deferential public

4. The Changing Relationship • will have implications for the operation of ministerial responsibility • bureaucrats may become the focus rather than ministers • bureaucrats may be unwilling to take any initiatives not directly sanctioned by the minister • bureaucrats may more forcefully exert role in policy • if they are answerable for policy, they will want to have strong hand in drafting policy • if they disagree with a policy, they may want to publicly criticize it to protect against being blamed for it • politicization of the bureaucracy

5. The Changing Relationship • tenure of both ministers and senior civil servants changing • unclear that one is necessarily becoming more powerful vis-a-vis the other • important in terms of relationship to The Centre

6. Questions: • Are these changes good or bad? • Should we be trying to reassert the authority of the minister? • Should we dispense with ministerial responsibility in favour of direct administrative accountability? • ...depends on model of DEMOCRACY!

7. Political/Bureaucratic Relationship from a Democratic Perspective • elite perspective • concern is with the public good • who should dominate? • not particularly concerned about power of bureaucratic elite if it operates to further the collective public good • ministerial accountability vs. bureaucratic accountability? • worried that bureaucratic accountability would stifle bureaucrats willingness to vigorously pursue the public good

8. Political/Bureaucratic Relationship from a Democratic Perspective • participatory perspective • concerned with public input (accountability/responsiveness) • who should dominate? • would be concerned about maximizing control of elected officials • Ministers and/or Parliament • ministerial responsibility vs. bureaucratic accountability? • making bureaucratic officials directly accountable to parliament increases transparency of government and opportunities for public involvement/input • debate is on technical issue of whether ministerial responsiblity or bureaucratic accountability best strengthens the role of Parliament

9. Political/Bureaucratic Relationship from a Democratic Perspective • liberal democratic perspective • primary concern is on individual rights/freedoms • who should dominate? • wouldn’t like all-powerful politicians any more than all-powerful bureaucrats • balance – politicians and bureaucrats acting as constraints on each other • ministerial responsibility vs. bureaucratic accountability • bureaucratic accountability the most effective option for putting constraints on the government

10. Organizational Structure... Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces in the Structure of Canadian Government October 30, 2000

11. Dilemmas of Organizational Structure – Centripetal and Centrifugal Tendencies • political control/accountability vs. impartiality • democratic paradox • top-down responsiveness vs. bottom- up responsiveness • bureaucratic paradox • central political accountability vs. diffused political accountability • parliamentary paradox • collective ministerial responsibility – accountability directly to the electorate • individual ministerial responsibility – accountability to parliament

12. The Centrifugal Tendencies • responsiveness (bottom-up) to clientele/public/changing circumstances • diffused political accountability

13. Centrifugal Organizational Responses • line/program/vertical/functional departments • responsiveness • diffused political accountability • departmental sub-units (structural heretics) • regulatory agencies • Crown Corporations • non-departmental agencies • impartiality (vs. political control)

14. The Centrifugal Tendencies – The Political/Bureaucratic Interface • individual ministerial responsibility • direct relationship • Minister and DM • indirect • Minister and Crown Corporation • Minister and regulatory agency

15. The Centripetal Tendencies • top-down responsiveness • centralized political accountability • collective cabinet responsibility

16. Centripetal Organizational Responses • agents of central political control • PM and Prime Minister’s Office • Cabinet • Treasury Board • Minister of Finance

17. Centripetal Organizational Responses • agents of central political control • agents of central bureaucratic control

18. Centripetal Organizational Responses – Central Bureaucratic Controls • Privy Council Office (PCO) • broad strategic policy advice to PM • advice on machinery of government • Department of Finance • advice to cabinet on all matters of economic policy • broad expenditure and revenue guidelines for government (and all departments) • Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) • specific guidelines for expenditures by operating departments • human resource management • expenditure management

19. The Centre – The Political/Bureaucratic Interfaces • PM/Cabinet and PCO • Clerk of the Privy Council • political bureaucratic interface in other central agencies • Minister of Finance and Department of Finance • President of the Treasury Board (cabinet committee) and the Treasury Board Secretariat