The China Factor in the Cold War

1. The China Factor in the Cold War

2. The Common Misconception • All Communists want to destroy the free world and establish world communism. • The USSR and China are Communist-ruled nations. • Therefore, the Soviet Union and Communist China must be united and working to destroy the free world and establish world communism (Schwartz).

3. July 31, 1963 “The indisputable facts prove that the policy pursued by the Soviet Government is one of allying with the forces of war to oppose the forces of peace, allying with imperialism to oppose Socialism, allying with the United States to oppose China, and allying with the reactionaries of all countries to oppose the people of the world” (Shwartz). August 2, 1963 “The leaders of China have shown to the whole world that their policy leads to the aggravation of international tensions, to further stepping up the arms race, to still further expansion of its scope and scale (Shwartz). The Reality

4. Chief Factors in the Development of Sino-Soviet Relations • Common Allegiance to Marxism-Leninism and the dream of a future communist world. • The perception that a public feud between them would harm the image of Communism. • Common hatred and fear of the United States.

5. The Korean War • The war was in the Common interest of both China and the USSR. • The threat pf possible Soviet intervention in the war was a major factor in the decision of the US and the UN to not carry the fight beyond Korea, into China (Shwartz). • Chinese participation in the conflict increased China’s dependence upon the USSR for weapons, munitions, and military aid. • The heavy cost of war contributed to China’s increasing economic dependence on the USSR.

6. Factors in the Deteriorating Sino-Soviet Alliance • China was never invited to the Cominform or the Comecon. • USSR’s handling of the Cuban Missle Crisis, and willingness to sign agreements with America restricting nuclear testing. • Conflict of ideology. • Krushchev’s secret speech attacking Stalin. • Personality clash between Krushchev and Mao Zedong. • Longstanding national rivalries. • Differing levels of economic development. • Rivalry for leadership of the Socialist Camp and the emergence of China as a a major player on the world stage. • USSR’s adoption of a strict stance of neutrality in the border conflicts between communist China and India.

7. Consequences of a Strained Relationship • The USSR reneged on their agreement to supply China with the technical data necessary to build an atomic bomb. • The USSR supported of an unsuccessful challenge to Mao’s leadership by his defense minister (Donaldson). • USSR curtailed its economic assistance and withdrew thousands of specialists. • An end to meetings between the two nations. • Massive buildup of forces among their common border. • “Forever destroyed the Marxist myth that proletariat forces engage in international relations of a new type” (Donaldson). • “Each party clearly regarded the other- and no longer the United States- as its primary security threat” (Donaldson). • Both sides turned to the United States for assistance against the other. • The three major powers began to visibly compete for influence upon emerging states in the developing world. • The decline of rigid bipolarity and the emergence of triangular politics.

8. The Americans are “paper tigers” (Lafeber). Imperialist/ conquering force. China would encourage wars of liberation throughout the newly emerging nations (Donaldson). Feared a communist dominated Far East. Restraining China by the threat of war will not work because of the lower value they attach to human life (Lafeber). Wars of liberation are not possible in areas the United States considers vital to her interests (Lafeber). China and America

9. The Vietnam War • President Johnson entered Vietnam to counter the “deepening shadow of communist China” (Lafeber), and because “the contest in Vietnam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes” (Lafeber). • Johnson feared along war would leave Vietnam more open to Chinese pressure, however, it was the Soviets that soon became the most important source of support and aid for the Vietnamese Communists (Lafeber). • This greatly angered China. • After Nixon came to power he embarked on a policy of carpet bombing North Vietnam so “the Russians and Chinese would understand they were dealing with a madman and so better force North Vietnam into a settlement before the world was consumed in a larger war” (Lafeber). • After Vietnam invaded Cambodia to topple their pro-Chinese government, China responded by invading Vietnam to punish them for their aggression. • While Vietnam was indeed an ally of the USSR, she was not willing to risk war with China to come to the aid of an ally. • By this time, China had become a thermonuclear power.

10. Deténte • Came about, in part, as a result of the failure of the traditional US policies of containment, as demonstrated through the Vietnam War. • Also in the hopes that the USSR would pressure North Vietnam to make peace. • Détente led to the realization that one Communist power could be played against another and that led to Nixon’s belief that an era of confrontation was ending, and an era of negotiation beginning (Lafeber). • Relations between the USA and China began to improve as both Nixon and Mao used the other to check Soviet Power. In 1971 Nixon became the first president to visit China. • This put Nixon in the position to Visit Moscow. • Both visits were great successes and helped ease the tensions amongst the Great Powers. • “Brezhnev designed his détente policy in part to ensure that it would remain in Nixon’s interests to deal with him instead of moving closer to Mao” (Lafeber).

11. Steps Towards the Normalization of Relations Between USSR and China • Elimination of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. • Elimination of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. • Demilitarization of the common border. • Steps towards these goals led to the first Sino-Soviet summit in 2O years, in May 1989.

13. Bibliography Donaldson, Robert H., and Joseph L. Nogee. The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005. Lafeber, Walter. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006. Boston: McGraw Hill, 2008. Schwartz, Harry. Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1964. Zagoria, Donald S. The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962.