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1. Click to edit Master title style Click to edit Master subtitle style PBC Lessons LearnedA Contractor’s Perspective June 29, 2005 Tushar Talele ARCADIS GFPR Program Manager

2. Lessons Learned – Some Impressions • Not everyone within the DOD or within key stakeholder organizations are comfortable with / supportive of a GFPR – PBC approach • DoD’s interest in PBC has prompted “interesting” responses from the marketplace: • Qualified staff are the brunt of recruiting frenzy (both in commercial and federal sectors) • Substantial amount of “mis-information” being spread to raise unnecessary concerns • Insurance markets (liability transfer indemnification) limited due to growing demand

3. Lessons Learned – Varying Perspectives • Varying levels of understanding in client organizations which limit full value of GFPR – PBC offerings. Examples: • Decision Documents (lack of standardized approach is adding time in some cases) • What is the review process (who reviews and what are their roles) – Said differently, who has what authority to say what? • How long should it take? • Milestone Payments (who defines performance / decides acceptability)? • Varying groups with highly different backgrounds (reference frames) called upon to fill role of COR • When is a regulator-issued NFA NOT a contractually acceptable NFA? • Are milestones realized upon document submissions or approvals? (who must approve?) • Do interim remedies count as remedy implementation if approved by regulators and likely to serve as final remediation approach?

4. Regulator Considerations • Sites selected for PBC generally not discussed with regulatory agencies in advance to assess agencies assessment of priority for action • Limited, if any, involvement in PBC proposal evaluations / awards (no opportunity to temper expectations or impact flawed approaches) • Changes in key personnel (eg. concerns over perception of dramatically increased work-load) will impact aggressive schedules for RC and / or RIP • Regulatory community (often understaffed) not “thrilled” with concept of DESMOA funding as an opportunity for them to enhance capabilities • True partnering concept not routinely or effectively employed between the DOD and regulatory community • Process efficiencies need to be established - meet both regulatory needs but also enhance ability to process information

5. A Shift in Paradigm • PBC approach can be a tough paradigm shift for the existing team working on an installation • This is especially true for DoD personnel who may not have sufficient guidance to know how much latitude they can and should extend to contractors • Regulators wary as to motives for change in contracting approach “Is DoD looking to shirk their responsibilities and abandon sites to contractors and regulators?” • Transition from previous contractors can be tenuous at best • Delays in the timely completion of work by the previous contractor (no incentive to accelerate / facilitate transition)

6. Decision Documents et al • Land Use Controls • Out of step with private sector, but getting better… • Delays closure, especially at RCRA sites as document reviewers struggle with issues that have been open and “debated” amongst other stakeholders for extended periods of time • Review of Decision Documents • Review comments not always consistent with intent of PBC contract • What $$$ to show as cost for remedy? • Delayed reviews impact RC and/or RIP date

7. Insurance Considerations • Is meaningful and value-added insurance really available to Small Businesses attempting to take lead PBC responsibilities at some sites? • Why require insurance limits in the amount of 1X bid price? (Where is the value in this “default” requirement?) • Why require insurance and bonding? • Available limits and insurance protection durations dramatically reduced by withdrawal of re-insurers and questions over the viability of long-term insurance policies • Policy terms and conditions are an excellent indicator of the strength of a contractors proposal • Higher premiums and greater attachment points (large buffers) are indicative of greater risks and likely flaws in technical approaches and contingency measures

8. The Challenge of Measuring Progress and Value • How is PBC – GFPR progress best measured? • Activities complete (sites closed) vs. milestones achieved (may not always be consistent) • How will the DoD define value going forward? • Is it best value OR technically acceptable – low cost? • If best value  how does one objectively evaluate and compare a broad spectrum of value offerings (with potentially highly variable components)? • If technically acceptable  low cost; how does one best establish minimum technically acceptable performance thresholds?

9. Other Issues of Interest • Potential changes in incremental funding constraints – what kind of challenge might such changes pose? • Additional costs likely to be born by the contracting entitities response to: • Decentralization of USACE contracting vehicles designed to accommodate PBC-GFPR projects (more IDIQ proposal submission required) • USACE seemingly looking to include PBC contracting terms in broader IDIQ solicitations – for contracts that would address a broader suite of needs • The temptation to compromise on the technical adequacy of a proposal because it may offer a dramatic price reduction.